Understanding retirement in the UK: an empirical analysis. by Smith, S.L.
2 8 0 9 6 6 2 5 3 7
REFERENCE ONLY
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON THESIS
Degree  Year 7. CTCPf-  Name of Author  L o\A \i<
COPYRIGHT
This is a thesis accepted for a Higher Degree of the University of London.  It is an 
unpublished  typescript  and  the  copyright  is  held  by  the  author.  All  persons 
consulting this thesis must read and abide by the Copyright Declaration below.
COPYRIGHT DECLARATION
I  recognise  that the  copyright of the  above-described  thesis  rests with  the  author 
and that no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without 
the prior written consent of the author.
LOANS
Theses  may  not  be  lent to  individuals,  but the  Senate  House  Library  may lend  a 
copy to approved libraries within the United Kingdom, for consultation solely on the 
premises  of those  libraries.  Application  should  be  made  to:  Inter-Library  Loans,
Senate House Library, Senate House, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HU.
REPRODUCTION
University  of  London  theses  may  not  be  reproduced  without  explicit  written 
permission from the Senate House Library.  Enquiries should  be addressed  to the 
Theses Section of the Library.  Regulations concerning reproduction vary according 
to the date of acceptance of the thesis and are listed below as guidelines.
A.  Before 1962.  Permission granted  only upon  the  prior written consent of the
author. (The Senate House Library will provide addresses where possible).
B.  1962-1974.  In  many cases the author has  agreed to  permit copying  upon
completion of a Copyright Declaration.
C.  1975-1988.  Most  theses  may  be  copied  upon  completion  of a  Copyright
Declaration.
D.  1989 onwards.  Most theses may be copied.
This thesis comes within category D.
[y   This copy has been deposited in the Library of  ( A  C  ^ —
This copy has been deposited in the Senate House Library, 
Senate House, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HU.Understanding retirement in the UK: 
An empirical analysis
Sarah Louise Smith
Thesis  submitted for the degree  of Doctor of Philosophy at University College, 
LondonUMI Number: U592436
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted.  Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U592436
Published by ProQuest LLC 2013.  Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved.  This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml  48106-1346Statement of conjoint work
Three (out of six)  chapters  of my thesis represent joint work with different co­
authors.  They are:
Chapter 2 What can we leam from retirement expectations data? Joint work with 
Professor  Richard  Disney  (University  of  Nottingham  and  Institute  for  Fiscal 
Studies).  Professor Disney and I contributed equally.
Chapter  4  Pension  Incentives  and  the  timing  of  retirement.  Joint  work  with 
Professor Richard Blundell and Professor Costas Meghir (University College  of 
London and Institute for Fiscal  Studies).  Professor Blundell,  Professor Meghir 
and I contributed equally.
Chapter 6 The Labour supply effect of the abolition of the earnings rule for older 
workers.  Joint work  with  Professor Richard  Disney  (University  of Nottingham 
and Institute for Fiscal Studies).  Professor Disney and I contributed equally.
Signed........................................(Sarah Smith)  Date................................
(signature of student)
Signed..........................................(Professor Richard Blundell)  Date....................
(signature of principal supervisor)
2Acknowledgements
I am hugely indebted to the people I have been lucky enough to work with on 
some of these papers -  James Banks, Richard Blundell, Richard Disney and 
Costas Meghir.  I learned an enormous amount from each of them, as well as from 
other former colleagues at the Institute for Fiscal Studies.  I owe a particularly 
large debt of gratitude to Richard for providing support and encouragement along 
the fairly long and tortuous path to this thesis.
And last, but by no means least, thanks to Paul, who has always been there.
3Abstract
Like most OECD  countries,  the  UK has  experienced a long-term trend towards 
earlier  letirement,  beginning  in  the  1970s,  a  trend  that  has  only  recently  been 
reversed.  The aim of this thesis is to shed light on these trends.
Chapters  1   -   3  consider  the  nature  of retirement.  Economic  models  typically 
assume  that  retirement  is  voluntary,  discrete  and  irreversible,  and  synonymous 
with drawing a pension, and this has been the dominant pattern for men in the UK. 
But there is a large minority, typically those with low wealth, for whom the path 
to  retirement  is  through  unemployment  or  long-term  sickness  and  for  whom 
unemployment  and  disability  benefits  provide  alternative  early  retirement 
vehicles.  Analysis  of retirement expectations  show that shocks to health and to 
marital  status  cause retirement plans  and outcomes  to diverge.  The distinction 
between “voluntary” and “involuntary” retirements is important in understanding 
the well-documented fall in spending that occurs after retirement (the “retirement - 
consumption  puzzle”).  Spending  falls  significantly  only  when  retirement  is 
involuntary, a finding that is consistent with a negative wealth shock arising from 
involuntary early retirement lying behind the puzzle.
Chapters 4 -6  explore the responsiveness of the labour supply of older workers to 
incentives in state and private pensions.  Pens ion wealth and accrual are shown to 
have significant effects on retirement, at least for the state pension and for defined 
benefit occupational pensions.  However,  early evidence suggests that wealth in 
defined  contribution  schemes  does  not  have  the  expected  positive  effect  on 
retirement,  a finding that is  consistent with their greater flexibility.  The  labour 
supply of older workers is also shown to be affected by earnings tests; the removal 
of such a test in the UK is estimated to increase average weekly  hours by three - 
four hours for men and two hours for women.
4Table of contents
Overview......................................................................................................................8
Chapter 1:  Retirement in the UK......................................................................13
1.1  Trends in labour market participation.......................................................13
1.2  What do we mean by retirement?............................................................. 20
1.3  Pensions and retirement............................................................................36
1.4  Conclusions................................................................................................44
Annex 1: Data from the British Household Panel Surwy..................................46
Chapter 2:  What can we learn from expectations data?...............................48
2.1  Retirement expectations............................................................................51
2.2  Retirement Survey data.............................................................................54
2.3  Interpreting point expectations and “don’t knows”.................................62
2.4  Comparing reported expectations and outcomes....................................67
2.5  Conclusions................................................................................................71
Annex 2: Further regression results..................................................................... 73
5Chapter 3:  Involuntary retirement and the retirement-consumption puzzle
76
3.1  Introduction................................................................................................77
3.2  The puzzle and possible  resolutions...........................................................79
3.3  The data.......................................................................................................83
3.3  Estimation.................................................................................................. 94
3.4  Regression results.......................................................................................98
3.5  Conclusions...............................................................................................106
Chapter 4:  Pension incentives and early retirement....................................109
4.1  Modeling retirement decisions................................................................ Ill
4.2  Constructing pension incentive measures..............................................118
4.3  Estimating the effect of pension incentives on retirement....................137
4.4  Conclusions...............................................................................................149
Annex 4: Further regression results....................................................................151
Chapter 5:  What  do  defined  contribution  pensions  mean  for  retirement?
154
5.1.  Retirement  incentives in DB and DC schemes.................................... 157
5.2  DB and DC schemes in the ELSA data..................................................1675.3  Regression analysis.................................................................................175
5.4  Conclusions..............................................................................................187
Annex 5: Further regression results....................................................................189
Chapter 6:  Did abolishing the earnings rule affect  employment?...............190
6.1  Background..............................................................................................192
6.2  Modelling retirement with the UK earnings test...................................200
6.3  Empirical analysis...................................................................................205
6.4  Conclusions.............................................................................................217
References................................................................................................................219
7Overview
Over the past few decades, while life expectancy has increased, there has been a 
trend  in  the  UK,  as  in  other  OECD  countries,  towards  earlier retirement.  As 
shown in the table below, the average retirement age fell from 65 to 61  between 
the cohorts bom  1900 and  1935.  Combined with longer life expectancy and an 
increased time  spent in education,  this  lead to a  10 percentage point fall  in the 
proportion of life spent working.  Among the explanations for falling activity rates 
are the disincentive effects created by social security and pension systems and the 
relative disadvantage of older workers during a period of industrial re-structuring 
and technological change, as well as rising levels of wealth which have afforded 
individuals a longer period in retirement.
Education, retirement and life expectancy by cohort in the UK
Cohort bom in
Mean age left 
school
Median 
retirement age
Life expectancy 
if reach age 55
Proportion of 
life spent in 
labour market
1900 14.1 65 73.5 0.69
1910 14.6 65 74.0 0.68
1920 14.8 63 74.5 0.65
1930 15.2 62 75.5 0.62
1935 15.9 61 76.7 0.59
Source:  Banks and Smith (2006)
Age left school and retirement age calculated using data from the Family Expenditure  Survey.
Data on life-expectancy from ONS Population Trends (2004).
Note:  Cohorts  are five-year  cohorts  beginning  with  listed  year  (so  1900  refers  to  the  cohort
1900-1904 etc.)
This trend has only very recently been reversed since the late  1990s.  The almostcontinuous  rise  in  employment  since  1992,  affecting  older workers  as  well  as 
younger,  is  likely  to  be  one  key  contributory  factor.  The  tightening  of early 
retirement windows  in  defined benefit  occupational pensions  and,  possibly,  the 
transition  from  defined  benefit  pensions  to  defined  contribution  pensions,  is 
another.
This  thesis  sheds  light  on  these  trends  by  presenting  empirical  analysis  of  a 
number of issues relating to retirement in the UK.  Chapters  1   -  3  are primarily 
concerned with the nature and consequences  of retirement.  Chapters 4  -  6 are 
primarily concerned with the responsiveness of the labour supply of older workers 
to incentives in state and private pension schemes.
Chapter  1  presents  key  stylized  facts  on  retirement  in  the  UK.  After 
documenting the main trends in retirement over the past thirty years, it looks at the 
main pathways into retirement.  The dominant pattern for men is one of voluntary, 
early retirement (ie before the state pension age) onto a private pension straight 
from (full-time) employment.  However, for those with id occupational pension, 
unemployment  benefits,  means-tested  income  support  and,  more  commonly, 
disability benefits provide alternative early retirement vehicles.  For those with 
low  levels  of qualifications,  levels  of non-work  are  high,  even  among  those  in 
their  40s  and  50s,  and  ‘retirement’  is  typically  via  another  non-working state 
(unemployment or long-term illness/ disability).
Chapter 2 analyzes data on retirement expectations in the UK Retirement Survey. 
At first sight, the data suggest that, even among a cohort close to retirement, there 
is  little  evidence  of planning  for  retirement.  Unlike  the  distribution  of actual
9retirement  ages,  the  distribution  of  expected  retirement  ages  is  very  heavily 
dominated by the state pension ages (65 for men and 60 for women), while a high 
proportion  say that  they  don’t know when they  expect to  retire.  Nevertheless, 
expected ages of retirement do vary plausibly in line with covariates,  implying 
that  individuals  do  not  simply  report  random  numbers.  Moreover,  reported 
expectations  appear  to  have  additional  predictive  power  for  actual  retirement 
behaviour,  above  their  correlation  with  individuals’  observable  characteristics. 
On  average,  though,  men  retire  earlier  than  expected.  There  is  evidence  that 
shocks to health and to marital status may cause retirement plans and outcomes to 
diverge.
Chapter  3 examines  whether  differences  in  the  nature  of retirement  -  and in 
particular  the  distinction  between  voluntary  and  involuntary  retirement  (ie 
retirement that is earlier than expected or desired) -  might be able to explain the 
well-documented  fall  in  spending  that  occurs  after  retirement  (the  “retirement- 
consumption puzzle”).  Using data from the British Household Panel  Survey,  it 
finds  that  food  spending  falls  significantly  only  when  retirement  is  involuntary 
and  not  when  retirement  is  voluntary.  This  finding  is  robust  to  alternative 
definitions  of  retirement  and  cannot  be  explained  in  terms  of  differences  in 
pension status and levels of education between voluntary and involuntary retirees. 
This finding is consistent with the fall in spending at retirement being caused by a 
negative wealth shock arising from involuntary early retirement.
Chapter  4  provides  an  empirical  evaluation  of  the  economic  incentives  for 
retirement  underlying  the  UK  pension  system.  The  probability  of retirement 
between the two waves of the Retirement Survey (1988/9- 1994) is modeled as a
10function  of (imputed)  pension  wealth  and  accrual  in  state  and  defined  benefit 
occupational pension schemes  and other demographic control variables.  Within 
the  cohort  bom  1919-33,  there  is  sufficient  variation  in  pension  wealth  and 
pension accrual arising from the maturing of the State Earnings Related Pension 
system  and  diversity  in  employer-provided  occupational  pensions  to  allow 
estimation of pension incentive effects.  The results point to significant effects of 
pension  wealth  and  accrual  on  retirement.  In  particular,  they  confirm  that 
(defined benefit) occupational pension incentives encourage early retirement.
Chapter 5 extends the analysis of the effects of pension incentives on the timing 
of retirement to examine the likely consequences of the shift from defined benefit 
to defined contribution schemes.  It simulates pension wealth and accrual  for a 
representative individual in typical DB  and DC  schemes  and predicts retirement 
probabilities  at  different  ages.  While  DB  schemes  typically  concentrate 
retirement  around  normal  or  early  retirement  ages,  DC  schemes  are  associated 
with  a  smoother  spread  of retirements.  Using  recent  data  from  the  English 
Longitudinal  Study  of  Ageing,  it  models  the  probability  of  retirement  as  a 
function of DC, DB  and state wealth and accrual.  While DB  and state pension 
wealth  have  the  expected  positive  (and  significant)  effect  cn the probability of 
retirement, the results suggest no effect of DC pension wealth, which is consistent 
with their greater flexibility.  In general, the results suggest that DC pensions are 
associated with later retirements.
Chapter 6 assesses  the effect of the abolition of the UK state pension earnings 
test on the  employment of older workers.  A priori, the  effect of the reform is 
ambiguous. People who are currently earning at or near the earnings test threshold
11are likely to have an incentive  Id work more. But a second group of people will 
experience a positive income effect as a result of abolishing the earnings test and 
this second group may actually reduce their hours and earnings.  Estimates using a 
differences-in-differences approach  suggest that the reform had a positive effect 
on employment, increasing average hours worked by men and women by around 3 
-  4 hours per week and 2 hours per week respectively.
12Chapter 1:  Retirement in the UK
This chapter sets the scene for the rest of the thesis by presenting some descriptive 
information on retirement and pensions in the UK.  It documents the main trends 
in labour market participation among older workers over the past thirty years and 
the nature of individual pathways into retirement and describes the main features 
of the UK pension system.
1.1  Trends in labour market participation
Over  the  past  few  decades,  while  life  expectancy  has  increased  across  OECD 
countries  there  has  been  a near-universal  trend  among  men  to  leave  the  labour 
market at younger ages (see Blondal and Scarpetta, 1999).
Figure  1.1  plots employment rates  for men in the UK, by age,  over a thirty-five 
year period from  1968 -  2002.1   It shows clearly the fall in employment2 among 
older workers that occurred over this period, particularly among those aged 55 and
1   All figures in this section are based on data from the Family Expenditure Survey 1968-2002.
2  Including  self-employment.  Within  those  employed,  there  has  also  been  a  shift  from 
employment to self-employment.above.3   Much  of the  decline  in  employment  among  older  workers  occurred 
during  the  early  1980s,  a period  of recession  in  the  UK,  suggesting  that  older 
workers  may have been hit particularly hard by the  industrial restructuring that 
occurred.  Banks and Casanova (2004), for example,  show that there has been a 
decline in the relative real wages of older workers (particularly the low-skilled) in 
the UK.  In practice, a combination of low wage opportunities, together with  the 
availability of early retirement windows  in occupational pensions  and long-term 
disability benefits (invalidity benefit and then incapacity benefit) is likely to have 
encouraged  permanent  labour  market  exit  among  older  workers  (see  Disney, 
1999).  Only in very recent years,  after a sustained period of economic growth, 
has the fall in employment begun to be reversed (see Disney and Hawkes, 2003).
3 The state pension ages for men and women are 65 and 60 respectively.  The state pension age for 
women will gradually be increased to 65  between 2010 and 2020.  The government has recently 
proposed raising state pension ages for both men and women to 68 by 2050.
14Figure 1.1 
Employment rates among men, by age
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Figure 1.2
Employment rates among women, by age
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15For  women,  the  story  is  quite  different,  as  shown  in  Figure  1.2.  The  fall  in 
employment among older women has been smaller, and limited to those above the 
state  pension  age  (aged  60  plus).  However,  this  contrasts  with  a  rise  in 
employment rates among younger women over the same period.
For men, the past thirty years have seen a dramatic change in the timing of exit 
from  employment.  This  can  be  seen  clearly  in  Figure  1.3,  which  shows  the 
proportion  in  employment  by  age,  for  selected  date  of birth  cohorts.  Of the 
earliest cohort (bom  1905-09), nearly three-quarters stayed in work until the state 
pension age, around 40% left work at age 65 and more than one-third worked past 
this  age.  Across  following  cohorts,  the  trends  have  been  towards  earlier 
employment exit,  more dispersed employment exit,  and far fewer men in work 
after the state pension age.4  Of the cohort bom 1935-39, one-quarter had already 
left work by age 55 and half by age 60; fewer than 20% left at the state pension 
and  only  around  15%  worked  after  age  65.  For  women,  by  comparison,  the 
changes  in patterns  of labour  market  exit  across  cohorts  have  been  much  less 
dramatic, as shown in Figure 1.4.
4  Some  of the  explanation  for  this  might  be  increased  survival,  although  the  increase  in  life 
expectancy,  conditional  on  surviving  to  age  55,  has  been  relatively  modest  from  73.5  for  the 
cohort bom 1900-04 to 76.7 for the cohort bom 1935-39.
16Figure 1.3
Proportion of men in employment, by date of birth cohort
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Figure 1.4
Proportion of women in employment, by date of birth cohort
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17To  begin  to  understand  what  lies  behind  the  trend  towards  earlier  and  more 
dispersed  exit  from  employment,  it  is  interesting  to  look  at  individuals’  self- 
reported employment state when they are not working.  Figures  1.5 -  1.7 plot, for 
different date of birth cohorts,5  the proportion who report that they are “retired”, 
“unemployed” (ie actively seeking work) and “long-term sick or disabled”.  The 
figures  show  that,  for  most  men,  leaving  work  after  age  55  typically  means 
leaving the labour market  -  only a minority of those not in employment beyond 
this age are seeking work.  There has been a clear trend across successive cohorts 
towards  earlier retirement,  according  to  a  self-reported  definition.  Among  the 
1935-39 cohort, more than 40% consider they are retired before the state pension 
age, compared to around  10% in the  1910-14 cohort.  But there has also been an 
increase in the proportion reporting that they are sick.  This has been reflected in a 
four-fold increase in the number of people claiming disability benefits  over the 
same period,  although whether this represents  a genuine increase  in disability is 
less clear.
5 This information is only available from  1972, which is why the first cohort chosen is bom  1910- 
14.
18Figure 1.5
Proportion of men reporting they are retired, by date of birth cohort
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Figure 1.6
Proportion of men reporting they are unemployed, by date of birth cohort
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19Figure 1.7
Proportion of men reporting they are sick, by date of birth cohort
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As is explored in more detail in the next section, what emerges from the analysis 
of labour market exits are two distinct groups of early retirees -  who can broadly 
be  categorized  by  their  levels  of education  (which  may  in  turn  reflect  lifetime 
wealth,  something  that  cannot  be  easily  measured  in  the  FES).  In  one  group, 
typically  “high  education”  individuals  retire  early,  drawing  an  income  from  an 
occupational pension before age 65. The other group of typically “low education” 
individuals are even more likely to be not working in their 50s,  yet do not define 
themselves  as  retired  and  are  supported  by  income  support,  or  more  usually, 
disability benefits.
1.2  What do we mean by retirement?
Any  discussion  of retirement  is  complicated  by  the  problem  of defining  when
20retirement occurs, and the prior problem of defining what retirement is.  Broadly, 
the concept of retirement may embody a number of different elements, to differing 
degrees:6
•  complete and permanent withdrawal from employment;
•  receipt of income from a state or private pension; and
•  a state of mind, i.e. the individual perceives themselves to be retired.
A purely subjective definition of retirement has the potential drawback that being 
retired  may  mean  different  things  to  different  people  and  more  importantly  to 
different  groups  of  the  population.  But,  understanding  an  individual’s 
expectations  about  their  current  and  future  employment  status  is  likely  to  be 
important for understanding their life-cycle decisions, i.e. their current and future 
consumption  and  savings  behaviour.  From  the  perspective  of  the  Life  Cycle 
Model of consumption and leisure,  individuals’  expectations  about their future 
labour  market  participation  and  future  income  will  affect  their  current 
consumption behaviour, and individuals’ preferences for future consumption will 
affect their desired future labour market participation.  The next chapter explores 
retirement expectations in more detail.
6 For further discussion of what retirement is,  see Fields and Mitchell (1984), Lazear (1986) and 
Lumsdaine and Mitchell (1999)
21Economic models of retirement -  such as that underlying the analysis of the effect 
of pension incentives in chapters 4 and  5 -  often make a number of simplifying
n
assumptions about the nature of retirement:
•  Retirement  is  usually  synonymous  with  drawing  a  pension.  In  some
countries,  the presence of an earnings test prevents people from working
and drawing a state pension, but this was abolished in the UK in 1989 (see 
chapter 6).  However, until recently, people in the UK have not been able 
to receive an occupational defined benefit pension from an employer they 
are still working for.
•  Retirement  is  usually  a  sudden,  rather  than  a  gradual,  process  and
encompasses the decision whether to work at all, rather than the decision
of how many hours to work.
•  Retirement is usually an absorbing (ie permanent) state.
•  Retirement is usually an individual decision rather than one made jointly 
with other household members.
•  Retirement  is  usually  a  voluntary  choice,  albeit  made  subject  to 
opportunities  and  constraints  presented  by  employers  and  pension
7  Of course,  there  are  exceptions,  including  Rust  and  Phelan  (1997)  who  model  the labour force 
participation separately from the decision to draw a pension, Berkovec and Stem (1991) who allow 
retirement  to  be  gradual  and  Gustman  and  Steinmeier  (2004)  who  model  joint  retirement 
decisions.  See Lumsdaine and Mitchell (1999) for a review.
22arrangements, and individuals are typically assumed to engage in forward- 
looking planning in determining the optimal time at which to retire.
This section uses data from the British Household Panel Survey8 to examine the 
extent to which the reality of retirement conforms to the stylized version of the 
models; the next chapter uses data on retirement expectations to examine in more 
detail  the  extent  to  which  individuals  appear  to  engage  in  forward-looking 
retirement planning.  Mainly, the analysis focuses on male retirement behaviour. 
This is not because female retirement is not an important and interesting subject, 
but typically looser labour market attachment and the  fact that many women do 
not have  a pension  in their own right,  make  it potentially more  complicated to 
analyse female retirement, and the effect of financial incentives on the retirement 
decision.
In practice,  there  are  multiple  pathways  to  retirement.  Some  people  consider 
themselves  to  be  retired,  but  are  still working,  others  have  left work  never to 
return,  but  do  not  yet  consider themselves  retired;  some  people  are  drawing  a 
pension but still working, while others are retired, but yet to draw a pension.  Yet, 
in spite of this diversity, it is possible to see a dominant pattern of retirement that 
does indeed to correspond to the stylized version in the economic models.  For the 
majority of men, the three events do coincide -  the majority of older men leaving 
work report that they are retired and start drawing a pension, which, if they retire 
before  age  65,  will  be  an  occupational  pension  from  their  former  employer.
Q
further details are given in the Annex 1.
23However, there is also a sizeable minority of typically less-qualified men who are 
even  more  likely  to  be  not  working  in  their  50s,  yet  typically  do  not  define 
themselves as retired on exit from the labour market and are supported by income 
support,  or more usually,  disability benefits.  Within both groups, the evidence 
suggests that leaving work is largely a discrete rather than a gradual process and, 
for  the  overwhelming  majority,  an  irreversible  one.  The  evidence  does  not 
suggest that a large number of people have been forced to retire early through 
mandatory early retirement ages (only abolished in the UK in October 2006).  But, 
health factors do appear to play a role in causing “involuntary” early retirements.
When do people retire?
Whichever  definition  of retirement  is  used  -  exit  from  employment,  drawing  a 
pension,  or  self-assessed retirement  status  -   the  majority  of men,  and  many 
women, do it before the state pension age of 65 for men and 60 for women (Table 
1.1).  These are the most common single retirement ages for men and women, but 
66%  of men  and  55%  of women  stop  working  before  this  age,  62%  of men 
consider themselves  to  be  retired before  they  reach  65,  and  65%  of men  have 
started drawing a pension by then.
24Table 1.1 
Average retirement ages
Men Women
Mode (% Mode (%
Median  retiring at that Median  retiring at that
age) age)
Age of retirement 62 65 (20.3%) 60 60(16.9%)
Age of stopping work 61 65 (13.0%) 58 60(10.2%)
Age of drawing pension 61 65 (27.5%) 60 60 (43.3%)
Source: British Household Panel Survey,  1991-2003
For just  over  half of men  and  one-third  of women,  the  three  retirement  ages 
coincide: The age at which they stop working is the same as the age at which they 
start  drawing  a  pension  and  the  age  at  which  they  consider  themselves  to  be 
retired.  In  other  cases,  people  stop  working  before  they  retire,  moving  into 
retirement via another non-working state; they also retire before they start to draw 
a pension, using other early retirement vehicles, particularly disability benefits.
Is retirement synonymous with labour market exit?
While the majority of men retire  from employment,  around 40%  of men move 
into  self-assessed  retirement  from  another  non-working  state,  usually 
unemployment  or  long-term  sick/disabled.  This  is  particularly  the  case  among 
those with low levels of qualifications, as shown in Figure  1.8 below.  For those 
with higher qualifications (33% of the sample), leaving employment is much more 
likely  to  be  synonymous  with  self-assessed  retirement.  For  those  with  no 
qualifications (34% of the sample), levels of non-employment are quite high, even
25among people in their 40s.  But early retirement is less usual.  Instead,  those in 
this group who leave employment are more likely to say that they are unemployed 
or long-term sick/ disabled.  For those with no qualifications, there is a far greater 
transition to self-assessed retirement at age 65. 9
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Is retirement synonymous with drawing a pension?
The majority of men start to draw a pension when they leave work.  In the UK, 
this is typically a private pension -  only 7% of men stop working at 65 and draw 
only a state pension at this age.  But,  around  one-quarter of men  stop  working
9  There is  a third group with school  qualifications whose  behaviour is  intermediate between the 
higher and lower education groups.
26before  they  start  to  draw  a  state  or  private  pension.  Instead,  unemployment 
benefits, income support or, more commonly, disability benefits, form alternative 
early retirement vehicles.  Again, there are interesting differences by education -  
the  better  qualified  are  much  more  likely  to  draw  on  a  private  pension  if they 
retire  before  65,  while  those  with  no  qualifications  are  more  likely  to  rely  on 
disability benefits.  Although around two-thirds of those with no qualifications do 
eventually  receive  some  income  from  a  private  pension,  they  are  much  more 
likely than those with higher qualifications to start drawing it at age 65; the better- 
educated are more likely to start drawing their pension earlier (see Table 1.2).
Table 1.2
Proportion of men receiving different income sources, by education (non­
working only)
Unemployment benefit/  Disability benefits  Private pension income 
Income support
Qualifications  Qualifications  Qualifications
Age  Higher  None  Higher  None  Higher  None
50-54 0.20 0.40 0.49 0.81 0.54 0.17
55-59 0.09 0.27 0.33 0.72 0.72 0.32
60-64 0.07 0.27 0.28 0.61 0.84 0.51
65-69 0.02 0.10 0.10 0.27 0.90 0.67
Note: Higher qualifications include degree, teaching, nursing or other higher qualification
Source: British Household Panel Survey,  1991-2003 
Is retirement gradual?
The evidence suggests that,  for the great majority of people, retirement is  not a 
gradual process of labour market withdrawal, but instead involves a fairly abrupt 
transition from full-time employment to zero hours.  In the run-up to retirement, 
the  proportion  of  men  working  part-time  doubles  (this  increase  is  fairly
27concentrated  between  five  -   seven  years  from  stopping  work),  but  part-time 
workers still comprise no more than 10% of the total.10
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The  cliff edge  nature  of retirement  is  evident  from  Figure  1.9,  which  shows 
average  hours  worked  per week,  with  and  without  overtime,  in  the  run  up  to 
retirement.1 1   Over the  cfecade  before  retirement,  there  is  a  seven-hour  drop  in
10 This evidence appears to be in contrast to the experience in the US where Ruhm (1990) suggests 
that partial retirement is common.
1 1  Note that this is not a balanced panel -  the sample observed ten years before retirement is not 
the same as the sample observed nine years before retirement, and so on.
28average  total  weekly  hours  worked  by  men.  A  fall  of  around  two  hours  is 
attributable to a reduction in overtime hours worked; around three hours is due to 
the  increase  in  part-time  work;  while,  among  those  who  work  full-time, the 
number of hours worked (excluding overtime) falls by a further two hours.  But, 
this  slight fall in average weekly hours is  as nothing compared to the huge drop 
that occurs when people retire.  It is a similar story for women, although the drop 
is slightly less steep because of the higher proportion who work part-time.  There 
is very little increase in the proportion of women working part-time in the run-up 
to retirement.
If there are diminishing marginal returns to leisure, there is clearly an issue about 
whether  such  a discrete  change  is  optimal  from  the  individual’s  point  of view. 
There are a number of possible reasons why individuals may not want to reduce 
their  hours  gradually,  including  fixed  costs  associated  with  working  and/or 
economies  of scale  in converting time  into utility-producing leisure.  They may 
also face constraints in their choice of the number of hours to work as a result of 
the fixed costs of employment to the employer -  although the higher proportion of 
women who work part-time suggests that more men could work part-time if they 
wanted to, although possibly not in the same job or for the same employer.
Occupational pensions may also affect the gradual/ discrete nature of retirement. 
Because pension typically depends on final salary, there is a penalty for reducing 
the number of hours worked in the run-up to drawing your pension, at least if you 
want to stay in the same job.  In fact, the incentive is to increase the number of 
hours worked in the run up to retirement in order to achieve the highest possible 
final  salary.  Also,  until  April  2006,  there  was  a  legal  constraint  on  someone
29drawing a pension and continuing to work for the same employer, a further barrier 
to  partial  retirement.  In  the  BHPS  data,  those  who  currently  belong  to  an 
employer’s  pension  are  less  likely  to  shift  into  part-time work (for the reasons 
outlined  above),  but  those  who  have  a pension  from  a previous  employer  are 
actually three times  more likely to work part-time before retirement than those 
who have never belonged to an employer’s pension scheme.  This suggests that 
earlier pension ages in employer pensions may actually facilitate part-time work, 
by  providing  an  income  to  supplement  earnings  from  part-time employment, 
compared to people who rely on the state pension.  Those with no private pension 
income or other financial wealth are likely to be more constrained in their ability 
to  work part-time  before  the  state  pension  age  since  other  (non-private) early 
retirement vehicles,  income support and disability benefit, do not allow people to 
combine part-time work with drawing an income.12
Is retirement permanent?
The  evidence  suggests  that  for  most  people,  retirement  is  an  absorbing  state. 
Looking  at  the  four  waves  after  someone  first  retires  (according  to  their  self­
assessed retirement status), 11% of men and 7% of women return to work at some
12 The over-5 Os earnings tax credit,  introduced in 2003, does provide in-work benefits to anyone 
working  16 hours a week or more, but is only available to those who have been out of work for 
more than 6 months.
30time during this period.  This means that more than 90%  of people who retire,
1  ^ appear to stay retired.
Is retirement an individual or household decision?
Retirement has most commonly been analysed as an individual rather than a joint 
household decision (for exceptions see Hurd,  1990, and Gustman and Steinmeier, 
2004) although this is mainly for reasons of analytic and computational simplicity. 
There are several reasons for thinking that retirement might be determined jointly, 
however,  including:  complementarity  of  leisure,  correlated  preferences,  caring 
responsibilities  in  the  presence  of  health  shocks,  or  common  income/wealth 
effects.  However,  evidence  from  the  BHPS  suggests  that  the  simultaneous 
retirement of husbands and wives is relatively uncommon.14  In the BHPS sample, 
for example, around 10% of people stop working at the same time as their partner, 
and  a  further  10%  retire  one  year  before/  after their partner.  Looking  at the 
reasons for retiring early (see Table 1.3 below), only 3% say that it was in order to 
retire  at  the  same  time  as  their partner,  although  7%  retired  early  because  of 
other’s  ill-health  and  8%  retired  early  to  spend  more  time  with  their  family, 
suggesting  that  consideration  may  be  given  not  just  to  leisure  time  or  caring 
responsibilities  with  respect  to  a  partner,  but  also  children,  grandchildren  and 
possibly  parents.  These  factors  are  much  more  important  for  women  than for
13 Again, the US experience appears somewhat different to this.  Ruhm (1990)  suggests that 25% 
of people who retire re-enter the labour force.
14  Although,  of course,  retirement  decisions  may  be  made jointly  even  if retirements  are  not 
simultaneous.
31men15 -  accounting for 30% of early retirements for women compared with 7% 
for men.
Is retirement a voluntary choice? Mandatory retirement and ill-health
Economic models typically treat retirement as  a choice variable,  albeit a choice 
that is made subject to the potential constraints of employment opportunities and 
pension arrangements.  However, there is a range of factors that may force people 
into early retirement.
One of these is mandatory early retirement ages, only abolished in the UK from 
October 2006 following a European Commission Directive.16  Evidence from the 
US  shows  that  there,  the  abolition  of  mandatory  retirement  ages  raised 
employment among older workers  -  Neumark  and  Stock  (1999),  for  example, 
found that abolition raised employment rates among affected older workers by as 
much as seven percentage points.  However, limited evidence in the UK, suggests 
that the effect of abolishing early retirement ages is likely to be quite small.  As 
shown in chapter 6, the  1989 abolition of the earnings test -  which operated as a 
restriction on the employment of older workers  -  had only a small effect on the 
employment  of older workers.  One  possible  reason  is  that  employment rates 
among  older  workers  are  typically  lower  than  they  were  in  the  US  when
15  This  is  consistent with  evidence  from  the US  showing that women’s  retirement  is  affected by 
their husbands’ pension arrangements, but that the same is not true for men (see Coile, 2004).
16 Mandatory retirement before the state pension age has been abolished, but firms can still impose 
retirement ages of 65 and above (for men) and 60 and above (for women)
32mandatory retirement was abolished.  The available evidence suggests that there 
are  relatively  few  people  who  feel  constrained  by  mandatory  early  retirement 
ages.  Around one-third of the BHPS sample say that they feel that retirement was 
something that they were forced into, rather than being voluntary, but mandatory 
early  retirement  ages  do  not  appear  to  be  the  main  factor  behind  forced 
retirements.  Around half the BHPS sample (60% of men) report that they have a 
fixed retirement age in their job,17 although for most men this age is 65 or greater 
and so will not be affected in October 2006.  Only around  1.5% of retirements 
appear to be attributable to mandatory retirement ages below 65. 18
Ill-health  appears  to  play  a  potentially  greater  role  than  mandatory  early 
retirement in explaining why people feel forced into retirement.  Table  1.3  shows 
that, overall, around one-quarter of the sample gave ill-health as the main reason 
for early retirement; when early retirement was forced, this proportion rose to o\er 
half.  These numbers are very similar numbers to those found using more recent 
data  from  the  English  Longitudinal  Study  of  Ageing  data  (see  Banks  and 
Casanova  (2004)  who  instead  distinguish  the  analysis  by  whether  individuals 
retired before or at/after the state pension age).
17 These figures are also likely to overstate the extent to which there are mandatory retirement ages 
since  people  may  just  be  referring  to  normal  retirement  ages  in  their  occupational  pension 
schemes.
18 This evidence is in line with Meadows (2003) who also found a limited number of cases where 
early retirement could be directly attributable to mandatory early retirement.
33Table 1.3
Main reason for early retirement, according to whether retirement was
wanted or forced
Men Women
All Wanted Forced All Wanted Forced
Own ill-health 28.8% 9.2% 56.3% 24.8% 11.4% 45.5%
Others’ ill-health 4.1% 2.3% 3.8% 10.2% 5.1% 17.6%
Redundancy/ 19.1% 10.0% 28.2% 12.1% 5.9% 20.6%
compulsory
Financial deal 25.3% 42.3% 4.7% 7.3% 11.8% 1.2%
Spend more time 3.4% 5.8% 0.0% 13.2% 21.7% 1.8%
with family
Enjoy life while 8.7% 16.5% 0.5% 9.7% 16.1% 1.8%
young & fit
Same time as 0.2% 0.0% 0.5% 6.7% 11.0% 1.2%
partner
Other 10.4% 13.9% 6.0% 16.0% 17.1% 10.3%
Source: British Household Panel Survey, 2001
Of course, there are a number of problems with these subjective data on reasons 
for retirement -  there may be a degree of post-hoc rationalisation and reported ill- 
health  may  be  linked  to  receipt  of  disability  and  other  ill-health  benefits. 
Nevertheless,  other  evidence  supports  a  link  between  ill-health and retirement. 
Figure  1.10 below shows that the proportion of people reporting that their health 
limits  their  daily  activities19  increases  sharply  in  the  years  immediately  before
19 This variable is not present in wave 9 of the BHPS, but a value can be imputed on the basis of 
individuals’ responses in waves 8 and  10.  For individuals who report the same values in wave 8 
and  10  this  is  fairly  straightforward.  Where  there  is  a  change  between  waves  8  and  10,  the 
individual is assigned the value in wave  10 (where available), and otherwise the value  in wave 8.
34people are observed stopping work.  Interestingly, there is a slight increase in the 
proportion reporting problems with their health five years before stopping work, 
which  coincides  with  the  biggest  reduction  in  average  weekly  hours  and  the 
increase in the proportion of people working part-time.
Figure 1.10
Proportion reporting that health limits daily activities
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The analysis of retirement expectations in the next chapter shows that differences 
between  actual  and  expected  retirement  ages  (people  retiring  earlier  than  they 
expected)  are  linked to  changes in (self-reported health status), although,  again, 
there  is  a  potential  problem  of  post-hoc  rationalisation.  In  a  more  robust 
specification using data from the British Household Panel  Survey, Disney et al
It  makes  no  difference  to  the  results  if,  instead,  the  individual  is  assigned  the  value  in wave  8 
where available and wave 10 otherwise
35(2006)  instrument the  (endogenous  and noisy)  self-reported health variable by a 
constructed  ‘health  stock’  measure using a set of health indicator variables  and 
personal characteristics. They show that adverse individual shocks to health stocks 
are a significant predictor of individual retirement behaviour among workers aged 
50 and over.
1.3  Pensions and retirement
A number of previous studies have shown that the timing and nature of retirement 
are influenced by state and private pension arrangements, and by the availability 
of other  benefits  as  alternative  early  retirement  vehicles.20  Gruber  and  Wise 
(2004) bring together individual micro-econometric studies of retirement across a 
number  of countries  which,  despite  unique pension  arrangements,  cultures  and 
labour  market  institutions,  share  the  following  common  responses  to  pension 
incentives:
•  A positive wealth effect -  the higher someone’s total pension wealth (and 
other financial wealth), the more likely they are to retire;
•  A negative accrual effect -  the more that someone can increase their total 
pension  wealth  by  delaying  their  retirement,  the  fcss  likely  they  are  to 
retire;
•  The independent effect of eligibility ages -  while pension accrual typically 
turns negative after someone becomes eligible for a pension, providing an
20 See for example, Fields and Mitchell (1984), Stock and Wise (1990), Samwick (1998)
36incentive to retire, a common finding across a number of countries studie s 
is  that  the  pure  economic  incentive  effects  cannot  explain  the  observed 
levels of retirement at these ages.  One explanation is that eligibility ages 
may  act  as  social  norms,  with  people  viewing  them  as  appropriate  or 
acceptable  retirement  ages.  Another possible  explanation is  that people 
may  be  liquidity  constrained  and  unable  to  retire  before  they  become 
eligible to receive pension income, even if it is “optimal” for them to retire 
earlier.21
These effects are explored further in chapters 4 and 5.  The UK is an interesting 
case to look at in analysing the relationship between pensions and retirement for a 
number of reasons (see Box 1.1 for an overview of the UK state pension system).
Reforms to the state pension system, (such as the introduction of SERPS in 1978) 
give  rise to  some  variation  in pension  wealth  across  recent  cohorts  of retirees, 
which can be used to identify the  effect of pension incentives  on the timing of 
retirement.  However,  most  men  in recent  and  current  cohorts  of retirees  have 
opted out of the earnings-related pension.  For them, the state pension is a fairly 
minimal,  flat rate pension and the main retirement incentives  are to be  found in 
their private pensions.
Compared  to  most  other  OECD  countries,  the  UK  has  a  high  level  of private 
pension  provision.  Among  recent  and  current  cohorts  of  retirees,  the  most 
important  private  pensions  have  been  employer-provided,  defined benefit (DB)
2 1People cannot typically borrow against future state pension income.
37occupational pensions.  As shown in Figure  1.11, membership of these schemes 
among grew rapidly in the 1950s and 1960s, but has been in gradual decline since 
the  early  1980s.  Among  men,  membership  doubled  in  the  1950s  and  1960s, 
reaching  10 million in  1967.  By 2004, male membership had fallen back to less 
than  5  million.  Among  women,  by  contrast,  membership  has  steadily  been 
increasing over the whole period -  from just over one million female members in 
1953  to  5  million  members  in  2004.  There  are  now  more  women  than  men 
belonging to an employer’s pension scheme.  This trend reflects changing female 
employment  (more  women working  full-time and in the public  sector), but also 
regulations requiring employers to provide pensions to part-time workers.
38Box 1.1 An overview of pensions in the UK
The first tier of the pension system is the Basic State Pension, largely unreformed 
since it was introduced in  1948.  It is  a flat rate,  contributory benefit payable to 
men from the age of 65  and to women from the age  of 60,  funded on a pay-as- 
you-go basis. Since  1989 it has been paid regardless of whether individuals have 
actually retired or not.  Since the early  1980s, the basic state pension has been 
uprated annually in line with inflation and its value has fallen relative to earnings. 
It is currently less than the level of means-tested benefits available for those aged 
60+,  and  in  practice,  these  benefits  also  form  part  of the  first  tier  of pension 
provision  for  those  with  no  (or  little)  additional  pension  income.  Until  1978, 
married women could choose to opt out of the basic  state pension (and receive 
only  an  addition  to  their  husband’s  pension)  in  return  for  reduced  national 
insurance contributions.  Only a minority of women retiring today qualify for a 
basic state pension in their own right.
Since 1978, individuals have also been compelled to contribute to a second tier of 
pension provision, but have a significant amount of choice over the way in which 
they save within this tier. The default is membership of the state scheme (formerly 
the state earnings-related pension scheme (SERPS), now the state second pens ion 
(S2P)), but individuals  can choose to  ‘opt out’  into a private pension.  When it 
was introduced,  SERPS was intended to pay a pension worth  one-quarter of an 
individual's best twenty years' earnings (up to a specified upper earnings limit) but 
its value has gradually been reduced and in the medium term, S2P will become a 
flat-rate top-up to the basic  state pension.  Between  1978  and  1988  individuals 
could  opt  out  of  SERPS  into  a  defined  benefit  (final  salary)  scheme  that 
guaranteed to pay at least as generous a pension as the state alternative. But, from 
1988 onwards individuals could also opt out into a defined contribution (money 
purchase) pension scheme.  Since this time, there has been a growth in defined 
contribution occupational pension schemes and  in individual retirement accounts, 
known in the UK as personal pensions or, since 2001, stakeholder pensions.22
22  A  stakeholder  pension  is  a  personal  pension  with  an  annual  charge  cap  and  no  limits  on 
minimum contributions.  See Chung et al (2004) for further discussion.
39Figure 1.11
Active members of employer pension schemes, by sex
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Since  1988, there has been a shift within private pension coverage from defined 
benefit  (DB)  to  defined  contribution  (DC)  schemes.  This  trend  is  linked  to  a 
number of different factors.  Most importantly, in  1988, the government extended 
contracting out of the second tier of the state pension to individual and employer 
DC plans (as well as DB plans), motivated by a desire to promote greater labour 
market flexibility (see Disney et al, 2004, for further discussion).  Roughly 25% 
of the workforce chose to purchase personal pensions over the period  1988 -  92, 
although  more  recent  figures  suggest  there  has  been  a  decline  in  membership 
since then with the 2002  General  Household  Survey showing  19% of full-time
40male employees and  12% of female employees with a personal pension.  More 
recently,  many employer DB  schemes have closed to new (and, less commonly, 
existing)  members  after  the  combination  of  increasing  life  expectancy,  an 
increasing  burden  of  regulation  and  low  equity  returns  put  them  under 
considerable  financial  strain  and,  within  employer  schemes,  there  has  been  a 
switch  from  DB  to  DC.  In  2004,  of the  5  million  members  of private  sector 
employer pensions, more than one million were in a defined contribution scheme. 
The  majority  of small  (<100  employees)  firms  with  an  employer pension  now 
have a DC scheme.
The  effects  of these  trends  on  coverage  of different  types  of pension  across 
successive cohorts  can be seen in Table  1.4.  Among men,  there was  an initial 
increase across cohorts in the proportion with an employer’s pension, followed by 
a  decline  among  more  recent  cohorts  (1940-49  onwards).  Beginning with  the 
1930-39 cohort, there has been a substantial increase in the proportion who have 
an  individual  defined  contribution  scheme.  Among  women,  there  has  been  a 
steady increase in coverage of both employer and individual pensions, reflecting 
changing  female  employment  and  increased  pension  coverage  among  part-time 
workers.
41Table 1.4
Private pension coverage, by cohort
Employer’s 
pension only
Employer’s 
pension and 
personal 
pension
Personal 
pension only
Neither
Men
1910-19 57.5% 9.3% 5.7% 27.5%
1920-29 61.6% 9.7% 4.9% 23.8%
1930-39 46.4% 22.7% 9.8% 21.2%
1940-49 35.7% 25.7% 17.7% 21.0%
1950-59 31.7% 27.0% 19.8% 21.5%
1960-69 30.3% 28.0% 19.2% 22.6%
Women
1910-19 22.2% 2.3% 4.7% 70.8%
1920-29 29.6% 4.2% 4.0% 62.2%
1930-39 32.0% 10.3% 6.6% 51.1%
1940-49 27.5% 16.5% 10.7% 45.4%
1950-59 30.3% 20.4% 10.9% 38.5%
1960-69 34.4% 18.8% 8.6% 38.3%
Note: Employer pension defined by whether someone is currently a member of their 
employer’s pension scheme and/or is receiving a pension from a former employer. 
Personal pension is defined by whether someone is contributing to a personal pension 
and/or is receiving a private pension or annuity.2 3
Source: British Household Panel Survey,  1991-2003
23  In  most  cases,  the  employer’s  pension will  be  a DB  occupational pension  scheme,  but some 
(particularly  younger)  workers,  may  have  an  employer  DC  pension  or  even  a  Group  Personal 
Pension  (a collection  of individual  DC  private  pensions  organised  at the  employer level).  The 
fairly high proportion who are observed to have both will include some people who, at some time, 
have  been  in  an  employer’s  pension  and a personal  pension,  some people  who belong  to  a  GPP 
and some people who make free standing additional  voluntary contributions to their occupational 
pension.
42The changing patterns of pension coverage are likely to have important effects on 
retirement  behaviour.  These  are  discussed  in  detail  in  chapters  4  and  5,  but 
broadly, they include the following impacts.
•  The widespread coverage of occupational pensions is likely to explain at 
least part of the trend towards earlier retirement.  Not only did increased 
coverage of occupational pensions  act as  a positive wealth effect, but in 
the  late  1980s  and  early  1990s,  employers  could  use  generous  early 
retirement windows, funded by pension surpluses, to downsize workforces 
during a period of industrial restructuring (see Disney,  1999).
•  DB  plans  typically  provide  individuals  with  strong  incentives  to  leave 
work  at  normal,  or  early,  retirement  ages.  Normal  retirement  ages  in 
employer pensions  are  typically before  the  state  pension  age,  and  most 
schemes  have  some  provision  for  early  retirement.  As  previously 
discussed, employer provided pensions may also have acted as a constraint 
on flexible retirement,  since people could not work for an employer and 
receive a pension at the same time.
•  The shift to DC schemes is likely to bring changes to retirement behaviour. 
There are less clear incentives to retire at particular ages and potentially 
greater  flexibility  over  the  timing  and  nature  of  retirement.  Recent 
estimates suggest that levels of wealth in defined contribution pensions are 
typically  lower  than  in  most  defined  benefit  employer  schemes,  which 
would tend to lead to later retirement.  Moreover, the associated risks and 
flexibility of these schemes  is quite different to that of DB  schemes,  as
43explored further in chapter 5.
1.4  Conclusions
This chapter has highlighted a number of features of retirement in the UK that will 
be picked up by the analysis in later chapters.
•  The pattern of retirement for men today is very different to that of 30 years
ago.  Most  men  now  leave  work  before  the  state  pension  age  and  the 
median  age  for  employment  exit  has  fallen  from  65  to  60.  Far  fewer 
people work beyond the state pension age, in spite of the abolition of the 
earnings test in the state pension in  1989.  Much of this pattern is likely to 
arise  from  incentives  faced  by  individuals  in  their  employer,  defined 
benefit  pension  schemes.  Chapter  4  explores  the  role  of  pension 
incentives  in  more  detail  and  chapter  5  considers  the  implications  for 
retirement  of  the  ongoing  shift  from  defined  benefit  to  defined 
contribution  plans.  Chapter  6  looks  at  whether  the  abolition  of  the
earnings test had an effect on the employment of affected older workers.
•  While there are multiple pathways to retirement, there is a dominant model 
that  conforms  to  the  stylized  model  of  retirement  underlying  many 
economic models.  The majority of men appear to take voluntary,  early 
retirement  onto  a pension income,  typically  from  a previous  employer. 
Retirement is usually discrete and permanent.
•  However,  there  is  a  sizeable  minority  of,  typically  less  well-qualified 
individuals,  who  enter  retirement  via  another  non-working  state and are
44more likely to receive unemployment or disability benefits, rather than a 
pension.  This thesis does not directly explore the links between health and 
retirement.  Chapter 2  compares retirement expectations with realisations 
and looks  at what might explain why people retire earlier/ or later than 
they  expected.  Chapter  3  compares  what  happens  to  a  measure  of 
spending at retirement when retirement appears to be involuntary rather 
than voluntary.
45Annex 1: Data from the British Household Panel Survey
The data used to analyze retirements in this chapter are taken from waves  1-13 of 
the  British  Household  Panel  Survey.  This  panel  dataset  has  been  collecting 
information on the  same  sample of approximately  10,000  individuals  each year 
since 1991.  The analysis uses a selected sub-sample of men and women aged 40 
-  80 in each wave.  Since the BHPS covers all ages, it has a smaller number of 
individuals in the relevant age range for studying retirement than, for example, the 
US  Health and Retirement  Survey and the new English Longitudinal  Survey of 
Ageing (ELSA).  Nevertheless, there is a reasonable-sized sample of around 1,500 
retirements over the entire period and a wide number of variables, including some 
summary information on spending, well-being and health as well as the detailed 
income information in each wave.  One of the main strengths of the BHPS is that, 
with  up  to  thirteen  waves  of  information  on  each  individual,  it  affords  quite 
detailed analysis of dynamics of retirement transitions.  Moreover, in wave  11, a 
special module collected information on ageing and retirement that was designed 
to  be  directly  comparable  with  the  questions  collected  in  the  more  specialist 
ELSA questionnaire.
The  definitions  of “retirement”  exploit  the  panel  aspect  of the  BHPS  data  as 
follows:
•  Self-assessed retirement is defined as the first time someone reports that 
their  employment  status  is  retired.  In  the  BHPS  someone  cannot  be 
simultaneously  working  and  retired  since  these  are  mutually  exclusive 
categories.  In other British retirement surveys, such as the UK Retirement
46Survey  (see  Tanner,  1998)  and ELSA  (see  Banks  and  Casanova,  2004) 
retirement  status  is  asked  independently  of employment  status,  so  that 
someone can be retired and working.
•  Stopping  work  is  cbfined  as  the  last  time  that  someone  is  observed to 
leave employment.  Clearly, this definition potentially suffers from the fact 
that the data are right-censored.
•  Pension  receipt  is  defined  as  the  first  period  in  which  someone  is 
observed to receive an income from a pension (from a former employer, a 
private pension/ annuity, an NI pension, or a widow’s pension).
47Chapter 2:  What can we learn from expectations data?
This chapter addresses two main questions:
•  To  what  extent  do  the  reported  retirement  expectations  of a  cohort  of 
individuals approaching retirement suggest that individuals  are engaging 
in  forward-looking  planning  behaviour  with  regard  to  their  retirement, 
such as  is  implied by,  for example,  the  life-cycle model of consumption 
and saving and  the  option  value  model  of retirement  (see,  for  example, 
Stock and Wise, 1990).
•  How do expectations and realizations of retirement compare, and is there 
evidence  of particular  shocks  that  cause  expectations  and  outcomes  to 
diverge?
The data are taken from the UK Retirement Survey.  This survey sampled a group 
of households in the UK that contained at least one individual aged between 55 
and  69  in  a period  covering  late  1988  and  1989.24  Surviving  individuals  who
24 For further details  on  sampling  procedures  and some cross-tabulations  from the  first wave of 
the sample, see Bone et al (1992). On retirement behaviour, using the first wave of the Retirement 
Survey, see Disney et al (1994).
48could  be  followed-up  were  re-interviewed  in  1994.  The  availability  of two 
waves of data from the Retirement Survey enable a matching of individuals’ prior 
expectations  of  their  retirement  age,  collected  in  the  first  wave,  with  their 
subsequent behaviour, observed by the second wave.  Similar studies  have been 
carried out in the US (see Bemheim,  1989, and Hurd, 1996).
At first sight, the data on retirement expectations do not appear to be promising. 
The distribution of reported expected retirement ages is dominated by spikes  at 
the state pension ages (60 for women and 65  for men) and is much more heavily 
concentrated than the distribution of actual retirement ages.  Also, even among a 
cohort close to retirement,  a high proportion reports that they don’t know when 
they expect to retire.
However, much  of this may reflect the nature of the data and,  in particular,  the 
fact that individuals are asked to give single point expectations.  Individuals are 
likely  to  face  uncertainty  over  their  retirement  age,  which  will  depend  on  a 
number  of  (unknown)  variables  such  as  future  earnings  and  health.  Their 
expectation of when they are going to retire may therefore be a range of possible 
ages, together with assigned probabilities, each of which represents the solution to 
the optimal retirement problem in a different state of the world.  Being asked to 
report  a  single point  expectation  then requires  them to  collapse  this  subjective 
probability distribution to a single measure.  In this case, Bemheim (1989) argues, 
there  is  no  reason  for  individuals  to  report  the  mathematical  expectation rather
25 See Disney et al (1998)
49than  some  other  measure  such  as  the  mode  or  the  median  of the  underlying 
distribution.
Among the implications of this are that:
•  The  distribution  of  reported  ages  will  be  more  concentrated  than  the 
distribution of actual ages.  Looking  at  Dutch  income  expectations,  for 
example, Das (1996) finds that the dispersion in expected income changes 
is smaller than the dispersion in actual income changes.
•  Even if more people retire earlier than they reported that they expected to 
than  hter than they reported that they expected to,  expectations may be 
rational.
Considerable attention in empirical studies using expectations data has focused on 
whether individuals appear to form ‘rational’ expectations (see Wolpin and Gonul, 
1985, Bemheim,  1989,  and Das and van Soest,  1997).  By rational is meant that 
individuals’  expectations equate to the best prediction of future outcomes taking 
advantage  of all  currently  available  information.  A  testable  implication  of the 
rational expectations hypothesis is that, in the absence of common macro-shocks, 
the  distribution  of  observed  retirement  outcomes  should  correspond  to 
individuals’ subjective probability distribution.  With point expectations data, this 
hypothesis cannot be tested directly.  And, with  only two waves of data, it is not 
possible to rule out common shocks.
The plan of the chapter is as follows.  The next section discusses in further detail 
some of the issues in analyzing and interpreting point expectations data.  Section
502.2 describes the Retirement Survey and the retirement expectations data.  Section
2.3 looks at what individuals appear to be reporting with single point expectations 
and with don’t know responses.  Section 2.4 compares reported expectations and 
outcomes and looks at whether there are identifiable shocks -  to health or marital 
status  -   which  may  cause  reported  expectations  and  realisations  to  diverge. 
Section 2.5 concludes.
2.1  Retirement expectations
The optimal time for an individual to retire is assumed to depend on a vector of 
observable  characteristics,  which  may  include  (uncertain)  future  values  of  eg 
wages, a vector of unobservable characteristics and pure unknowns.  Individuals 
are  assumed  to  form  a  subjective  probability  distribution  over  possible  future 
retirement ages (corresponding to different states of the world).
If individuals form rational expectations, their set of retirement expectations (p[r | 
I(t)])  represents  the  best  prediction  of their  actual  retirement  outcomes,  given 
available  information.  This  implies  that,  for  a  set  of identical  individuals,  the 
observed distribution of outcomes will be identical to the  subjective probability 
distribution except for unanticipated shocks.
R(t) =p[r\I(t)] + e
where R(t) is the distribution of actual retirement ages and e is a common macro­
shock which is uncorrelated with I(t).
Knowing  individuals’  subjective  probability  distribution,  this  could  be  tested 
explicitly.  Some surveys ask questions about future events which try to get atindividuals’ underlying subjective probability distribution.  In the US Health and 
Retirement Survey, for example, individuals are asked to indicate the chances of 
various future events, such as retiring at 62 or 65, on a scale of 1  to 10.  These can 
be  used  to  build  up  probability  distributions  for  expectational  variables  of this 
type:  see  inter alia  Dominitz  and Manski  (1997),  Hurd  and  McGarry  (1995), 
Juster and Smith (1997), and Manski (1990).
In  the  Retirement  Survey,  however,  individuals  are  asked  to  report  a  point 
expectation, which is assumed to represent a single measure of central tendency 
from the underlying distribution. One possibility is that individuals adopt a modal 
response strategy, i.e
ER(t) = argmaxr p[r \ 1(t)J
Where  ER(t)  is  the  reported  expected  age  of retirement  and  p[r  |  I(t)]  is  the 
underlying subjective probability distribution over all possible retirement ages.
With  this  information,  it  is  not  possible  to  test  directly  a rational  expectations 
hypothesis.  The  distribution  of  outcomes  (R(t))  could  exactly  match  the 
individuals’  underlying  subjective  probability  distribution  (p[r|I(t)])  without  it 
being  the  case  that  the  distribution  of reported  expectations  is  the  same  as  the 
distribution of outcomes  (and vice versa).  A  simple illustration illuminates  this 
point.  Suppose  I  (together  with  the  rest  of  the  population)  think  that  the 
probabilities of retiring at 62, 63, 65 and 66 are respectively 0.1, 0.2, 0.5 and 0.2. 
When asked to give a single expected age of retirement a possible response is to 
say 65 since it is the mode and mean (to the nearest whole age) of the underlying 
probability distribution.  In the absence of shocks,  10 per cent of the populationretires at 63, 20 per cent at 64, 50 per cent at 65 and 20 per cent at 66. In this case 
the  observed  distribution  of actual  retirement  ages  is  more  dispersed  than  the 
distribution of reported expected ages (which is a single spike at 65). Comparing 
outcomes to reported expectations, half the population would appear not to retire 
when they expected and more people would appear to retire earlier than expected 
than retired later than expected whereas in fact the  subjective and the objective 
probability distributions are identical.
However,  it would be possible to test a joint hypothesis  of rational  expectation 
formation and a modal response strategy:
ER(t) = argmax R(t) + e
i.e. the reported expected age of retirement will  correspond to the mode of the 
distribution  of outcomes.  In  the  Retirement  Survey,  however,  with  only  two 
waves of data, it is not possible to rule out common shocks.
If individuals adopt a modal response strategy there may be circumstances where 
it is difficult for them to provide a single point expectation,  for example, where 
the underlying probability distribution is bimodal. Or it  may be the case that the 
distribution  is  insufficiently  compact  to  permit  a  plausible  modal  response.  In 
such circumstances, Carlson and Parkin (1975) suggest that individuals may adopt 
the following ‘rule of thumb’:
Response =  ER(t) = argmaxr p[r | I(t)]  if p(argmaxr ) >0.5
and:
53Response =  ‘don’t know’ ifp(argmaxr ) <0.5
That  is,  individuals  will  only  provide  a  response  to  this  question  if the  point 
expectation dominates all other possibilities. Otherwise, they give a ‘don’t know’ 
response.  In  this  case,  ‘don’t  know’  is  not  an  indicator  of a  lack  of forward- 
planning behaviour, but an indicator of genuinely greater uncertainty. In principle 
it  should be  possible  to  distinguish  between  these  two  if there  are  reasonable 
proxies  for  the  ability  to  form  an underlying  subjective  probability  distribution 
(for  example  education)  and  for the  compactness  of the  subjective  probability 
distribution (for example, proximity to retirement).
2.2  Retirement Survey data
The  data  are  taken  from  the  UK  Retirement  Survey  (RS),  a household  panel 
survey collected by the Office for Population and Census Surveys on behalf of the 
Department for Social Security.  This was the first large-scale panel data set in the 
United  Kingdom  to  focus  on  individuals  around  the  time  of  retirement;26  it 
collected information on a national random sample of individuals bom between 
1919 and 1933 who were aged 55-69 at the time of the first wave.  In this respect, 
it  is  similar  to  the  Retirement  History  Survey  (RHS)  and  the  Health  and 
Retirement  Survey  (HRS)  in  the  US.  And,  like  the  two  US  surveys,  the 
Retirement Survey contains detailed information on individuals’  health, wealth, 
income  and  retirement  behaviour,  and  a  retrospective  event  history  covering 
family composition and employment. It also contains information on individuals’
26  For a good overview of information in the Retirement Survey see Disney et al. (1998).
54expectations of retirement.  However, it differs from the US surveys in that only 
two waves of data were collected.  The first wave of the  survey was  conducted 
between November  1988  and January  1989  and collected information on 3,543 
key respondents (who were aged 55-69). The key respondents include spouses if 
they were in the relevant age range. In addition, information was also collected on 
609 spouses outside this age range. About two-thirds of the original sample vrere 
re-interviewed  in  1994.  11%  of respondents  disappeared  in  this  interval  due  to 
mortality;  the  residual  attrition  is  a  combination  of non-response and (perhaps) 
unreported mortality.27
Unlike the two US surveys, however, the Retirement Survey has only two waves. 
Wave  1, carried out in  1988/89, collected information on 3543  ‘key respondents’ 
who were then aged 55-69, together with 609 spouses outside this age range,  a 
total of 4152 individuals. Wave 2 was collected in  1994. About two-thirds of the 
original  sample  of key  respondents  and  spouses  were  re-interviewed.  11%  of 
respondents are known to have died in this interval, while the residual attrition is a 
combination of nonresponse and (perhaps) unreported mortality.28
The  analysis  is  based  on  a  selected  sample  of  individuals  in  the  Retirement 
Survey. First, we select only those who appear in both waves of the Survey. Since 
the rates of (non-mortality) attrition between the two waves are not random, the
27 The high attrition rate is largely due to the fact that the survey was not originally intended to be 
a panel  survey.  Hence,  little  attempt was  made  to  keep  in  touch with respondents after the  first 
wave.
55sample of survivors is re-weighted to correct for known differential attrition rates
90
by age, socio-economic status and gender.  A second selection is that, within the 
group  of survivors,  we  look only at those who have not yet retired by the first 
wave  of the  sample,  and  who  have  non-missing  information  (including don’t 
know responses) on expected age of retirement.
Table 2.1  reports summary statistics for this sub-sample relative to the sample of 
all  wave  2  survivors.  Given  the  selection  criteria,  it  is  a  relatively  small  and 
selected  sub-sample  of the whole  data.  There  are  differences  in  the  observable 
characteristics (such as gender, age, health and whether or not they have a private 
pension) and also presumably in unobservable characteristics, such as preferences 
over  work  and  leisure.  Since,  for  the  most  part,  we  compare  expectations  and 
outcomes for the same people, the problem of unobserved heterogeneity is not a 
central issue but we would emphasis that the analysis in this chapter is likely to be 
indicative only and is not presented as  a (reduced form) model of retirement for 
the general population.
28 The Retirement Survey was not originally intended to be a panel and insufficient care was paid 
to keeping in touch with Wave 1  respondents to ensure high response in the second wave.
29  A  detailed  description  of the  grossing  factors  used  to  re-weight  the  sample  is  given  in  the 
Appendix to Disney et al (1998)
56Table 2.1 
Summary sample statistics
Whole sample  Sub-sample
Average age in Wave 1 61.7 58.6
Proportion who are female 54.4% 38.2%
Proportion with no educational qualifications 57.0% 52.0%
Proportion who are married in Wave 1 74.9% 79.4%
Proportion who are divorced/ widowed in Wave 1 18.3% 12.9%
Average severity score 0.86 0.41
Proportion who are working full-time in W1 24.2% 66.6%
Proportion who are working part-time in W1 13.1% 26.2%
Proportion who are self-employed in W1 9.4% 14.5%
Proportion with an occupational pension 47.0% 55.2%
No. of observations 2488 764
Source: Retirement Survey
Severity  scores  are  measures  of  self-assessed  health status.  They  are  based  on the  international
classification  of impairments,  disabilities  and handicaps (ICDIH).  Separate  scales  are  constructed  for
areas  of locomotion,  reaching  and stretching,  dexterity, seeing,  hearing,  continence,  communication,
personal  care,  behaviour,  intellectual  functioning,  consciousness,  digestion  and  disfigurement.  The 
severity  score  is  constructed as  a weighted  average  of the  three  highest  severity  scores  from  the  13 
areas: Highest + 0.4(second highest) + 0.3(third highest).
The definition of retirement used throughout this  chapter is a purely subjective 
one. The age of retirement is the age at which individuals report that they retired.
57As  the  previous  chapter  showed,  subjective  retirement  may  differ  from  an 
objective measure of permanent exit from the labour market.  Objective measures 
are  sometime  preferred  to  avoid  the  problem  of  what  subjectively-defined 
retirement  actually  means.  However,  since  this  chapter  will  be  concerned  with 
comparing  individuals’  expectations  and  realisations  of  retirement,  this  issue 
should  matter  les.  The  main  thing  is  that  people  refer  to  expectations  and 
realisations of the same event in their minds, however defined.
All people in the first wave of the Retirement Survey who have not retired are 
asked  "at  what  age  do  you  expect  to  retire?’ ’  The  distributions  of  reported 
expected retirement ages for men and women are plotted in Figure 2.1  (including 
the proportions of men and women who  say that they do not know when they 
expect to retire). The distribution for men is dominated by a ‘spike’ at 65, the age 
at which men first become eligible to receive the state pension, with more than 
60%  of men  saying  that  they  expect  to  retire  at  this  age.  Around  one-third of 
women  say  that they  expect to  retire  at  60  (the  state pension  age  for women), 
although nearly the  same number say that they do not know when they expect to 
retire.
58Figure 2.1
Distribution of expected retirement ages
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The dominance of the distribution by spikes at the state pension ages and the high 
proportion  of  ‘don’t  knows’  at  first  sight  suggests  that  little  interesting 
information is provided by these responses.30  But, the responses are not simply 
random.  A first (albeit obvious) difference is that, on average, women expect to 
retire at earlier ages than men.  In  addition, regression analysis shows that other 
observable characteristics, which are known to be correlated with retirement ages, 
co-vary with retirement expectations in the same way.  This is explored by means 
of an ordered probit regression of a dependent variable that takes the value 1, 2 or
30 Keane  and  Runkle  (1990)  suggest  that individuals have no  incentive  to  respond truthfully  or 
honestly to expectations questions.
593 depending on whether the individual expects to retire before, at or after the state 
pension age.  The  full results  are reported in the Appendix  (Table A2.1).  The 
main findings are:
•  For both men and women age enters positively and significantly as might 
be expected -  the older the individual at the first wave the less likely they 
are to expect to retire before the state pension age.
•  Conditional  on  age,  men with  an  occupational  pension  are  significantly 
more likely to expect to retire before the state pension age.  This is likely 
to reflect typical normal or early retirement ages in occupational pensions 
before age 65 (see chapter 4).
•  Men who have  spent more than 95 per cent of their working lives  since 
age  25  in  full-time  employment  are  also  more  likely  to  expect  to  retire 
before the state pension age.  This may reflect the fact that they have built 
up a greater level of pension wealth in a state or private pension.
•  Men and women currently in part-time employment are significantly more 
likely to expect to retire after the state pension age. In the case of men this 
group  is  likely  to  comprise  those  who  have  left  their  main  lifetime 
employment and returned to work part-time.
•  Poor health, measured by the severity score at wave 1, has a positive effect 
on the probability of expecting to retire before the state pension age, which 
is significant in the case of women.
Moreover,  individuals’  reported  expectations  also  have  predictive  power  for
60retirement behaviour beyond their correlation with observables.  Most likely this 
is because they reflect unobservable characteristics (such as preferences for work 
and leisure).  For individuals who had retired by the second wave, we run a simple 
OLS  regression  of  the  actual  age  of  retirement  on  a  set  of  economic  and 
demographic variables known at wave  1   and include individuals’ expected age of 
retirement as  an additional explanatory variable to see if it has predictive power 
for individuals’  actual age of retirement.  The coefficient on expected retirement 
age  (summarised  in  Table  2.2)  is  positive  and  significant  for  both  men  and 
women, suggesting that expectations information, if available, does have a role to 
play in modelling actual retirement behaviour.
Table 2.2
Predictive power of expe ctations for actual age of retirement
Dependent variable:  Age of retirement (if known at wave 2)
Men
Coeff SE
Women
Coeff SE
Expected retirement age .3421 .0467* .3015 .0629*
No. observations 245 150
Control  variables:  Age,  income,  education,  marital  status,  severity  score,  occupational  pension,  whether 
saved for retirement, employment status in wave 1, employment history 
* denotes significant at 5% level 
Source: Retirement Survey
612.3  Interpreting point expectations and “don’t knows ”
So, point expectations do appear to have some informative content, but how do 
they relate to individuals’ underlying subjective probability distribution?  Figure 
2.2  plots  the  distributions  of actual  retirement  ages  for  each  expected  age  of 
retirement between 60 and 65  (for men and women together to increase sample 
size).  It  shows  a  positive  monotonic  relationship  between  expected  age  of 
retirement and the bulk of the distribution of actual ages of retirement with most 
people retiring when (or close to when) they said they expected to retire at each 
given expected age of retirement.  This supports the idea that point expectations 
represent a measure of central tendency.
Figure 2.2
Distribution of actual retirement ages, by reported expected age
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62Table  2.3  considers  the  relationship  between  expected  retirement  age  and  the 
mean, mode and median of actual retirement ages.31  Within the age range 60-65, 
reported  expectations  appear  reasonably  consistent  with  all  three  measures,
N
although none is a perfect match.  A simple performance measure,  ^lERj-Rj ,
i= 1
A
where  ER,  is the individual’s expected retirement age and  is the measure of
central tendency, shows that the data support a mode or median response strategy 
rather than a mean response  strategy.  This result is  consistent with Bemheim’s 
finding  for  the  US  that  individuals’  reported  expectations  do  not  appear  to 
correspond  to  a mathematical  ‘expectation’,  but  some  other measure  of central 
tendency.
31  The truncation of the distribution of actual  retirement ages  imposed by  the  two  waves  of the 
UK Retirement Survey makes a definitive test of the mean value hypotheses difficult.  The closer 
the expected retirement age to an individual’s age at the first wave, the more likely he or she is to 
retire  later than expected and the higher the mean actual  retirement  age relative  to  the  expected. 
Not  surprisingly,  the  highest  proportions  of  individuals  retiring  after  they  expect  at  younger 
expected  retirement  ages.  The  truncation  of  the  dstribution  is  also  likely  to  present  similar 
problems  in testing  the  modal  value  hypothesis,  although  less  so  if individuals  have  a  compact 
probability distribution.
63Table 2.3
What do people report: mean, median or mode?
Average of actual retirement ages
Expected Men Women
Age N Mean Mode  Median Mean Mode Median
60 106 60 60 60 60 60 60
61 13 62 60 60.5 62 61 61
62 17 62 62 62 62 62 62
63 18 63 63 63 63 64 63
64 10 64 64 64 65 65 64.5
65 199 64 65 65 64 65 65
X ;=i 191 27 7 52 33 15
No. obs 235 235 235 148 148 148
Source: Retirement Survey
A sizeable number of people in the sample say that they do not know when they 
expect  to  retire.  Some  previous  studies  of  retirement  expectations,  such  as 
Bemheim (1989),  have dropped  ‘don’t know’  responses  from the  sample.  But, 
rather than being a lazy or uninformed response, a ‘don’t know’ may be a rational 
response  where  people  face  greater uncertainty  over  their  future  labour market 
behaviour.  Looking in more detail at the characteristics of the don’t knows and 
finding proxies  for the  ability to form expectations  (e.g.  education)  and for the
64compactness  of  the  subjective  probability  distribution  (e.g.  proximity  to 
retirement)  it  should be  possible  to  distinguish  between  these  two  hypotheses. 
This is explored by means of a probit regression of a dummy variable that takes 
the  value  one  for  a  ‘don’t  know’  response.  The  full  results  are  given  in  Table 
A2.3.  The main findings are:
•  The further away is  actual retirement,  the more likely is  a  ‘don’t know’ 
response.  Individuals  who  retired  within  one  year  of  wave  1   were 
significantly  more  likely  to  have  given  an  expected  retirement  date  in 
wave 1.  On the other hand, individuals who had not retired by wave 2, by 
which time  over 5  years had elapsed since wave  1, were more  likely to 
have given a ‘don’t know’ response at wave 1.  This supports the idea that 
a “don’t know” reflects a genuinely greater degree of uncertainty.  In fact, 
when  asked  the  same  expectations  question  in  the  second  wave  if they 
have still not retired, the majority of ‘don’t knows’  do give an expected 
age  of retirement.  A  plausible  interpretation  of the  positive  significant 
effect of the individual liking their current job on the probability of giving 
a ‘don’t know’ response is that these people tend to retire later on average.
•  In general, the greater the individual’s involvement with the labour market 
in full-time employment during their working lives (and the less variable 
their employment experience),  the less  likely it is that they give  a  ‘don’t 
know’ response. Men who have spent more than 95% of their time since 
age  25  in  full-time  employment  are  less  likely  to  give  a  don’t  know 
response.  Among  women,  the  greater  the  proportion  of time  spent  not 
working,  the  more  likely  it  is  that  they  give  a  ‘don’t  know’
65response, although this is not significant.
•  For men, having an occupational pension has a significant, negative effect 
on  the  ‘don’t  know’  response  probability.  This  is  likely  to  reflect  the 
presence  of  normal  (and  early)  retirement  ages  with  clear  retirement 
incentives in many occupational schemes.
•  Poor health (measured by severity score at wave  1) is also associated with 
a higher probability of giving a ‘don’t know’ response which may indicate 
greater uncertainty over future labour market participation.
•  For  men,  being  divorced  or  widowed  in  wave  1   also  means  a  higher 
probability of  a  ‘don’t  know’  response  although  this  result  is  hard  to 
interpret.
•  A don’t know response is not associated with lower educational attainment 
per se although,  as Carlson and Parkin (1975) point out, low educational 
attainment may be correlated with other  factors such as interrupted career 
history.  But  the  variable  ‘has  saved  for  retirement’,  which  is  also 
significant for men, is likely to reflect a greater propensity to think about 
future retirement.
Given the small sample size and the proxy nature of many of these variables, these 
results are not conclusive.  But they do lend some support to the  argument that 
‘don’t  know’  responses  to  the  retirement  expectations  questions  may  reflect 
genuinely  greater uncertainty  about  retirement.  At  the  very  least,  these  results 
show that the probability of giving ‘don’t know’ responses is not random across
66the population.
2.4  Comparing reported expectations and outcomes
In total nearly half of the sample retired when they said they expected to (Table 
2.4,  panel  A)  and  nearly  two-thirds  retired  within  one  year  of their  reported 
expected  retirement  age  (Table  2.4,  panel  B).  The  cumulative  distributions  of 
actual and reported expected retirement ages are plotted in Figure 2.3. For women, 
the  ‘fit’  is  surprisingly good;  but nen are more likely to retire earlier than they 
said they  expected  to  and  the  cumulative  retirement  probability  distribution  is 
much  smoother  than  the  distribution  of reported  expected  ages.  As  already 
discussed, with point expectations data and only two waves, this is not an explicit 
test of rational expectations.  Nevertheless,  it is  interesting to see whether there 
are  identifiable  shocks  that  may  have  caused  expectations  and  realisations  to 
diverge.
67Table 2.4
Comparing retirement expectations and outcomes
Panel A: At expected age
Retired before 
expected age
Retired at 
expected age
Retired after 
expected age
No. obs
Whole sample 37.2% 46.8% 16.0% 421
Men 43.5% 44.2% 12.4% 265
Women 26.7% 51.2% 22.1% 156
Panel B: Within one year of expected age
Retired before Retired at Retired after No. obs
expected age expected age expected age
Whole sample 25.8% 65.5% 8.7% 421
Men 31.4% 62.4% 6.2% 265
Women 16.3% 70.9% 12.8% 156
Source: Retirement Survey
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Cumulative distribution of expected and actual retirement ages
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This is done by means of an ordered probit regression on a dependent variable that 
takes the value  1, 2 or 3 according to whether individuals retire before, when or 
after they  said  they  expected  to.  The  number  of years  until  expected  age  of 
retirement is included as a conditioning variable since the sooner the expected age 
of retirement, the less likely it is that individuals will retire before they said they 
expected  to.  The  full  results  are  reported  in  the  Appendix  (Table A2.3).  The
69main findings are:
•  None of the employment history variables, which affected whether or not 
individuals could form any point expectation,  affects whether they retire 
when they expected to. However, employment status in Wave 1  does have 
a  significant  effect  on  ‘getting  it  right’  (or  wrong).  Men  who  were 
unemployed at the first wave of the survey are significantly more likely to 
retire  earlier  than  expected.  This  may  indicate  that  unemployment  is 
associated with earlier than anticipated retirement as older workers find it 
harder  than  expected  to  re-enter  employment  (and/or  face  stiff  wage 
penalties).  Of course, with only two waves, it is not possible to generalize 
this finding beyond the experience of the early  1990s (a time of recession 
in the UK), but it corresponds with the analysis in chapters  1   and 3  on 
involuntary early retirement.
•  An  increase  in  severity  score  between  the  two  waves  of the  survey  is 
associated  with  individuals  being  more  likely  to  retire  earlier  than 
expected.  Of  course,  given  the  use  of  disability  benefits  as  an  early 
retirement  vehicle,  the  reported  severity  score  in  the  second  wave  may 
reflect measurement error and/or post-hoc rationalisation.  But Disney et al
(2004), using a more robust specification that instruments the (endogenous 
and noisy)  self-reported health variable  also  find that  adverse  individual 
shocks to health stocks are a significant predictor of individual retirement 
behaviour among workers aged 50 and over.
•  Finally, a change in marital status is significant for men and is associated
70with earlier than expected retirement.
2.5  Conclusions
This chapter has  examined expectations of retirement age in order to assess the 
extent to which individuals are engaging in forward-looking behaviour and to look 
for possible shocks that may cause expectations and outcomes to diverge.
The  distribution  of  expected  retirement  ages  is  heavily  concentrated  and 
dominated by spikes at the state pension ages.  A high proportion of people also 
report that they don’t know when they expect to retire.  But, reported ages do vary 
systematically  with  individuals’  observable  characteristics  in  a  sensible  way. 
More  importantly  from  the  point  of  view  of  modelling  actual  retirement 
behaviour, reported expectations have some additional predictive power for actual 
retirement  behaviour  above  their  correlation  with  individuals’  observable 
characteristics.
The  evidence  supports  the  hypothesis  that point  expectations  are  a  measure  of 
central  tendency  of  individuals’  underlying  probability  distribution,  but  more 
likely to reflect the  mode/ median than the mathematical  expectation.  There  is 
also some evidence that a “don’t know” response may reflect a higher level of 
uncertainty  rather  than  being  a  lazy  or  uninformed  Esponse.  A  particularly 
important finding in this respect is that the majority of individuals who responded 
don’t know in the first wave of the survey do give point expectations in the second 
wave at which point some uncertainty may have been resolved.
There is systematic deviation between individuals’ reported expectations and their
71actual retirement ages, with men retiring earlier than expected on average.  There 
is some evidence that unemployment and health may lead to earlier than expected 
retirement.  The next chapter explores this further by looking at whether there are 
differences  in spending  and measures  of well-being at retirement between those 
who  appear  to  retire  voluntarily  and  those  for  whom  early  retirement  may  be 
involuntary.
72Annex 2: Further regression results
Table A2.1 
When do people expect to retire?
Ordered probit regression.  Dependent variable  1   = expects to retire before state 
pension age, 2 = expects to retire at state pension age, 3 = expects to retire after 
state pension age
Men
Coeff SE
Women
Coeff SE
Individual characteristics
Age in Wave 1 .1247** .0271 .3086** .0500 *
Ln(individual income) in W 1 -.0681 .1053 .1800 .2194
No educational qualification -.0048 .1542 .3003 .2101
Married in W1 -.3293 .2775 -.5811 .4629
Divorced/ widowed in W1 -.2693 .3705 -.5741 .4847
W 1  severity score 2-3 -.2701 .3124 -.1445 .5127
W 1 severity score > 3 -.5803 .5289 -1.0652** .4762*
Occupational pension -.5394** .1927 -.2359 .2392
Saved for retirement -.2502 .1556 .1811 .1954
Employment status and history
Unemployed in W1 -.3782 .3759 -.1412 .5880
Part-time employed in W1 1.0053** .4292 .6207** .2646*
Self-employed in W1 -.0464 .2969 1.3922** .5727*
FT employed > 95% since age 25 -.3583* .2161 -.5899 .4914
% time not working since age 25 -.1910 .9942 .1911 .5524
Cutl 4.9830** 1.690 16.599** 3.161*
Cut2 7.9577** 1.733 18.720** 3.202*
Number of observations 362 193
Log likelihood -213.42 -130.80
Pseudo R2 0.166 0.240
LR X2(24), men; LR X2(14), women 84.96* 82.62*
** Significant at 5% level  *Significant at 10% level
Regression  for men  includes  a  set  of 10  regional  dummies  which  are jointly  significant  at  5% 
level.  Regional dummies are not significant in the case of women, and are excluded.
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Characteristics of “don’t knows”
Results of a probit regression.  Dependent variable 1  = gives don’t know response, 
0 = gives point expectation
Men Women
Marginal Standard Marginal Standard
effect Error effect Error
Individual characteristics
Age in Wave 1 .0148** .0054 .0194* .0109
Ln(individual income) in W1 -.0184 .0165 -.1582** .0531
No educational qualification .0088 .0296 -.0948 .0678
Married in W1 .0530 .0402 -.1641 .1965
Divorced/ widowed in W 1 .2330** .1516 .0077 .1765
W 1   severity score 2-3 .1007 .0947 .3180* .1946
W 1  severity score > 3 .2025* .1590 -.0470 .1493
Occupational pension . 1337** .0441 -.0097 .0697
Saved for retirement -.0569* .0313 -.0400 .0580
Likes current job .0476* .0281 .1233** .0586
Employment status & history
Unemployed in W1 -.0358 .0647 -.0118 .1595
Part-time employed in W1 -.0053 .0674 .1940** .0762
Self-employed in W1 -.0094 .0429 .1839 .2024
FT employed > 95% since age 25 -.0961** .0467 .0772 .1919
% time not working since age 25 -.3030 .2966 .2175 .1549
Distance from actual retirement
One year or less -.0848** .0231 . 1893** .0571
Not retired Wave 2 (>5 years) .1282** .0437 .1064 .0724
Number of observations 426 270
Log likelihood -132.85 -122.64
Pseudo R2 0.2737 0.2520
LR*2(27) 100.15* 82.63*
** Significant at 5% level  *Significant at 10% level
Regressions  for  men  and  women  includes  a  set  of  10  regional  dummies  which  are  jointly 
significant at 5% level
74Table A2.3 
Retirement expectations and outcomes
Results  of  an  ordered  probit  model.  Dependent  variable  1   =  retires  before 
expected age, 2 = retires at expected age, 3 = retires after expected age
Men
Coeff SE
Women
Coeff SE
Individual characteristics
Age in Wave 1 -.0535 .0399 -.0192 .0515
Ln(individual income) in W1 .1763 .1256 -.3270 .2412
No educational qualification .4630** .1806 .1908 .2375
Married in W1 -.3071 .2981 .9196* .4789
Divorced/ widowed in W1 -.7261* .4382 .7640 .5042
W1 severity score 2-3 -.0792 .3422 -1.176** .5610
W1  severity score > 3 .2757 .5423 -.1450 .5559
Occupational pension -.0715 .2425 .2707 .2665
Saved for retirement -.0151 .1821 .1046 .2130
Likes current job -.0000 .1713 -.1300 .2031
Employment status & history
Unemployed in W1 -1.231** .4071 -.2726 .7224
Part-time employed in W1 .7614 .4726 -.0790 .2838
Self-employed in W1 -.0039 .3429 1.414** .6976
FT employed > 95% since 25 .2320 .2386 -.0486 .5024
% time not working since 25 1.450 .9850 -.1478 .5782
‘Shocks’
Change in severity score -.3063* .1813 -.4080* .2413
Change in marital status -.8305* .4790 .0712 .3322
Number  of years  until  expected  age  of -.4249** .0529
retirement
Cutl -4.5316 2.6868 -3.687 3.311
Cut2 -2.5308 2.6778 -1.867 3.306
Number of observations 245 150
Log likelihood 171.034 122.298
Pseudo R2 .2828 0.2110
LRx2(18) 134.9 65.42
* Significant at 5%  ** Significant at 10%
75Chapter 3:  Involuntary retirement and the retirement- 
consumption puzzle
Chapter  1   showed that,  for a sizeable minority of men, retirement appears to be 
involuntary.  These are cases where individuals enter retirement via another non­
working state and are more likely to receive unemployment or disability benefits, 
rather than  start  drawing  a  pension  when  they  leave  employment.  Chapter 2 
supported  the  idea  of  involuntary  retirement  by  showing  that  earlier  than 
anticipated retirement could be linked to health shocks (measured by changes in 
severity scores)  and unemployment.  This  chapter explores whether involuntary 
early  retirement  might,  at  least  partly,  account  for  the  well-documented  fall in 
spending at retirement (the  “retirement-savings” puzzle).  Earlier than expected 
retirement -  through ill-health or redundancy32 -  is likely to be associated with a 
negative wealth shock because of lost earnings and/or pension wealth that might 
cause people to reduce their spending at retirement, rather than smoothing it.  This 
chapter  explores  this  idea  by  categorizing  retirements  as  “voluntary”  or 
“involuntary” and comparing what happens to spending across the two groups.  If
32 Of course, redundancy does not necessarily lead to retirement (permanent labour market exit), 
but the wage cut someone would have to take in getting another job may be enough to make them 
stop working altogether.
76spending falls only among the group of involuntary retirees, it would be consistent 
with the retirement-consumption puzzle being at least partly resolved in terms of a 
negative wealth shock.
3.1  Introduction
A  number of studies have  found that average consumption falls significantly at 
retirement,  even  allowing  for  obvious  work-related  spending  items  (see 
Hamermesh,  1984, Banks et al,  1998, Bemheim et al, 2001, Ameriks et al, 2002, 
Hurd  and  Rohwedder,  2003,  Miniaci  et  al,  2003,  Haider  and  Stephens,  2007, 
Aguiar and Hurst, 2005, and Blau, 2004).  This fall, common across a number of 
countries  (US,  UK and Italy),  across different time periods  and across different 
measures  of spending,  is  at odds with the predictions  of a simplified life-cycle 
model  of consumption  and  has  become  known  as  the  “retirement-consumption 
puzzle”.
Looking at consumption at retirement is important for at least two reasons.  First, 
it can give insights into how well off people are in retirement, compared to when 
they are working.  Particularly if retired people hold substantial  levels  of (non- 
annuitised)  wealth  which  they  use  to  finance  consumption,  looking  directly  at 
spending may provide a better measure of how well off people are than income 
replacement rates.
Secondly, it may provide one way of assessing whether people have saved enough 
for their retirement, an issue attracting increasing policy interest in the UK given 
the  government’s  deliberate  attempt  to  shift  more  of  the  burden  of  pension 
provision  from  the  state  to  individuals.  Looking  at  what  happens  to  people’s
77spending in retirement is one possible way to gauge the adequacy of their saving -  
if people have to reduce spending, contrary to the predictions of a forward-looking 
life-cycle model  of consumption and saving,  it may suggest that they have not 
saved enough.  But,  before drawing policy conclusions,  it is  important to try to 
understand why the drop in spending has occurred -  whether because of irrational 
financial  planning  prior  to  retirement  (Bemheim,  et  al  (2001),  or  earlier  than 
expected  retirement  (Haider  and  Stephens,  2007))  and/or  lower  than  expected 
pension income,  or something else.  Indeed,  a fall in spending may be  optimal 
given  increased  leisure  time  (Hurd  and  Rohwedder,  2003,  Aguiar  and  Hurst, 
2005).
This  chapter  revisits  the  retirement-consumption  puzzle  and  looks  at  what 
happens to spending on food at retirement using panel data drawn from the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS).  Consistent with the earlier findings for the UK 
(Banks et al,  1998),  the data do  show evidence of a fall in mean (and median) 
spending on food around the time of retirement (see Figure 3.1).
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The  rest  of the  chapter  is  as  follows.  The  next  section  summarizes  previous, 
related studies  on the retirement-consumption puzzle.  Section 3.3  discusses the 
data  and  the  definitions  of voluntary  and  involuntary  retirements  and  presents 
some simple descriptive statistics, while section 3.4 presents the results of fixed-
effects  regressions  comparing  spending  at  retirement  for  voluntary  and
involuntary retirees. Section 3.5 offers some conclusions.
3.2  The puzzle and possible resolutions
The fact that observed consumption falls at retirement is a challenge to the simple, 
one-consumption-good  life  cycle  model.  In  its  simplest  form,  with  utility
79dependent only on consumption, no uncertainty and assuming that marginal utility 
is  continuous  and declining in consumption,  the maximisation of lifetime utility 
implies that the marginal utility of consumption, and consumption itself, should be 
smoothed.  In this case, falling consumption at retirement would imply irrational 
behaviour by consumers.  This is the conclusion reached by Bernheim et al (2001) 
who argue that the evidence of a fall in spending at retirement points to people 
using  rules  of  thumb,  rather  than  forward-looking  optimising  behaviour,  to 
determine retirement saving.
One  possible  explanation  is  that  the  studies  capture  a  fall  in  spending  at 
retirement,  which  is  not  the  same  as  a  fall  in utility-producing  consumption at 
retirement.  Households may stock up on durables immediately prior to retirement 
and enjoy a higher flow of services from durables after retirement; thus while their 
observed  spending  may  fall,  their  overall  consumption  remains  the  same. 
However, Miniaci et al (2003) find no evidence of pre-retirement stocking up of 
durables.  Another possible explanation is that there is a necessary level of (non­
utility-producing)  spending  associated  with  working,  for  example  the  cost  of 
buying suits  and travelling to work, that stops when people retire.  Again,  this 
would imply that, while observed spending falls, (utility-producing) consumption 
may be smoothed over retirement.  This effect will be reinforced to the extent that 
the  spending  of  the  retired  on  certain  items  is  subsidised  (transport  and 
prescription charges in the UK, health in the US).  However, Banks et al (1998) 
take out obvious work-related spending items from total spending and look at sub­
components of spending and still find evidence of a fall at retirement.
Two  possible  extensions  to  the  simple  life  cycle  model,  however,  would  be
80consistent with a fall in spending at retirement.
One possibility s that spending falls as a result of the big increase in leisure on 
retirement.33  Spending  would  fall  either,  if  consumption  and  leisure  are 
substitutes in a household utility function, or if time is a substitute for spending in 
a  household  production  function  to  generate  consumption.  Aguiar  and  Hurst
(2005)  use detailed information on food intake and time use in the US  to  show 
that,  despite  a  fall  in  spending  on  food,  nutritional  content  and  quality  are 
maintained and that more time is spent on shopping and food preparation.
As  evidence  in  support  of  the  leisure-substitution  hypothesis,  Hurd  and 
Rohwedder  (2003)  show  that  most people  anticipate  that  spending  will  fall  at 
retirement and, if anything, that the anticipated decline is greater than the fall in 
spending  that  actually  occurred  among  (a  different  group  of)  those  who  had 
already retired  (20%  compared  to  12%  among  married  couples,  for  example). 
Ameriks et al (2002) also find that many people expect to spend less in retirement.
However, this evidence, while interesting, is not conclusive about the mechanism 
that causes actual spending to fall (people may anticipate that spending will fall if 
they are following a simple rule of thumb, for example).  Hurd and Rohwedder’s 
evidence is less convincing for being based on cross-section analysis and there are 
important differences between sub-groups.  For example, anticipated declines in 
spending at retirement vary little with income, wealth and health  status, but the
33 There is clearly an issue about whether such a discrete change is optimal from the individual’s 
point of view given diminishing marginal returns to leisure.  See chapter 1  for further discussion of 
the discrete/ gradual nature of retirement.
81actual  falls  in  spending  are  far greater for those who, post-retirement, are in the 
bottom income and wealth quartiles and self-report poor health.  Using data from 
the  earlier  Retirement  History  Survey,  which  does  link  expected  and  actual 
changes in spending for the same people, Haider and Stephens (2007) show there 
is little correlation between the two -  the fall in spending that occurs in retirement 
is broadly the same whatever people’s prior expectations.
A second possible explanation for the fall in consumption is that retirement may 
be  associated  with  a  negative  shock  to  wealth.  If retirement  is  earlier  than 
anticipated,  for  example,  there  may  be  lost  earnings  and/or  pension  accrual. 
Evidence presented in the two previous chapters supports the idea that there may 
be shocks to the timing of retirement, at least for a (fairly substantial) minority.  In 
chapter 1  it was shown that around one-third of people fell that the timing of their 
retirement  was  forced;  ill-health  and  redundancy  appear to  be  the  most  likely 
factors  that  account  for  such  involuntary  retirements.  These  findings  were 
confirmed  in  chapter  2,  which  showed  more  than  one-third of people retiring 
before  their  expected  age  of  retirement.  Of  course,  earlier  than  expected 
retirement  may  follow  from  a  positive  wealth  shock,  but earlier than expected 
retirement  is  linked  to  both  unemployment  and  changes  in  health.  With  self- 
reported  health  status,  the  findings  on  the  relationship  between  retirement  and 
health are not conclusive.  But,  instrumenting self-reported health  status,  Disney 
et  al  (2004)  present  more  conclusive  evidence  that  changes  in  health  are 
associated with early retirement.
A number of previous studies have explored whether uncertainty over the timing 
of retirement may lie behind the observed fall in spending.  Blau (2004) calibrates
82a model of retirement showing that uncertainty over the timing of retirement will 
generate a fall in spending if retirement is a discrete event.  Banks et al (1998) and 
Bemheim  et  al  (2001)  explore  whether  spending  falls  when  retiremeri  is 
anticipated  by  instrumenting  retirement  with  lagged  retirement  and  age 
respectively.  In both  cases,  the  drop  is  smaller when  retirement  is  anticipated 
(although not  eliminated  altogether).  For the  US,  Haider and  Stephens  (2007) 
reach  a  similar  conclusion  using  subjective  retirement  expectations  as  the 
instrument.  With no data on spending in the retirement survey, it is not possible 
to  follow  Haider  and  Stephens’  approach.  This  chapter  adopts  a  different 
approach  to  testing  the  hypothesis  that  the  fill  in  spending  may  be  linked  to 
unanticipated early retirement, that is to compare the spending of “voluntary” and 
“involuntary” retirees.  The next section discusses in detail how these two groups 
are defined.
3.3  The data
The data are  drawn from the  first eleven waves  of the BHPS  (see  Annex  1   for 
further details on the survey).  The analysis focuses on a cohort of men aged 45 -  
64 in the first year of the survey, a total sample of around 2,000.  Since the BHPS 
covers all ages, it has a smaller number of individuals in the relevant age range for 
studying retirement than, for example, the US Health and Retirement Survey and 
the  new  English  Longitudinal  Survey  of  Ageing.  Nevertheless,  there  is  a 
reasonable-sized  sample  of more  than  500  retirements34  and a  wide  number  of 
variables, including information on spending, well-being, income and health.  As
34 See Bardasi et al (2000) for a study of incomes at retirement using the BHPS
83discussed  further  below,  the  variables  are  often  not  ideal -   the  information  on 
spending,  for  example  is  very  limited  compared  to  the  Family  Expenditure 
Survey,  used by  Banks  et al,  1998,  in their analysis  of spending  at retirement. 
This is discussed further in the concluding section.
Voluntary/ involuntary retirement
Chapter 1  showed that there is a variety of routes into retirement.  The majority of 
men  retire  (ie  self-report  that  they  are  retired)  from  (usually  full-time) 
employment,  but  as  shown  in  Figure  3.2,  around  40%  of  men  move  into 
retirement from another (self-assessed) non-working state, usually unemployed or 
long-term sick/disabled, and there is an increasing proportion of men in these non­
working, non-retired states in the run-up to retirement.
Figure 3.2 
Employment status prior to retirement
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84When  people  are  asked  to  give  their reasons  for  early  retiremeit, the answers, 
summarized,  in  Table  3.1,  broadly  reflect  varying  degrees  of  voluntarism  -  
“offered  reasonable  financial  terms”  and  “to  enjoy  life  while  young  and  fit” 
suggest  that  early  retirement  was  the  individual’s  own voluntary  choice,  while 
“own  ill-health”  and  “redundant,  dismissed  and  no  choice”  suggest  that  the 
individual  retired  earlier than  they  may  have  anticipated  and/or wanted  to.  Of 
course,  these  reasons  may  reflect  an  element  of post-hoc rationalisation and/or 
recall error.  But, as in earlier work (Tanner,  1998) there is a strong link between 
the  route  into  retirement  and  the  reason  given.  Those  who  report  ill-health or 
redundancy  as  the  main  reason  for  early  retirement  are  more  likely  to  enter 
retirement through  another non-working state, while those who  enter retirement 
straight from employment are more likely to report reasonable financial terms or 
enjoying life while young and fit.
Table 3.1
The (main) reason for early retirement
All Retired from 
work
Retired from 
non-work
Own ill-health 23.3% 15.0% 48.5%
Redundant/ dismissed/ no choice 18.1% 15.0% 27.3%
Offered reasonable financial terms 31.6% 36.0% 18.2%
To enjoy life while young and fit 15.8% 20.0% 3.0%
Other 11.2% 14.0% 3.0%
Total 100% 100% 100%
85Source: British Household Panel Survey
This suggests that there are (at least) two distinct experiences of retirement.  For 
the  majority  of people,  retirement  appears  to  be,  broadly,  voluntary.  In  these 
cases, people enter retirement straight from employment and, if they retire early, 
do so because they are offered reasonable financial terms or to  enjoy life while 
young  and  fit.  For  some,  however,  there  is  evidence  that  retirement  is 
involuntary.  They  are more  likely to  cite  ill-health or redundancy as the main 
reason for retiring early and to enter retirement from employment via another non­
working state (suggesting that at the time they leave work, they may not anticipate 
that their exit is going to be permanent).  For the retirement-consumption puzzle, 
this  distinction  is  potentially  important because  those  who  retire  involuntarily, 
earlier than they anticipated or wanted,  are more likely to experience a negative 
shock to their wealth through lost earnings or pension accrual that may cause them 
to reduce  spending  in retirement.  The  issue  explored here  is whether there  are 
observable differences in spending at retirement for the two types of retirees that 
would support this hypothesis.
For the  purpose  of this  analysis,  the  two  types  of retirement  -   voluntary  and 
involuntary -  are defined in the following way:
•  “Voluntary retirees” -  retire directly from working, are observed to work 
for at least two consecutive periods prior to retiring and are not observed 
to re-enter employment after retirement (= 226 retirements).
•  “Involuntary  retirees”  -   retire  from  a  non-work  employment  state 
(typically unemployed or long-term sick/ disabled), are observed working
86prior  to  becoming  unemployed/sick  and  are  not  observed  to  re-enter 
employment after reporting themselves as retired (=57 retirements).  In 
these cases, the date of retirement is redefined to be when the person left 
work rather than when they first self-reported themselves as retired.
Table  3.2  below  provides  further detail  on  how  individuals  are  categorized  as 
voluntary or involuntary retired.  The sequence of employment states (work or 
non-work) in (up to) the five periods prior to the individual reporting themselves 
as retired is  analyzed.  If the individual is working in (at least)  two consecutive 
periods immediately prior to retirement, they are classed as retiring voluntarily.  If 
they experience a period of not-working immediately prior to retirement, but have 
previously been observed working, they are classed as retiring involuntarily.
87Table 3.2
Voluntary and involuntary retirees
Pre-retirement sequence Retirement Number of
W = working, NW = not working type observations
W_W Voluntary 49
W_NW Involuntary 8
w_w_w Voluntary 21
W_W_NW Involuntary 6
W_NW_NW Involuntary 5
w_w_w_w Voluntary 20
W_W_W_NW Involuntary 11
W_W_NW_NW Involuntary 3
W_NW_NW__NW Involuntary 2
wwwww Voluntary 133
WWWWNW Involuntary 8
W_W_W_NW_NW Involuntary 5
W_W_NW_NW_NW Involuntary 4
W_NW_NW_W_W Voluntary 2
W_NW_NW_NW_NW Involuntary 5
NW_W_W_W_W Voluntary 1
TOTAL 283
Source:  British Household Panel Survey
The number of retirements that can be allocated to one of these two groups (283) 
is smaller than the total number of retirements observed in the BHPS sub-sample(around 500).  In the majority of cases this is because the person is never observed 
in work prior to retirement.35  In other cases,  it is because the person re-enters 
employment  after  declaring  themselves  to  be  retired.  The  assignment  of 
individuals  as  “voluntary”  or  “involuntary”  retirees  inevitably  has  a  degree  of 
arbitrariness -  for example the requirement that individuals are observed not to re­
enter work will be more restrictive for those who are observed to retire earlier in 
the  survey  period.  Section  3.4  below  reports  regression  results  using  an 
alternative definition of being out of work for two consecutive periods.  Another 
possible  alternative  would  be  to  use  the  reasons  given  for  early  retirement  to 
categorize people as voluntary and involuntary retirees.  However, since these are 
available only in wave  11, this  would tend to reduce the sample size further and, 
as stated above,  the responses may be  subject to post-hoc rationalisation and/or 
recall error.
The characteristics  of the two groups  of retirees  are fairly distinct,  as  shown in 
table  3.4  below.  Voluntary  retirees  tend  to  have  higher  occupations  and 
educational qualifications and are more likely to have an occupational pension. 
Involuntary retirees  are more  likely to report that their health  limits  their daily 
activities.37  This raises the possibility that any observed differences in spending
35 This is important since retirement for involuntary retirees is re -defined as when they leave work 
rather than when they move from non-work to “retired”.
36 Also, the employment states are those at the time of interview, whereas some individuals may 
change employment state between interviews.
37 This variable  is not available in wave 9 of the BHPS  and must be imputed.  See Section 3  for 
details.
89between the two groups may be attributable to the different characteristics of the 
groups rather than the nature of their retirement and this is explored further in the 
regressions below.
Table 3.3
Characteristics of voluntary and involuntary retirees
Voluntary
Retirees
Involuntary
Retirees
Professional/ managerial occupation 27.9% 17.9%
Manual occupation 52.7% 64.3%
Occupational pension 59.3% 56.1%
Worked in the public sector 76.6% 80.7%
Higher educational qualification 30.9% 17.9%
No educational qualification 31.8% 44.6%
Health limits daily activities (in retirement) 20.3% 42.3%
N 226 57
Source: British Household Panel Survey
Measures of spending in the BHPS
The BHPS  only  collects  information on  food  spending in all waves.  Clearly it 
would  be preferable  to have  a  fuller measure  of household  spending,  but  as  a 
necessary good with a small income elasticity, food provides quite a strong test of 
consumption smoothing; if households do not smooth spending on  food, they are 
unlikely  to  smooth  other  forms  of  spending  (although  if  food  spending  is
90smoothed, it can not be rejected that total spending falls).
Respondents  are  asked “approximately how much does your household usually 
spend each week in total on food and groceries.”  In the first wave, they are asked 
to give a continuous answer; in subsequent waves, they are asked to say in which 
band (out  of 12) their weekly food spending lies.  They are told to  include  all 
food, bread, milk, soft drinks etc, but asked to exclude pet food, alcohol, cigarettes 
and meals out.  Take-aways eaten in the home are, however, included.
To obtain a weekly spending figure, each individual is assigned the mid-point of 
their reported band each year, adjusted for inflation in food prices.38  Comparisons 
with the more detailed spending information in the Family Expenditure  Survey 
shows that mean food spending in the BHPS is slightly higher than in the FES.39 
In part this may reflect the  fact that there  are  fewer observations  in the  lowest 
bands in the BHPS (respondents may ignore atypical weeks when they spend very 
little).  Alternatively,  respondents  may  include  other  grocery  items  that  they 
regularly buy at the supermarket such as washing powder, toilet roll etc.  When 
these items are included in the FES spending figures, the two sets of numbers are 
very similar.
38 For wave 1, the continuous answers are first banded, and then the midpoints are assigned.
39 To calculate the FES  figures, the continuous weekly spending figures are  converted into bands 
and then mid-points as in the BHPS.Income and spending before and after retirement
Table 3.4 summarizes household income and food spending for the two groups of 
voluntary and involuntary retirees, averaged  across all periods before retirement 
and after.  Figures  3.3  and 3.4 present the same information slightly differently, 
showing the paths of the variables in each of the three years before, and the three 
years after, retirement.  In the figures, year 0 represents the first year in which the 
individual is retired.
Table 3.4
Mean income and spending
Before retirement After retirement
Real weekly household income
Voluntary retirees £503 £274
Involuntary retirees £415 £274
Real weekly household food spending
Voluntary retirees £54 £51
Involuntary retirees £58 £51
Source: British Household Panel Survey
As would be expected from their higher level of qualifications and occupational 
groups, voluntary retirees have higher average incomes prior to retirement.  After 
retirement, however, average incomes of the two groups appear to be very similar. 
Figure  3.3  shows  that  both  groups  experience  a  fall  in  income  coinciding  with 
retirement -  the fall is absolutely and relatively greater for voluntary retirees.
92The  summary  statistics  provide  evidence  that  food  spending  at  retirement  also 
behaves  differently  for  the  two  groups.  In  spite  of a  bigger  fall  in  income, 
voluntary retirees experience a smaller fall in food spending.  Their average food 
spending  is  around  £3  a  week  lower  after  retirement  than  before;  among 
involuntary retirees  average  food  spending  after  retirement  is  around  £7  lower 
than it was pre-retirement.  This pattern is reflected in Figure 3.4 -  for voluntary 
retirees, the path of spending is broadly maintained through retirement, while for 
involuntary retirees, there is evidence of a fall in spending around retirement.
Figure 3.3
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93Figure 3.4
Average weekly real food spending (£), by retirement type
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These  preliminary  findings  are  consistent  with  the  hypothesis  that  involuntary 
retirees are more likely to experience a negative wealth shock at retirement that 
causes them to reduce  spending.  But, they are not conclusive  -  firstly because 
they fail to control for other factors (age, for example is related to well-being and 
varies systematically across the groups) and secondly, because of compositional 
changes (i.e. the sample one year after retirement is not necessarily the same as 
the sample two years after retirement and so on).  The next section presents the 
results of regression analysis that tries to control for both these factors.
3.3  Estimation
The  estimation  approach  is  derived  from  a  marginal-utility-of-wealth-constant
94consumption  demand  function,  or  Frisch  function  (see  Browning,  Deaton  and 
Irish, 1985, and Blundell and Macurdy, 1999)
Consumers are assumed to choose consumption and leisure according to the value 
function:
V(A,, t) = max{t/(C, ,L„X,)+Se[ v (Am , t + 1)]}
subject to the following budget constraint:
AM =(\ + r\A,+B,+W,H,-C,)
where dis the consumer’s discount rate, At is total wealth, Ct is consumption, Lt is 
leisure,  Xt  is  a  vector  of  demographics,  r  is  the  (constant)  interest  rate,  Bt  is 
unearned income,  Wt is the wage rate and Ht is number of hours worked.
This  yields  the  following  first-order-condition  for  the  marginal  utility  of 
consumption and the marginal utility of wealth, ?t (= dV /dAt):
Uc(CnL,X,)=X,
X,  =SE',[A„,('l + r)]
implying a consumption demand function of the form,  C,  = C(A,,Wt, Xt).
This allows consumption demand to be expressed as a function of an individual’s 
current  characteristics  (including  wages)  and  a  angle  statistic  -   the  marginal 
utility  of  wealth  -   capturing  all  other  (expected)  future  information  that 
determines  the  level  of  consumption  today.  This  will  include  the  effect  of
95retirement where it is fully anticipated.
With  uncertainty,  shocks  will be reflected in changes  in the marginal utility  of 
wealth from one period to the next.  It is possible to express the stochastic process 
for the marginal utility of wealth as follows:
In Xt = bt  + In  + £t  =  bj + In A0   £  j
j~\  7=0
(where b*t depends on the discount factor, the interest rate and the moments of the 
forecast error e*t).  With this  specification, the marginal utility of wealth can be 
captured by  an  individual  fixed  effect,  ?o, plus  a function of age plus  a random 
error term, reflecting expectational error in the current period.
This allows consumption demand to be modelled as a function of an individual’s 
characteristics (Xit), age (An),  an individual fixed effect (coi) and an expectational 
error term (w„):
h C„ = P'X„ + y,Air + i«S ?G A  *», +u„
g  = 1
Note that wages are not included directly, but are assumed to be determined by the 
individual’s characteristics and age.  The expression for consumption given here 
also includes a variable,  Ru for whether the  individual  is  retired  or not,  and  an 
identifier, G/, denoting which of the two groups of retirees they belong to (G,=1  if 
retirement is voluntary, =2 if retirement is involuntary).  This interaction term is 
included in the estimation to capture the extent to which spending (differentially) 
changes at retirement for voluntary and involuntary retirees.  If retirement is fully
96anticipated then,  under the model specified above, there  should be no change in 
spending  since the  effect of retirement would already have been captured in the 
(constant)  marginal  utility  of wealth.  But,  if involuntary retirement results  in a 
negative  shock to wealth through loss of earnings or pension accrual, retirement 
will coincide with an expectational error that causes consumption to change.  The 
interaction term is not intended directly to estimate the effect on consumption of 
retirement per se, but the extent to which retirement -  and involuntary retirement 
in particular -  is  accompanied by an expectational  error that results  in a fall  in 
spending.  If the initial hypothesis is correct, there should be a significant fall in 
spending only where retirement is involuntary.
The assignment of individuals into groups of voluntary and involuntary retirees is 
somewhat  akin  to  an  instrumental  variables  approach.  Ideally,  what  would  be 
included in the regression is whether the individual experiences a negative wealth 
shock on retirement, but this is unobserved.  Instead, what is included is a term if 
the retirement is involuntary, on the basis that this is likely to be correlated with 
any unobserved wealth  shock.  As  the analysis  in the previous  section showed, 
involuntary  retirement  is  more  likely  to  occur  as  a  result  of  ill-health  or 
redundancy,  both  of which  are  likely  to  mean  loss  of earnings  and/or  pension 
accrual.
In  order  to  interpret  a  significant  coefficient  on  involuntary  retirement  as  an 
indicator  of a  negative  wealth  shock,  there  can  be  no  direct  link  between  an 
individuals’ self-reported employment state and their level of spending.  Clearly, 
this  may  not  be  true  in  the  case  of  ill-health  which  is  linked  to  involuntary 
retirement  and  may  also  have  a  direct  effect  on  spending.  The  regression
97therefore includes a number of variables which attempt to control for health status. 
It is  assumed that other factors that may result in involuntary retirements  do not 
have a direct effect on spending other than through their effect on being retired.
3.4  Regression results
Table  3.5  reports  the  results  from  the  fixed  effects  estimation.  In  all  cases, 
retirement  is  included  as  a  state variable  (ie R =  1   if the  individual is retired). 
Because  the  BHPS  asks  about  “usual  spending  on  food”,  it  is  likely  that  any 
reported change in food will be gradual and will be more likely to be picked up by 
the state variable than by a transition variable.40
The results in column (1) show that, for the sample as a whole, there is a small, 
insignificant  fall  in  spending  after  retirement.  Column  (2)  shows  the  effect  of 
adding a dummy  for involuntary retirement.  The regression results  confirm the 
preliminary  findings  from  the  previous  section.  The  coefficient  on  retirement, 
capturing  the  change  in  spending  associated  with  voluntary  retirement,  is 
insignificant,  but  for  involuntary  retirements  the  coefficient  is  negative  and 
significant:  Involuntary retirement is  associated with a fall in  food spending of 
around  11% and this is significantly different to what happens to spending when 
retirement is voluntary.  This  is  consistent with  the  hypothesis  that involuntary 
retirement  is  associated  with  a  negative  wealth  shock  that  causes  a  fall  in 
spending.  It is interesting that the fall in spending for involuntary retirees occurs
40 There is no significant change in reported usual food spending when retirement is included as a 
transition variable for any of the groups.
98in spite of a significantly smaller drop in income (shown by the results in column
(4)).
Table 3.5
Main regression results
Dependent variable
(1) 
Log food 
spending
(2) 
Log food 
spending
(3)
Log food 
spending
(4)
Log real 
income
Retired -0.0178 0.0052 0.0062 -0.5681**
0.0179 0.0190 0.0189 0.0303
Retired, Involuntary -0.1036** -0.0965** 0.1573**
0.0297 0.0295 0.0476
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Health controls Yes Yes No Yes
N 2505 2505 2505 2505
Notes to table:
Demographic controls = household size, whether the respondent is divorced/widowed/separated, 
whether the spouse is working, age dummies
Health controls = whether the respondent has health problems, number of health problems (if health 
problems>0), whether health limits daily activities
Standard errors included in italics, ** denotes statistically significant at the 5% level (two-tailed tests) 
Controlling  for  health  is  particularly  important  since  ill-health  is  a  cause  of
99involuntary early retirement and may have a separate direct effect on spending. 
The BHPS contains a large number of variables measuring individuals’ health, but 
only a limited number of health variables in all ten waves (see Disney et al (2004) 
for  a  more  detailed  analysis  of health  and  labour  market  exit  using  the  BHPS 
data).  Here,  two  variables  are  used  as  controls  for  health  status.  One  is  the 
number  of health  problems  reported  by  the  individual  in  each  year  (out  of a 
maximum of 13, including arms, legs and hands; sight; hearing;  skin conditions/ 
allergy;  chest/  breathing;  heart/  blood  pressure;  stomach/  digestion;  diabetes; 
anxiety/ depression; alcohol & drugs; epilepsy; migraine and other).  The other is 
whether  the  individual  reports  that  their  health  limits  daily  activities.  This 
variable  is  not  present  in  wave  9,  but  a  value  can  be  imputed  on  the  basis  of 
individuals’ responses in waves 8 and 10.41
Column  (3)  reports  regression  results  excluding  these  health  controls  for 
comparison,  but  there  is  little  change  in  the  results.  If anything,  poor  health 
appears to be associated with an increase in food spending (possibly a substitution 
of home  consumption  for  meals  out)  and  the  magnitude  of the  coefficient  on 
involuntary retirement is slightly larger in absolute terms when health controls are 
included.
41  For  individuals  who  report  the  same  values  in  wave  8  and  10  this  is  fairly  straightforward. 
Where there is a change between waves 8 and  10, the individual is assigned the value in wave  10 
(where  available),  and  otherwise  the  value  in  wave  8.  It  makes  no  difference  to  the  results  if, 
instead, the individual is assigned the value in wave 8 where available and wave 10 otherwise.
100Robustness checks
As  discussed  above,  there  is  an  inevitable  degree  of arbitrariness  in  assigning 
individuals  into  groups  of voluntary  and  involuntary retirees  and  this raises the 
possibility that the  results  may be partly driven by the  chosen criteria.  This  is 
explored further by re-defining retirement as two consecutive periods out of work 
after  age  50  (following  at  least  one  period  observed  in  work).  As  before, 
individuals  are  assumed to retire voluntarily if they report themselves  as retired 
and to be involuntarily retired if they report another non-working state, such as LT 
sick/ disabled or unemployed.  The date of retirement is again taken to be the first 
period out of work.  This is a less restrictive definition of retirement -  there is no 
requirement  that  individuals  do not re-enter work at a later date  and there  is no 
requirement  (for  involuntary retirees)  that  they  self-report themselves as retired. 
Correspondingly, the sample size is slightly higher (325 retirements).
The  fixed  effects  regression  results  incorporating  this  broader  definition  of 
retirement are reported in column (1) of Table 3.6.  The basic result is the same; 
there  is  no  significant  change  in  spending  if  retirement  is  voluntary,  but 
involuntary  retirees  do  experience  a  significant  drop  in  spending.  Using  this 
broader definition,  however,  the  observed fall  in  spending is  smaller  -  less than 
7%.  This is not surprising since this broader definition of retirement potentially 
allows people who  are defined as retired to re-enter work and, correspondingly, 
experience a smaller loss of earnings/ pension accrual.
101Table 3.6
Robustness checks -  definition of retirement 
Dependent variable = (log) weekly real spending on food
(1) (2) (3)
Retired 0.0043 -0.0138 -0.0065
0.0169 0.0144 0.0163
Retired, Involuntary -0.0674 -0.0549** -0.0467*
0.0246 0.0243 0.0273
Temporarily out of work -0.0425** -0.0172
0.0217 0.0242
Log real income No No Yes
Demographic & health controls Yes Yes Yes
N 3300 3835 3835
Notes to table:
Demographic & health controls as in Table 4 
“Retired” = two consecutive periods not in work 
Standard errors included in italics
** denotes statistically significant at the 5% level, * at the  10% level (two-tailed tests)
To explore this further, column (2) includes temporary spells out of work of not 
more  than  one  period.42  They  too  are  associated  with  a  significant  fall  in 
spending, but this  drop  is  smaller again than in the case  of spells of involuntary
42 i.e.  someone is not working in one period, but is in work in the periods immediately before and 
after
102“retirement” of two or more periods out of work.  Moreover, as shown in column 
(3), the drop in spending that occurs with a temporary spell out of work is more 
strongly linked to contemporaneous income.  In general, these results imply that 
the more permanent the involuntary spell out of work (and the greater the loss of 
earnings and pension accrual), the larger the fall in spending.
An alternative explanation for why spending at retirement behaves differently for 
voluntary and involuntary retirees might be that it reflects, not a negative wealth 
shock associated with involuntary retirement, but some of the differences in their 
characteristics.  To  explore  this,  further  regressions  are  run  incorporating 
additional  interaction  terms  to pick up differences  in spending at retirement by, 
respectively,  age  of  retirement,  occupational  pension  status  and  educational 
qualification.  The  results  are  reported  in  Table  3.7.  Note  that  the  original, 
narrower definition of retirement is used.
First,  age  of retirement.  Involuntary  retirees  retire  earlier,  on  average,  than 
voluntary  retirees.  Column  (2)  in  panel  (a)  reports  the  results  when  separate 
interaction terms are included for voluntary retirements that occur at age 65 (the 
state pension age)  and after age 65.  When these  additional terms  are included, 
and  involuntary  retirement  is  compared  to  voluntary  retirements  occurring  at  a 
similar age (ie before age 65), the coefficient on involuntary retirement becomes 
even  larger (in  absolute terms).  Thus,  the drop in  spending when retirement is 
involuntary can not be attributable to the  fact that people retire before the  state 
pension age.
The results in column (1)  in panels  (b)  and (c)  lend  support to the  idea that the
103drop in spending among involuntary retirees may be linked to their lower level of 
occupational pensions and/or educational qualifications (the two are correlated). 
If no account is taken of whether retirement is involuntary or voluntary, changes 
in  spending  at  retirement  are  strongly  correlated  with  pension  status  and 
educational qualifications.  Spending falls  significantly at retirement if someone 
does  not  have  an  employer  pension,  but  not  if they  do  (column  1,  panel  b). 
Similarly,  spending  falls  significantly  at  retirement  for  someone  with  no 
educational  qualifications,  but  not  for  someone  with  qualifications  (column  1, 
panel c).
But,  if pension status  is  further interacted with voluntary/ involuntary retirement 
status, the results in column (2) show that whether or not retirement is voluntary 
or involuntary also matters.  Within the group of men with no employer pension, 
it  is  only  those  who  retire  involuntarily  who  experience  a  significant  fall  in 
spending (panel b), while those who retire involuntarily and do have an emplo>er 
pension experience a (smaller) fall in spending that is significant at the 10% level.
104Table 3.7
Robustness checks -  characteristics of retirees
Dependent variable = (log) weekly real spending on food
Panel a: Age of retirement
(1) (2)
Retired 0.0052 0.0120
0.0190 0.0238
Retired, Involuntary -0.1036** -0.1097**
0.0297 0.0325
Retired at 65, Voluntary -0.0119
Retired > 65, Voluntary
0.0398
-0.0184
Demographic & health controls
0.0385
Yes
Panel b: Employer pension
(1) (2)
Retired 0.0019 0.0155
0.0205 0.0220
Retired, No employer pension -0.0516**
Retired, Voluntary, No employer pension
0.0262
-0.0293
Retired, Involuntary, Employer pension
0.0297
-0.0731*
Retired, Involuntary, No employer pension
0.0376
-0.1732**
Demographic & health controls
0.0446
Yes
Panel c: Qualifications
(1) (2)
Retired 0.0047 0.0105
0.0196 0.0209
Retired, No qualifications -0.0701**
Retired, Voluntary, No qualifications
0.0250
-0.0212
Retired, Involuntary, Qualifications
0.0365
0.0273
Retired, Involuntary, No qualifications
0.0471
-0.2317**
Demographic & health controls Yes
0.0435
Yes
Notes to table:
Demographic & health controls as in Table 4 
Standard errors included in italics
** denotes statistically significant at the 5% level, * at the 10% level (two-tailed tests)
105It is a similar story with educational qualifications.  Within the group of men with 
no  qualifications,  it  is  only  those  who  retire  involuntarily  who  experience  a 
significant fall in spending (panel b).  In this case, however, there is no significant 
fall  in  spending  among  those  who  retire  involuntarily  and  do  have  higher 
qualifications.
These  results  confirm  that  there  is  a  significant  difference  in  spending  at 
retirement between voluntary and involuntary retirees.  In cases where retirement 
is voluntary, there is little evidence to suggest that spending on food falls, even for 
those with no employer pension and no educational qualifications.  But, the fall in 
spending  associated  with  involuntary  retirement  is  bigger  for  those  with  no 
employer  pension  (compared  to  those  with  an  employer  pension)  and  only 
significant for those with no educational qualifications (compared to those who do 
have  educational  qualifications).  Both these characteristics  are  likely to reflect 
low levels of lifetime wealth, which may give individuals less of a cushion against 
negative wealth shocks.
3.5  Conclusions
The  earlier  UK  study  of  consumption  at  retirement  by  Banks  et  al  (1998) 
concluded that the “evidence strongly suggests that there are unanticipated shocks 
occurring around the time of retirement”.  Banks et al (1998) and Bemheim et al 
(2001) found a smaller drop in spending when retirement was anticipated, but the 
results depend on the validity of the instruments for retirement -  lagged retirement 
and  age  respectively.  Here,  a  different  approach  to  looking  at  the  effect  of 
unanticipated early retirement is  adopted by looking directly at the  evidence  on
106the  nature  of  retirement.  The  main  finding  is  that  food  spending  only  falls 
significantly when retirement is involuntary, occurring as a result of ill-health or 
redundancy  for example,  and not when retirement  is  voluntary.  This  finding  is 
robust to alternative definitions of retirement and cannot be explained in terms of 
differences  in  pension  status  and  levels  of  education  between  voluntary  and 
involuntary retirees.  But, among the group of involuntary retirees, those with no 
occupational pension experience a larger fall in spending and only those with no 
educational qualifications experience a significant fall in spending.
This  main  finding  is  consistent  with  the  hypothesis  that  unanticipated  early 
retirement  is  associated  with  a  negative  wealth  shock  that  causes  a  drop  in 
spending, in particular where lower levels of lifetime wealth mean that people are 
less able to cushion the effects of an adverse shock.  The BHPS evidence suggests 
that up to 40% of men may retire involuntarily -  defined by the reason given for 
early retirement or the route into retirement.  Given the magnitude  of the fall in 
food  spending among involuntary retirees (between 7% and  11% depending on 
the definition used), this would be enough to explain the retirement-consumption 
puzzle (3% fall in total non-durable spending) observed in the earlier UK study.
The biggest limitation with this study is that it is restricted to food spending.  If 
spending on a basic item such as food falls, then total spending is almost certain to 
fall,  but  the  same  cannot  be  said  if food  spending  does  not  fall.  The  BHPS 
collects information on two further items of personal spending -  meals out43 and 
leisure -  but only in more recent waves and the sample sizes are not large enough
43 “Meals out” include meals eaten at work and so is a heavily work-related item of spending.
107to  gain  significant  results.  Nevertheless,  the  results  of preliminary  analysis  of 
leisure spending are consistent with the main finding  -  spending  on leisure  falls 
by £3 a week when retirement is voluntary and by £15 a week when retirement is 
involuntary.  As further waves of the BHPS become available, this is something to 
return to in the future.
108Chapter 4:  Pension incentives and early retirement
As  shown  in  chapter  1,  there  has  been  a  fundamental  shift  in  male  retirement 
behaviour  over  a  thiityyear  period,  during  which  time,  the  median  age  of 
retirement fell from 65 to 60.  A large part of this shift is likely to be attributable 
to  incentives  in  pension  schemes,  and  in  particular,  incentives  in  occupational 
pensions.  The period saw an increase in the number of men who belonged to such 
schemes (see chapter 1, table  1.4), increased levels of occupational pension wealth 
among successive cohorts of retirees and a trend for employers to set the scheme 
rules to facilitate or even encourage early retirement before the state pension age.
Unfortunately, the available data do not allow a detailed examination of the extent 
to  which  the  trend  towards  early  retirement  can  be  directly  attributable  to  the 
particular incentives offered by private occupational schemes  at this time.  Most 
household  and  individual  surveys  that  provide  information  on  employment  and 
socio-demographic characteristics do not ask sufficiently detailed questions about 
occupational scheme rules.  In particular, it is not possible to identify the extent to 
which  individuals  were  offered  particular  inducements  to  retire  early  (early 
retirement windows).
Instead,  the  more  modest  aim  of this  chapter  is  to  show  the  degree  to  which 
participation choices  among older workers  can be  affected by the  incentives  in
109their pension schemes.  It does this by modeling the likely (rather than the actual) 
incentives faced by a cohort of individuals approaching retirement and estimating 
the effect of these incentives on labour market exit.
Previous  analysis  has  shown  clear  differences  in  the  retirement  behaviour  of 
people with and without (defined benefit)  occupational pensions in the UK (see 
Disney et al,  1994, Meghir and Whitehouse,  1997, Blundell and Johnson,  1998). 
As  shown  in  figure  4.1,  those  with  occupational  pensions  are  more  likely  to 
remain in employment up to age 60 than those without, but more likely to leave 
after this  age.44  This difference in behaviour has been attributed to the incentive 
structure  of occupational pensions, but this has never been modelled explicitly. 
One contribution of this analysis therefore is to increase our understanding of the 
incentive effects of occupational pensions on retirement.
44 The differences in labour market exits appear to be relatively small, compared to eg the analysis 
in chapter 1.  This is likely to be due to conditioning on labour market participation at age 50.  The 
effects of this selection are not considered explicitly in this analysis.
110Figure 4.1
Survival Probability in the Labour Market, Men by Pension Status
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The  next  section  discusses  the  underlying  approach  to  estimating  the  effect  of 
pension incentives on retirement, which is based on the option value model (Stock 
and  Wise,  1990).  Section  4.2  describes  the  data  and  the  approach  taken  in 
modeling individuals’  retirement incentives.  Section 4.3  presents the estimation 
results and section 4.4 concludes.
4.1  Modeling retirement decisions
The approach to estimating the effect of pension incentives on retirement in this 
chapter (and in chapter 5)  is based on the  option value model  (Stock and Wise, 
1990).  In this model, the individual’s  decision of whether or not to retire today 
involves  a  comparison  of the  expected present  value  of retiring  today  with  the 
expected  present  value  of working  today,  which  in  turn  includes  the  expected 
present value of retiring at all possible future  ages.  Earlier attempts to  estimate
111the effect of pension incentives on retirement based on lifetime budget constraints 
(for example,  Fields  and Mitchell,  1984)  or simpler proportional hazard models 
(for  example,  Diamond  and  Hausman,  1984)  had  considered  forward-looking 
accrual  measures  defined  over  a  single  year  or  a  discrete  period  of time  (for 
example the anticipated change in pension wealth from working between ages 60 
and 65).45  However, a feature of many pension schemes, occupational pensions in 
particular, is that accruals may be non-linear.  So, for example, for a scheme that 
offers an early retirement window for people retiring at age 60, the gain in pension 
received from not retiring at age 58 may be very different to the gain in pension 
received  from  not  retiring  at  age  59.  The  option  value  model  is intended  to
capture  such  non-linear  accruals  by considering  the  gain  from  postponing
retirement until all possible future ages.
The  option  value  model  is  intended to  capture  retirements  that  are  largely
voluntary  and  not  the  result  of  eg  health  shocks  or  redundancy.  It  models
retirement  as  an  individual  choice  and  not  a joint  household  decision.  Also, 
retirement is seen a discrete decision (to work or not work) and a permanent one. 
This  seems  particularly  appropriate  for  individuals  in  defined  benefit  pension 
schemes where there is little incentive to reduce hours (since pension depends on 
final  salary)  and individuals cannot continue to build up their pension once they 
have  left  their  employer.  This  way  of modeling  retirement  may  be  less  well- 
suited to those with defined contribution plans which  offer considerably greater
45  Burtless (1986) estimates the age of retirement as a function of a non-linear budge constraint -  
the changes in social security wealth from working one more year at different ages.
112flexibility.  Finally,  since  the  model  is  concerned  with  the  effect  of pension 
incentives on labour market participation, retirement is synonymous with drawing 
a pension  Since the abolition of the earnings test in the UK (see chapter 6), this is 
not the case with the state pension.  But, until recent legislation, individuals were 
prohibited from continuing to be employed by an employer they drew a pension 
from, so, again, this is not an unrealistic characterization of the situation in the UK 
for most men.
In the original option value model, the value of retirement in period r is defined as 
the  (discounted)  sum  of  utility  associated  with  labour  earnings  (Ys)  up  to 
retirement and the (discounted) sum of utility associated with pension income (Bs) 
from retirement until (known) death in period S, i.e.:
y, (r) = f t8"'Uw  (ys) + f  8~U, (B, (r))
s=l  s=r
Ujy,) = yj +«,  where ws = pm,_, + em
U r (B s) = i k B , f  +£*  W h e r e   Z ,  =  P tr - l   + £ is
where  y  is  the  coefficient  of constant  relative  risk  aversion,  k  >  1   captures 
disutility of work and cos,  are random individual effects, assumed to follow an 
AR(1)  process,  reflecting  individual  preferences  for  work/leisure,  health  or 
unobserved wealth.
The  individual  is  assumed to  compare the  expected present discounted value of 
retirement  today  with  the  maximum  of the  expected  values  from  all  possible 
future retirement dates.  The optimum age of retirement r* is that associated with
113the maximum value from retirement.  An individual will carry on working if there 
is a gain to postponing retirement, i.e.
G,(r')=E,V,(r')-E,V,(l)> 0
Assuming that the  discount rate  is  independent of earnings  and error terms, the 
gain from postponing retirement to period r is defined as follows:
G,(r) = f tSs-'E,Y/ +j^8s-'EAkBAr)Y  o, - £ )
s=t  s=r  s=t  s=t
In other words, it is equal to the expected present discounted value of utility from 
future  earnings  from  working  up  to  r,  together  with  the  expected  present 
discounted value  from the  change  in pension wealth by delaying receipt until r, 
plus  the  expected  present  discounted  value  of  the  difference  in  the  random 
components  of utility,  a  heteroskedastic  error  term  that  increases  in  value,  the 
further r is in the future.
Practically,  this  can be  estimated relatively simply via a probit model in which 
observed  (binary)  retirement decisions  are  estimated  as  a  function of the option 
value from delaying retirement, assuming values of y, k and 8 and assuming that 
the random components of Q(r) are all equal to zero:
Pr[retire in /]= Pr[/30  + filGt(r*) + £ > oj 
This is the approach taken here.
The option value approach captures the full,  financial incentives associated with
114retirement at different ages, but empirically is dominated by future earnings.  This 
is  potentially  problematic  for  (at  least)  two  reasons.  First,  there  may  be 
considerable uncertainty over an individual’s future earnings, particularly at older 
ages.  Given the increasing selection of workers into employment at older ages, it 
may be hard to get unbiased estimates of individuals’ genuine wage opportunities. 
While  pension  accrual  is  also  dependent  on  future  earnings,  it  will  not be  so 
sensitive  to  alternative  assumptions  about  the  profile  of  future  earnings. 
Secondly,  earnings  may  capture individual heterogeneity,  which may also  affect 
retirement decision  -   for  example,  high  wage  individuals  may  have  a  taste  for 
work.  Of course, in principle, it is possible to control separately for earnings, but 
this may be hard in practice since earnings enter the option value in a highly non­
linear fashion.
To avoid the dominance by earnings, Coile and Gruber (2000, 2007) proposed an 
alternative measure  to the  option value  -   the peak value,  which is  equal to the 
difference between the  level  of pension wealth that someone has today  and the 
maximum  level  of pension  wealth  that  they  could  get by  delaying  retirement. 
This  is  intended  to  provide  a  measure  that  reflects  forward-looking  pension 
incentives, but is not primarily driven by future earnings.
The peak value is derived from the option value in the following way.  Making the 
assumptions  that  there  is  no  disutility  from  work  and  that  the  coefficient  of 
relative  risk  aversion  is  equal  to  one  i.e.  y  =  k  =  1  (and  no  random  error 
component), the option value from delaying retirement can be written as:
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s=t  s=r  s=t
which is  equal to  the  expected present discounted value  of future earnings from 
working  up  to  r*  and  the  expected  present  discounted  value  of the  change  in 
pension wealth by delaying pension receipt until r*.  Under the assumptions set 
out above, the value function becomes a ‘revenue function’.  Defining r* purely in 
terms of the age that gives the greatest discounted value of pension benefits, the 
peak value is then equal to this  second term.  Empirically,  as with option value 
model, the effect on retirement of the peak value can be simply estimated using a 
probit model.
Using the peak value avoids the potential problems associated with the dominance 
of earnings  in defining  incentives,  and gives potentially greater bite to pension 
incentives.  However,  by  ignoring  earnings,  it may understate  the  full  effect  of 
financial incentives.  Also, the units of the peak value are income, not the utility 
associated  with  income  and  this  may  underestimate  the  utility  associated  with 
greater leisure in retirement, as well as ignoring diminishing marginal utility from 
additional income.  Coile and Gruber (2007) neatly summarize the pros and cons 
of using  the  peak  value  in  the  following  way  -   the  option  value  is  a  richer 
specification  that,  if  correct,  should  more  accurately  reflect  the  underlying 
incentives in the retirement decision.  But, if the specification is wrong, the peak 
value may give a better approximation.
The main alternative  approach to the  option value model  that can accommodate 
the non-linear incentives in many pension schemes, is the dynamic programming
116model  (see,  for  example,  Rust,  1987,  French,  2005).  Here,  the  individual  is 
assumed  to  optimize  utility  jointly  over  retirement  and  income/consumption46 
subject  to  expected  income  from  employment  and  pensions  associated  with 
alternative retirement dates.
In  a  two-period  setting,  the  option value  model  and the  dynamic  programming 
model  yield  the  same  solution,  i.e.  work  in  period  1   if  the  expected  value 
associated  with  retirement  is  less  than  the  expected  present  discounted  value 
associated with retirement tomorrow.  In a three-plus period setting, however, the 
dynamic programming model  solves  for the expected value of the maximum of 
the  present  discounted  values  of retiring  in  different  periods,  rather  than  the 
maximum of the expected values.  Since the expected value of the maximum of a 
random variable is greater than the maximum of the expected value, the dynamic 
programming model will tend to give rise to relatively greater incentives to delay 
retirement.  These  differences  may  be  particularly  important  where  there  is 
considerable  uncertainty  over  future  pension  values,  such  as  with  defined 
contribution schemes.
While  theoretically  correct,  there  is  no  a  priori  reason  for  thinking  that  the 
dynamic programming model more closely reflects how individuals actually solve 
for their optimal retirement age.  It is therefore  an empirical issue which model 
best captures actual decision-making.  In a test of the two models, Lumsdaine et al 
(1990),  found  that  the  option  value  model  performed  well  against  a  dynamic
46 There is typically no saving.
117programming  model47  in  capturing  individual  responses  to  an  early  retirement 
window in an employer’s defined benefit pension.  However, the two approaches 
would need to be compared across a much larger range of incentive schemes for 
their  relative  performance  to  be  properly  assessed.  Moreover,  the  dynamic 
programming model estimated by Lumsdaine et al (1990) was a relatively simple 
one compared to those adopted by Rust (1987) and French (2005).  Nevertheless, 
the comparison study suggests that the option value model does a reasonable job 
against  the  dynamic  programming  model  at  capturing  the  effect  of  pension 
incentives  on  retirement  behaviour.  The  fact  that  it  is  computationally  much 
simpler makes it relatively attractive to adopt in practice.
4.2  Constructing pension incentive measures
The main data used for analysing retirement behaviour in this chapter are drawn 
from  the  UK  Retirement  Survey  (see  discussion  in  chapter  2  for  further 
information on this  survey).  Among  available  surveys  in the  UK,  this  offers  a 
relatively large sample of people in the relevant age range and rich demographic, 
economic and health information on individuals and their spouses in both waves. 
And  it  has  employment  history  information  and  pension  history  information 
dating right back to individuals' first jobs.  However, the survey does not collect 
earnings  history  information  which  is  needed  to  calculate  exact  pension 
entitlements for each individual. Instead, as described below (see Box 4) earnings 
profiles from cross-section surveys are matched on the basis of cohort, education
47  In  practice,  there  are  several  dynamic  programming  models  corresponding  to  alternative 
specifications of the error terms.and industry.  Another drawback of the survey is that individuals are not asked to 
provide  detailed  information  on  the  rules  of their  employers’  pension  (if they 
belong to  one).  Some  information is  available  on eg the normal retirement age. 
But, other aspects of the scheme rules, such as accrual rates, are unavailable and 
are imputed according to the rules of the most common scheme  in the  sector in 
which the individual works.  A final drawback is that there is no way of knowing 
if individuals were offered particular early retirement windows.
The  analysis  of retirement behaviour is based on a sub-sample of people in the 
Retirement Survey. The group comprises those who were:
•  below the state pension age in Wave 1, ie men aged 55-64 or women aged 
55-59 in 1988/9;
•  working in Wave  1   with non-missing earnings information and no income 
from  occupational  pension  schemes/unemployment  benefit/income 
support; and
•  interviewed in both waves.
Excluding people who fail to meet any one of these criteria leaves 456 individuals 
-  283 men and  173 women. Each of these individuals remains in the sample from 
1989  until  they  leave  employment,  leaving  a  total  sample  of  1,998  person 
observations.  Summary sample  characteristics,  based on all person-observations 
are given in Table 4.1.
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Sample Characteristics
Men Women
Number of person observations 1276 722
Mean age 61.50 59.87
Proportion currently married 0.8659 0.7659
Age difference between individual and spouse (years) 2.80 1.17
Net earnings ($) 18570 9064
Proportion with an occupational pension 0.6857 0.3850
Proportion of women paying reduced rate NI 0.0000 0.7410
Length of time in current job (years) 12.16 9.85
Proportion of time in FT employment 0.6143 0.2341
Industry = energy 0.0940 0.0000
Industry = engineering 0.0030 0.0457
Industry = manufacturing 0.2014 0.1191
Industry = distribution 0.1951 0.1551
Industry = services 0.2429 0.6053
Industry = government 0.0635 0.0748
Zero financial wealth 0.1897 0.1856
£1 - £3000 financial wealth 0.4036 0.4460
£3000 - £10000 financial wealth 0.2045 0.1717
>£10000 financial wealth 0.1575 0.1399
Missing financial wealth 0.0447 0.0568
No qualifications 0.4397 0.6108
School qualifications 0.4287 0.3047
College 0.1317 0.0845
Health in 1988 (severity score) 0.3017 0.3670
Variable definitions
Severity score = measure of self-assessed health status based on the international classification of 
impairments, disabilities and handicaps (ICDIH). Separate scales are constructed for areas of 
locomotion, reaching and stretching, dexterity, seeing, hearing, continence, communication, 
personal care, behaviour, intellectual functioning, consciousness, digestion and disfigurement. 
The severity score is constructed as a weighted average of the three highest severity scores from 
the 13 areas: Highest + 0.4(second highest) + 0.3(third highest).
120There are  several different elements to the  financial retirement incentives  facing 
the cohort of individuals in the Retirement Survey (see also Box 1  in chapter 1  for 
an overview  of the UK pension system).  Table 4.2  summarises  labour market 
participation and income receipt by age using data from the Family Expenditure 
Survey  1994-5  (corresponding to the second wave of the Retirement Survey).  It 
shows  relatively  high  rates  of  labour  market  withdrawal  among  men  before 
eligibility for state pensions (the basic state pension and the state earnings-related 
pension scheme, SERPS), which are payable from age 65 for men and age 60 for 
women.  Before  this  age,  private  pensions  (typically  from  former  employers), 
disability benefits and other benefits (unemployment benefits and income support) 
provide alternative early retirement vehicles.  It is important to stress that private 
pensions and disability benefits  are not always alternative pre-retirement income 
sources,  but  are  often  received  together  by  the  same  people.  The  fact  that 
disability benefit was not means-tested prior to April 2001  meant that it could be 
received in conjunction with  other forms  of income.  Three-quarters of people in 
receipt  of disability  benefit  income  also  received  some  money  from  a  private 
pension.
121Table 4.2
Labour Market Participation and Income Receipt
Not in State Private Disab Dis + Other
work pension pension benefits Private benefits
Men
50-54 0.150 0.000 0.094 0.073 0.023 0.065
55-59 0.359 0.000 0.343 0.138 0.082 0.072
60-64 0.553 0.000 0.539 0.209 0.147 0.123
65-69 0.897 0.812 0.741 0.166 0.131 0.053
Women
50-54 0.290 0.050 0.104 0.040 0.013 0.048
55-59 0.467 0.097 0.198 0.039 0.006 0.052
60-64 0.769 0.797 0.360 0.024 0.015 0.048
65-69 0.915 0.959 0.412 0.000 0.000 0.046
Source: Family Expenditure Survey  1994-5
The  approach  to  constructing  these  various  elements  of  the  pension  system 
(broadly defined) for each individual in the Retirement Survey is discussed below. 
Potential  sources  of  variation  in  total  pension  wealth  and  accrual  rates  are 
highlighted since these are crucial for identifying the impact of pension incentives 
on retirement behaviour in practice.
The basic state pension
The basic state pension is a flat rate pension paid to men from age 65 and women 
from age 60 who have made sufficient contributions over their working lifetimes.
122Since  1989, receipt has not been subject to any earnings test (see chapter 6).  As 
shown in Table 4.1., most women in the Retirement Survey cohort chose to pay 
the  reduced  rate  of married  women’s  national  insurance  contributions  and  will 
therefore receive no  state pension in their own right, but only be eligible  for an 
addition to their husband’s pension.
Calculation of basic  state pension entitlement is  straightforward.  It depends  on 
the total number of years' contributions and, for a married woman, on whether she 
opted to pay reduced rate National Insurance contributions.  This  latter piece of 
information  is known directly  from the  Retirement  Survey.  Although the basic 
state pension is flat rate, total wealth will vary across individuals because of the 
dependant's  allowance  and  because  of  the  fact  that  widows  not  entitled  to  a 
pension in their own right can claim their former spouse's pension in full when 
their  spouse  dies.  In  these  cases,  husbands'  total  pension  wealth  needs  to  be 
computed  over the  life  of the  couple,  based  on  the  age  difference  between  the 
spouses. Obviously, the larger the age difference between husband and wife, the 
greater the husband's total pension wealth.
The State Earnings Related Pension Scheme (SERPS)
The state earnings-related pension scheme (SERPS) was introduced in 1978 and at 
the time, was intended to pay a pension worth one-quarter of an individual’s best
123twenty years  of earnings.  However, the majority of people in the Retirement 
Survey cohort were not eligible for SERPS.  For women, this was because they 
had given up their right to a state pension at all; for around two-thirds of men, it 
was  because  they  belonged  to  an  occupational  pension  and  contracted  out  of 
SERPS.  Only a minority of people in the sample of retirees remained in SERPS, 
although they form an interesting group to  look at since  SERPS was nearing its 
peak in terms of generosity at the time they were retiring.
The precise formula for calculating an individual’s SERPS pension is given by:
Earnings up to an annual upper earnings limit (UEL) are re-valued to the year of 
reaching state pension age (R) using an index of economy-wide average earnings 
(Y r/Y i).  The  lower  earnings  limit  (LEL)  in  the  year  prior  to  the  individual 
reaching state pension age is deducted from each year's re-valued earnings and the 
net of LEL earnings are multiplied by an accrual factor (?Rt).49  For people retiring
48  Its  generosity  was  reduced by  subsequent reforms  and,  in 2004,  SERPS  was  replaced  by  the 
state  second  pension  (S2P),  which  is  eventually  to  become  a  flat-rate  top-up to the basic  state 
pension.
49  This  formula  changed  from  fom  April  2000.  Instead  of uprating  annual  earnings  and  then 
subtracting  the  LEL  from  the  year  prior  to  retirement,  the  lower  earnings  limit  from  the  year 
worked  is  subtracted  from  earnings  first  and  then the  difference  is  uprated  in  line  with  earnings 
growth.  Since the LEL is annually uprated in line with the Basic State Pension, ie with prices, this 
has the effect of reducing the generosity of SERPS.
SERPS =  2  X„  W— LEL. where  W - max (Wt, UELt)
124before 2000 the accrual rate was 1.25% a year.  Given individual earnings profiles 
(see Box 4)  SERPS  entitlements  are  fairly  straightforward to calculate.  People 
who are in occupational pension schemes and married women who have opted to 
pay  reduced  rate  National  Insurance  contributions  are  assumed  to  have  zero 
SERPS entitlement.
There are several potential  sources of variation in  SERPS pension wealth across 
individuals.  Total  wealth,  but  not  accrual,  will  be  affected  by  an  individual's 
employment  history  since  1978  -  both  the  number  of years  they  have  been  in 
employment and their earnings -  while projected earnings in the future will have 
an  impact  on  expected  total  wealth  and  accrual.  Another  important  factor  for 
determining total wealth (but not accrual) will be the individual's age in 1978; this 
was  when  SERPS  was  introduced.  The  maximum  SERPS  pension  to  which  an 
individual could  be  entitled,  for each year of retirement  since  1978  is  shown in 
figure  4.2.  (and  also  the  SERPS  entitlement  based  on  average  earnings).  For 
example,  someone reaching state pension age in  1979 would receive practically 
no  SERPS pension since they would only have been building up entitlement for 
one  year.50  Someone  retiring  in  1998  could  have  accrued  rights  to  a  SERPS 
pension of up to £5,000 a year by earning the upper earnings limit for 20 years.5 1 
Finally, the fact that widows can claim their former husbands' SERPS pensions if 
they  receive  no  pension  in  their  own  right  means  that,  as  with  the  basic  state
50 Individuals cease to build up entitlements once they pass the state pension age.
51  Accrual rates will change after 2000, but this reform will not affect the cohort of individuals in 
the Retirement Survey all of whom will have reached the state pension age before then.
125pension,  a man's  marital  status,  and the  age  difference  between them  and  their 
spouse also affects their total pension wealth and accrual.
Figure 4.2 
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Where individuals had retired by the second wave and report pension receipt, their 
estimated SERPS pension can be compared with the actual SERPS pension they 
received.  The correlation coefficient is positive and significant, but is fairly low 
(0.3334)  compared to that for occupational pensions  (see below).  On average, 
estimated  SERPS  pensions  (£2,406)  are  lower  than  actual  pensions  received 
(£2,697).  One possible explanation for the low correlation is that individuals who 
are in SERPS -  and not therefore in occupational pension schemes  -  are likely to 
have had more variable employment histories than those who are in occupational 
schemes.  The method for estimating earnings profiles may be missing  a  lot of
126variation  in  their  previous  earnings,  which  would  also  matter more  for  SERPS 
than for occupational pensions which are typically determined only according to 
recent years' earnings.
Means-tested benefits and disability benefits
In addition to the basic state pension and SERPS, there are two other state benefits 
that are taken up widely by older non-workers -  means-tested income support and 
disability  benefits  (incapacity  benefit,  formerly  invalidity  benefit).  Income 
support is a flat rate, non-contributory means-tested benefit, paid automatically to 
people aged 60 or more who do not work.  Unlike people in younger age groups, 
the over-60s do not have to show that they are actively seeking work in order to 
qualify.  In the analysis, income support is ignored since it is universal.
Incapacity benefit (formerly invalidity benefit) is a contributory benefit paid to the 
long-term sick and disabled.  Receipt is  conditional on medical certificates  from 
an individual’s own doctor (in the case of invalidity benefit) or on being assessed 
on  an  ‘all  work  test’  by  a  doctor  employed  by  the  Benefits  Agency  Medical 
Service (in the case of incapacity benefit).
127Box 4 Imputing earnings histories
Earnings  histories  are  absent  in  the  Retirement  Survey.  But  the  survey  does 
provide detailed work histories documenting spells in employment, whether the 
employment  was  part-time  or  full-time  and  in  which  industry  the  individual 
worked, which, together with information on age and education, allow us to match 
earnings  profiles  from  cross-section  data.  There  is  no  single  dataset  with 
consistent  information  on  these  variables  going  back  to  1978.  Instead,  we 
combine information from two datasets to get consecutive cross-section waves of 
data from  1978-89 -  the Family Expenditure  Survey (1978-86) and the General 
Household Survey (1987-9).  Projecting forward from  1989 we assume constant 
real wages.
We also exploit the earnings information that is available in the first wave of the 
Retirement Survey to construct an individual fixed effect, which we use to adjust 
the individual's entire earnings profile. We assume that the wage of individual i in 
cohort/education/industry sub-group g in period t can be expressed as
W ig l.  ? ,W g,
where ?i is a constant individual fixed effect,  Wig88/Wg88, where  Wig88 is taken 
from the Retirement Survey and  Wg88 is calculated from the  cross-section data. 
Our  underlying  assumption  is  that  macro  shocks  affect  everyone  in  the 
cohort/education/industry  sub-group  in  the  same  way  and  there  are  no 
idiosyncratic  shocks  changing the ordering  of individuals  of the  same  cohort in 
the income distribution.
128One possible way to treat entitlement to invalidity benefit would be to assume that 
only individuals who received the benefit were eligible, and that only those who 
satisfied the eligibility conditions received the benefit.  However, this assumption 
seems inappropriate given the fourfold increase in the number of people receiving 
invalidity benefit between  1980 and  1994, which is unlikely to reflect such a big 
increase in underlying levels of disability.  The alternative approach taken here is 
to calculate  an individual’s  invalidity benefit wealth on the basis of an assigned 
probability that they will receive the benefit.  These probabilities are derived from 
estimating  a  probit  model  for  receipt  of  invalidity  benefit  as  a  function  of 
characteristics such as age,  education, region,  tenure, marital  status and spouse's 
employment  status  using  data drawn  from the Family Expenditure  Survey from 
April  1988 to March  1994.  Probabilities for individuals in the Retirement Survey 
are imputed on the basis of matched characteristics. The probit results are reported 
in the Annex to this chapter.
Private pensions
Compared to most other European countries the United Kingdom has a high level 
of  coverage  of  private  pensions,  including  both  occupational  pensions  and 
individual retirement accounts (personal pensions).  For the cohort of retirees in 
the  Retirement  Survey,  defined benefit  occupational  pensions  dominate private 
pension incentives  -  and are likely to be more important than state pensions  in 
determining retirement for those who belong to  such schemes.  Nearly 70%  of 
men and 40% of women in the sub-sample analysed here had an employer pension 
(see Table 4.1).  Coverage  of individual  DC plans was much  lower among this 
cohort  (see  Table  1.4  in  chapter  1)  and  these  pensions  are  excluded  from  the
129analysis  in  this  chapter,  not  least  because  the  survey  contains  very  little 
information  on  the  value  of wealth  held  in  defined  contribution  schemes  that 
would allow any reasonable estimates of wealth and accrual effects for this type of 
scheme.  Excluding DC  schemes will mean mis-measurement of pension wealth 
for some individuals, but the effects of this should be relatively small few people. 
Table  1.4 suggests  that among the cohort of men bom  1920-29, which includes 
most  in  the  Retirement  Survey,  approximately  15%  had  a  personal  pension, 
although  this  had  increased  to  more  than 30%  among the  cohort bom  1930-39. 
However,  many  of these  are  likely  to  be  self-employed,  and  will  have  been 
excluded  from  the  sub-sample  analyzed here.  Moreover,  among the employed, 
levels  of pension wealth held  in personal pensions  are  likely to be  fairly small 
since  individuals would only have been able to  contract out  of the  state  system 
into such schemes from 1988 onwards.
The  pension  received  in  a  defined  benefit  occupational  pension  scheme  (p) is 
typically determined by a formula of the type:
P R=NR <t>(PE «~PLE LR _ t)
where /   is the  scheme-specific accrual rate,  PEr is  ‘pensionable earnings’  at the 
time of retirement, typically the individual's average earnings in the last year, or 
last few years, before retirement,^ is the ‘integration factor’ (zero or one), LEL is 
the lower earnings limit in the Nation Insurance system,  and N is the number of 
years that the individual has belonged to the scheme at the time of retirement.  N 
is known from information in the Retirement Survey, where respondents are asked
130how long they have belonged to their occupational pension scheme.  However, the 
other parameters,/,/ and the choice of pensionable earnings have to be assigned.
The  main  distinction  in  assigned  accrual  rates,  pensionable  earnings  and 
integration factors is between those working in the private sector and those in the 
public  sector.  Based  on  the  responses  in  the  government’s  1991  survey  of 
occupational pensions, it is assumed that individuals in the private sector face an 
accrual rate of l/60th and an integration factor of 1  and a definition of pensionable 
earnings  that  takes  the  best  three  out  of  the  last  ten  years’  earnings.  For 
individuals  in  the  public  sector,  it  is  assumed  that  they  face  an  accrual  rate  of 
l/80th and an integration factor of 0, and that pensionable earnings are taken as the 
best year's earnings out of the last ten years.
Comparing the  estimates  of individuals'  occupational  pension  income  with  the 
actual occupational pension they received (where this information is available, ie 
for individuals who had retired by the second wave of the Retirement Survey and 
reported  pension  receipt),  the  correlation  coefficient  is  positive,  significant  and 
high (0.7868).  As with SERPS, however, the average amount received is under­
estimated (5,088 compared to an actual average annual pension of 4,841)
By construction total occupational pension wealth -  and accrual rates -  will vary 
across individuals according to whether they work in the public or private sector. 
But there  are  other  sources  of variation  in both  total  wealth  and  accrual  rates. 
Total wealth will vary according to the number of years  that the individual has 
belonged to the scheme, while projected earnings in the future will have an impact 
on expected total wealth and accrual.
131Further  variation  in  accrual  rates  comes  from  differences  across  occupational 
schemes  in the  normal  retirement  age -  defined by  Inland  Revenue  as  the  age 
members can start drawing a pension with no reduction for early payment.52  We 
assume that people can continue to accrue rights to occupational pensions beyond 
this age (up to a maximum of forty years), but for each year that they continue to 
work beyond this age they lose a year's pension.
As  shown in Figure 4.3,  there has been a gradual fall in normal retirement ages 
among  private  sector  scheme  members  since  1971  (almost  all  public  sector 
scheme  members  have  a  normal  retirement  age  of  60)  and  an  increasing 
proportion with a normal retirement age of 60.  In part, this may reflect the growth 
in  female  employees  who  belong  to  occupational  pensions,53  but  even  among 
men, the proportion with a normal retirement age of 65  fell from 87% in  1971  to 
68% in 1991.
The  trend  towards  early  retirement  may  partly  be  explained  by  the  increasing 
number with a normal retirement age below  65.  But,  a complete picture of the 
incentives to retire  early would also have to  take  account of schemes’ provision 
for early retirement due to ill-health or on other grounds.  As shown in Table 4.3. 
provision for early retirement on the grounds of ill-health became more generous
52  The  survey  asks  ‘At what age will you start to  receive  the pension’  and then asks  ‘is  that the 
usual age for drawing a pension’, which it is for 90% of respondents.  Where information on usual 
pension age is missing, we assume that it is 65 (the modal age).
53 Since the Barber ruling of 1990, schemes must have the same normal retirement age for men and 
women.
132during the  1970s and  1980s; by  1991  more than half of members in private sector 
schemes would be given an enhancement to the pension they had accrued up to 
the point of retirement.
Figure 4.3
Normal retirement ages, private sector scheme members
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133Table 4.3
Provision for retirement on grounds of ill-health, private schemes
1971 1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 2000
Better than accrued 15% 38% 46% 45% 47% 54% 43%
Accmed only 28% 28% 33% 22% 13% 6% 20%
Less than accrued 57% 34% 21% 28% 23% 14%
Health insurance 5% 14% 15% 7%
Money purchase 3% 11% 14%
Other 26%
“Better than accrued” means that individuals are given an enhancement to the pension they have 
accrued, sometimes up to the amount they would have received if they had worked up to the 
normal retirement age.  “Accrued only” means that individuals receive the pension they have 
accrued with no reduction for early retirement.  “Less than accrued” means that individuals receive 
a smaller annual pension than they have accrued to take account of earlier retirement.
The figures for 2000 are not directly comparable with those from previous years because of the 
high proportion of other (typically offering different combinations of the other options).
Source: Government Actuary’s Department, Survey of occupational pension schemes, various 
years
The  government  actuary  department’s  (GAD)  surveys  of occupational  schemes 
also revealed widespread (and varied) provision for early retirement, other than on 
grounds  of  ill-health.  In  1987,  for  example,  the  option  to  retire  early  was 
available to 95% members; in 12% of cases at the member’s initiative, 22% at the 
employer’s  initiative  and  65%  at  either.  In  most  cases,  early  retirement  was 
possible  from  age  50.  The  details  of provisions  for  early  retirement  are  not 
formally documented in the GAD surveys, but include paying a pension based on 
accrued service with a reduction factor (often actuarially favourable), applying a 
reduction  factor  to  a  pension  based  on  full  potential  service  to  the  normal 
retirement  age  and  immediate  retirement  based  on  accrued  pension  with  no 
reduction.
134The Retirement Survey does not contain any information about what provision is 
made for early retirement in the scheme that the respondent belongs to,  and we 
make no additional assumptions about what early retirement benefits the scheme 
might  provide.  Thus  what  is  modeled  is  wealth  and  accrual  under  a  stylized 
version  of  the  individual’s  standard  scheme,  with  no  provision  for  early 
retirement.  This  almost  certainly  fails  to  capture  the  actual  set  of retirement 
incentives facing some individuals, and in particular, will tend to under-estimate 
the  incentives  to  retire  early.  With  this  important  caveat  in  mind,  we  present 
estimates  of  total  pension  wealth  and  the  forward-looking  peak  value  for 
individuals  in  the  Retirement  Survey  and  then  estimate  the  effect  of pension 
incentive measures on the timing of retirement.
Total Pension Wealth and Accrual Measures
Estimates  of total pension wealth  and peak values  are presented in table 4.4 for 
men, separately for those with and without an occupational pension.  Peak values 
are  shown  since  they  are  easier  to  interpret  than  option  values,  which  are 
expressed  in utility terms.  In practice,  option values  typically remain positive, 
even up to age 70.  Partly, this reflects typically low replacement rates in the UK, 
but it is also driven by the assumption that earnings remain constant in real terms 
indefinitely,  which may be unrealistic.  While  individual  wage profiles  derived 
from panel data show no or little decline in real wages, there is a high degree of 
selection,  which needs  to be  taken into  account.  A better understanding  of the 
true wage opportunities for older workers is an important area for future research, 
but beyond the scope of this thesis.
135Table 4.4
Estimated pension wealth and peak values (£, 1998), men only
No occupational pension  With occupational pension
Age Mean wealth Mean peak value Mean wealth Mean peak value
57 51,873 4,545 69,724 14,764
58 54,387 3,998 75,962 12,235
59 57,654 3,683 77,299 9,329
60 61,190 3,456 80,684 8,051
61 64,905 2,937 81,289 6,398
62 65,499 2,039 83,265 4,644
63 70,097 1,050 88,741 2,644
64 71,905 1,195 87,824 3,139
65 70,723 -5,403 89,018 -3,312
66 58,099 -5,106 74,862 -3,307
67 45,886 -4,854 56,872 -3,819
68 32,430 -4,563 49,784 -4,568
69 21,808 -4,546 26,064 -4,869
70 15,283 -4,282 17,506 -5,634
The  values  for  wealth  and  peak  value  in  table  4.4  do  not  represent  true  age 
profiles since the mean values are calculated across an unbalanced panel.  In other 
words, the sample of men observed at age 58 is not the same as the sample of men 
observed at age 59, and so on.  The age profile will be affected by cohort effects 
(the  older men  in the  sample  are  drawn  from a different cohort to the younger 
ones), as well as by the increasing selection of individuals as retirements increase
136with  age.  Nevertheless,  the  values  give  some  indication  of the  magnitude  of 
wealth  and accrual  values  at different ages,  and  of the  difference between men 
with and without an occupational pension.  Those with occupational pensions tend 
to  have  higher  peak  values,  at  least  up  to  the  state  pension  age  -  and higher 
wealth.  These incentives could work in either direction towards earlier retirement 
(through higher wealth values)  or later retirement (through higher peak values). 
The observed pattern of exits suggests that the effect of the higher peak values is 
likely to dominate at least at younger ages,  encouraging men with occupational 
pensions to stay in employment. It is worth pointing out that although the typical 
annual  occupational  pension  is  considerably  higher  than  the  typical  SERPS 
pension, the difference between total pension wealth for people with occupational 
pensions  and  those  without  s  reduced  by  the  more  generous  survivors'  benefit 
provisions  of SERPS.  In  the  case  of SERPS,  the  surviving  spouse  inherits  the 
pension in full; in the case of occupational pensions, they inherit only half.54
4.3  Estimating the effect of  pension incentives on retirement
The effects of pension incentives on retirement are estimated by means of a probit 
model.  As  described in section 4.1.  above,  this  is  equivalent to  estimating the 
option value model, assuming particular values for the parameters  k (set =  1.5), y
54 The survivors' benefit was due to be cut to half in SERPS from April 2001. However, in the run 
up  to  the pre-announced  reform  many  people  were  issued  the  wrong  information  in  the  form of 
leaflets that did not refer to the reform.  The change was delayed to October 2002 and those who 
can show that they were mis-informed will keep their original entitlement.
137(set = 0.75) and fi (set = 0.97) and assuming that the random error component is 
equal to zero.
For each individual i, we define D/ = 1  if the individual has left the labour market 
in  period  t  (conditional  on  being  in  the  labour  market  in  period  t-1).  The 
probability of this  event is then modelled as  a function of observable household 
and individual characteristics as well as the pension incentive variables. Denoting 
the observable characteristics as Z/, and the pension incentive variables as h, the 
conditional probability model may be expressed as:
Pr(D„  =1 )=G{a'Z„+bIu)
where  G  is  the  cumulative  distribution  function  of  unobservables  in  the 
conditional  exit  model,  assumed  to  be  normal,  and  a  and  b  are  unknown 
coefficients,  estimated  using  a  probit,  pooling  all  five  years  of  retirement 
information.
We estimate different specifications using alternative pension incentive variables. 
Because the option value model may be empirically dominated by future earnings, 
we  try  a measure  of peak value  and ve also try the single-period accrual to see 
how  it compares.  In each case,  we  also  include  a measure  of discounted total 
pension wealth for the individual, accrued up to period t-1, plus the same variable 
for the spouse, to take account of the fact that higher levels of wealth are likely to 
cause  the  individual  to  retire  earlier,  independently  of  the  effect  of  possible 
additions  to  that  wealth  from  staying  in  work.  We  also  include  a  measure  of 
financial wealth and housing tenure, proxying for housing wealth.
138In  order  to  identify  the  effects  of incentive  measures  on  retirement  behaviour, 
these measures must vary across individuals and/or over time  conditional on the 
other  socio-demographic  covariates  that  would  be  included  in  a  model  of 
retirement.  As  the  previous  discussion  of  the  construction  of  the  pension 
incentive measures has  shown, there are several potential sources of variation in 
total  wealth  and  in  the  forward-looking  accrual  measures  for  each  of the  four 
separate elements of the pension system (summarized in Table 4.5).  Almost all of 
the sources of variation affect both total pension wealth and accrual.  However, 
future earnings will affect forward-looking accrual measures but not current total 
pension wealth, while total wealth (but not accrual) varies with past earnings and 
with the individual's date-of-birth (in the case of individuals with SERPS).
139Table 4.5
Sources of variation in pension incentives across individuals
Wealth Accrual
Marital status and age of spouse BSP, SERPS, OP ✓ ✓
Whether spouse paid reduced rate NI BSP, SERPS ✓
Past earnings SERPS, OP S
Future earnings SERPS, OP ✓
Date of birth SERPS V
Number of years with current employer OP V S
Accmal rate SERPS, OP S V
Pensionable earnings OP s s
Normal retirement age OP s
Region, tenure, spouse’s employment, 
education, age
IVB s
BSP = basic state pension; SERPS = state earnings-related pension scheme; OP = 
occupational pension; IVB = invalidity benefit
Simple OLS regressions of the pension wealth and accrua 1  measures on the full set 
of control variables  confirm that there  is  independent variability in the pension 
measures.  The results, reported in Table A4.2 in the Annex to this chapter, show 
that  nearly  40%  of total  pension  wealth  remains  unexplained  by  all the  other 
included regressors,  including option values.  For the  option value,  24%  of the 
variation  remains  unexplained  by  the  other  regressors,  including  total  pension 
wealth.  For peak value, the proportion is more than 50%.
Turning  to  the  conditional  exit  probability  estimates,  Table  4.6  presents  the 
marginal  effects  and  standard  errors  from  a  Probit  regression  for  three 
specifications  estimated  using  data  on  the  sample  of  men  in  the  Retirement 
Survey.  The columns vary  according to the  specification of age effects.  In the 
first column, a linear age term is allowed.  If all other age effects are due to wealth
140and incentive effects, this specification would be adequate.  However, given that 
the survey mixes different cohorts and that age may reflect preferences as well as 
incentives, the second column includes a set of dummies for single year date-of- 
birth cohorts.  The final column includes a full set of age dummies.
When  a  full  set  of age  dummies  is  included,  the  accrual  effects  are  typically 
insignificant.  Including a full set of age dummies risks “over-fitting” the data and 
removing the effect of pension incentive measures on retirement, where these are 
strongly related to age.  In the discussion below, we therefore focus on the results 
with  Inear  age  and  cohort  dummies  rather  than  those  with  the  full  set  of age 
dummies.  However,  given  the  limited  information  available  in  the  Retirement 
Survey,  the  pension  measures  may  fail  to  pick  up  the  full  incentive  effects 
(discussed further below).  In  an attempt to balance the two concerns, panel (b) 
shows  the  results  including  a  dummy  variable  for  age  at  which  individuals 
become eligible to receive a pension. For recipients of the basic state pension and 
SERPS  this  is the normal  state pension age,  65  fir men and 60 for women.  For 
individuals with an occupational pension we use the age at which they are entitled 
to start drawing their occupational pension. Because the eligible age varies across 
individuals  in  occupational pension  schemes,  it has  potentia 1  explanatory power 
even when added to the specification with the full set of age dummies in the final 
column.
141Table 4.6
Effect of pension incentives on the probability of retirement
Linear age Cohort dummies Age dummies
(a) Excluding age first eligible to draw pension
Total wealth 0.1599 0.0293** 0.1854 0.0316** 0.1464 0.0315**
Single period accrual -0.7960 0.2520** -1.4225 0.2422** -0.2002 0.2819
Spouse wealth 0.0324 0.0154** 0.0386 0.0165** 0.0306 0.0159*
Log likelihood -404.12 -407.94 -384.43
Total wealth 0.1413 0.0278** 0.1599 0.0308** 0.1428 0.0308**
Peak value -0.1515 0.1273 -0.5073 0.1248** -0.0412 0.1219
Spouse wealth 0.0269 0.0153* 0.0298 0.0166* 0.0293 0.0158*
Log likelihood -408.89 -418.72 -384.63
Total wealth 0.1242 0.0328** 0.0816 0.0330** 0.1200 0.0341**
Option value -0.5790 0.6714 -2.8157 0.5880** -0.9824 0.7140
Spouse wealth 0.0245 0.0154 0.0188 0.0165 0.0267 0.0158*
Log likelihood -409.25 -415.68 -383.72
(b) Including age first*eligible to draw pension
Total wealth 0.1119 0.0301** 0.1378 0.0329** 0.1321 0.0322**
Single period accrual -0.3126 0.2599 -1.0185 0.2529** -0.1831 0.2832
Spouse wealth 0.0224 0.0155 0.0281 0.0167* 0.0279 0.0158*
Eligible age 0.1788 0.0454** 0.1586 0.0456** 0.0961 0.0635*
Log likelihood -390.34 -397.77 -382.72
Total wealth 0.1007 0.0286** 0.1114 0.0318** 0.1284 0.0316**
Peak value -0.0136 0.1225 -0.3239 0.1259** -0.0185 0.1217
Spouse wealth 0.0194 0.0154 0.0199 0.0167 0.0266 0.0157*
Eligible age 0.1992 0.0452** 0.2013 0.0171** 0.0962 0.0637*
Log likelihood -391.07 -402.78 -382.92
Total wealth 0.0850 0.0335** 0.0394 0.0333 0.1047 0.0349**
Option value -0.5983 0.6722 -2.5430 0.5845** -1.0236 0.7136
Spouse wealth 0.0175 0.0154 0.0105 0.0164 0.0239 0.0158
Eligible age 0.1977 0.0441** 0.2143 0.0465** 0.0995 0.0638*
Log likelihood -390.68 -396.54
** denotes significance at the 5% level; * denotes significance at the  10% level.
The single accrual, peak value, option value and total pension wealth measures are in £ 100,000s. 
The  set  of controls  comprises  earnings,  spouse  earnings  (and  both  squared),  difference  in  age 
between  the  couple, job  tnure,  %  life  spent  working  full-time,  education,  health  score,  housing 
tenure, industry, wealth and a dummy for occupational pension membership.
142The  results  strongly  support  an  effect  of  pension  incentives  on  retirement 
behaviour.  In all but two cases, the signs are as would be expected,  showing a 
positive wealth effect (the higher someone’s pension wealth, the more likely they 
are to retire) and a negative accrual effect (the more someone can increase their 
pension wealth by working, the less likely they are to retire).  Since the pension 
measures are in £100,000, the magnitude of the coefficients in panel (a) indicates 
that a £50,000 increase in pension wealth would raise the probability of retirement 
by between four and eight percentage points, depending on the specification.  If 
someone  could  increase  their  pension  wealth  by  £10,000  by  working  for  an 
additional year (i.e. single period accrual), the probability of retiring would fall by 
between four and seven percentage points.  In most cases, the wealth and accrual 
variables are significant.55
The dummy for eligible age is strongly positive and significant.  This may capture 
a number of different effects.  It may reflect social norms  and the tendency for 
people to retire at the “retirement age”, whether this is the state pension age or the 
usual  retirement  age  in  their  firm.  Or,  it  may  reflect  the  presence  of liquidity 
constraints  -   the  fact  that  people  cannot  typically  borrow  against  their  future 
pension income may restrict them to retiring only once they are eligible to receive
55  The  panel  nature  of the  survey  means  that  the  standard  errors  calculated  from  the  standard 
formula for the Probit model will not account for the dependence across time periods.  Blundell et 
al.  (2004),  present  bootstrap  confidence  intervals  that  do  allow  for  this  dependence.  These 
intervals maintain the significance in the wealth and incentive variables found in Table 4.6.
143a pension  income.  However,  further analysis  (reported in Blundell et al,  2004) 
suggests that this  is unlikely.  Additional interaction terms  equal to total wealth 
and accrual only after the age of eligibility were found not to be significant, even 
for the group of people with very low levels of financial wealth.  In the UK, the 
availability of generous means-tested benefits from age 60, typically equivalent to 
or greater than the value of the state pension for people on low incomes, means 
that liquidity constraints are not likely to operate in practice.  Finally, the dummy 
for  eligible  age  may  pick  up  retirement  incentives  that  have  not  been  fully 
incorporated into the pension measures.
Before  discussing  further the  results  from  the  different  specifications,  there  are 
some other interesting significant coefficients that are worth commenting on (see 
Table A4.3):
•  The effect of spouse pension wealth is also positive, but smaller and less 
often significant than the individual’s own wealth.
•  The  difference  in  years  between  the  ages  of the  couple  is  negative and 
significant (ie the younger the wife, relative to the husband, the less likely 
he  is  to  retire).  This  may  indicate  some  degree  of joint  retirement 
decision-making.  A  dummy  for whether  or not  the  spouse  is  retired  is 
positive and significant, which may also indicate joint retirement.
•  The  health  score  at  wave  1   is  positive  and  significant,  indicating,  not 
surprisingly, that people in poorer health are more likely to retire.
•  A  dummy  variable  for  whether  or  not  someone  has  an  occupational
144pension is positive and significant.  This may indicate a taste for retirement 
among those who select into jobs with occupational pension schemes or it 
may pick up retirement incentives not properly captured by the pension 
measures.
Figure  4.5  is  intended  to  shed  further light on the performance of the different 
regression specifications.  It shows how the predictions from regressions including 
single  period  accruals,  peak values  and  option values  compare  with  the  actual 
pattern of retirement by age.
All  three  specifications  are fairly good at picking up retirements before age  65. 
However, without the inclusion of a dummy for age of eligibility, all fail to pick 
up the size of the spike at age 65.  In general, the single period accruals perform 
surprisingly well against the peak value and option value models.  Although single 
period accrual measures will not capture non- linear incentives, the absence of any 
information  on  particular  early  retirement  windows  means  that  most  of  the 
pension incentive measures constructed for the Retirement Survey cohort typically 
evolve in a fairly linear fashion.  The single period accrual measure is best able to 
capture the  spike  at  age  65,  which may reflect the  fact that the peak value  and 
option value will tend to smooth future accrual over a number of years.
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Figure  4.5  compares  predicted  retirement  for  those  with  and  without  an 
occupational  pension,  using  each  of the  three different  accrual  measures.  The 
impact of the occupational pension dummy variable is removed (on the basis that 
it  represents  unobserved  characteristics  of  the  OP  group)  and  the  figure  just 
captures  the  impact  of the  differing  wealth  and  option  values  (and observable 
characteristics).  However,  to  the  extent  that  the  dummy  captures  unmeasured 
occupational  pension  incentives,  the  probability  of  retirement  will  be  under­
predicted for those with an occupational pension.
The  figure  shows  that,  by  the  age  of 63,  the  proportion  of  those  with  an 
occupational  pension  who  are  still  in  employment  is  between  three  and  ten 
percentage  points  lower  than  among  those  with  no  occupational  pension. 
Interestingly,  the  option  value  specification  gives  rise  to  the  least  difference 
between the two groups.  This  is likely to reflect the importance of the earnings
147variables  in the  option values, which may reduce the impact of the differential 
pension  incentives,  particularly  since  those  with  an  occupational  pension  are 
typically more highly paid.
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4.4  Conclusions
This chapter has offered an evaluation of the economic incentives for retirement 
using a sample of men aged 55  or older from the UK Retirement  Survey.  The 
results point to significant wealth and accrual  effects on retirement through the 
pension system, in keeping with the results found for other countries (see Gruber 
and Wise, 2004).  Age of eligibility is also found to have a positive and significant 
effect on the probability of retirement, although whether this reflects social norms 
or unmeasured pension incentive effects is unclear.  It does not appear to reflect 
liquidity constraints.
The results show that occupational pensions tend to encourage early retirement. 
We  find  a  difference  in  the  age  63  employment  rate  between  those  with  and 
without an occupational pension of between 3-10 percentage points, depending 
on  the  specification.  Moreover,  these  results  almost  certainly  understate  the
149extent to which occupational pensions incentivised early retirement.  The survey 
does  not  contain  sufficient  information  to  enable  construction  of  the  full 
retirement incentives faced by individuals in occupational schemes.  At the time, 
occupational pensions were typically making increasingly generous provision for 
ill-health retirement and early retirement on other grounds, which would tend to 
encourage early retirement still further.
150Annex 4: Further regression results
Table A4.1
Results of probit regression, invalidity benefit receipt
Dependent variable 1  = receives invalidity benefit
Men
Coeff SE
Women 
Coeff  SE
Yorks & Humberside -0.0958 0.0748 -0.1601 0.1129
North West 0.0217 0.0713 0.2176 0.0989
East Midlands -0.4242 0.0857 -0.2936 0.1256
West Midlands -0.3005 0.0773 -0.3128 0.1155
East Anglia -0.6051 0.1189 -0.4210 0.1700
South East -0.5109 0.0835 -0.2288 0.1165
Greater London -0.5336 0.0731 -0.4302 0.1101
South West -0.4568 0.0852 -0.3078 0.1253
Wales 0.2494 0.0809 0.3606 0.1088
Scotland 0.0179 0.0743 0.2237 0.0998
Age 0.5859 0.0246 0.4968 0.0354
Age squared -0.0054 0.0002 -0.0048 0.0003
College education -0.6891 0.0962 -0.0452 0.1019
Spouse employed 0.1476 0.0416 -0.1923 0.0467
Homeowner with mortgage 0.0109 0.0484 -0.0529 0.0614
Outright owner -0.0850 0.0399 -0.2829 0.0595
Constant -15.7892 0.6933 -13.5498 0.9405
Number obs 9,636 14,192
Source: Data from Family Expenditure Survey, April  1988-March  1994.
151Table A4.2
Results of OLS regressions, wealth and accrual
Wealth Option value Peak value
Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
Option value -9.010 .4965*
Total pension wealth -0.023 .0013* 0.021 .0067*
Spouse pension wealth -0.153 .0113* -0.003 .0006* 0.003 .0032
Net earnings -0.067 .0073* 0.001 .0004 -0.008 .0020*
Spouse net earnings -0.008 .0046 -0.001 .0002* -0.001 .0012
Net earnings A  2 0.004 .0003* 0.000 .0000* 0.000 .0001*
Spouse net earnings A  2 0.001 .0004* 0.000 .0000* 0.000 .0001
Difference in ages 0.016 .0016* 0.001 .0000* 0.002 .0004*
Job tenure 0.005 .0011* 0.000 .0001 0.001 .0003*
% time in FT employment 0.063 .0275* 0.001 .0014 -0.011 .0007
Education 0.056 .0137* 0.001 .0007 0.001 .0037
Health score 0.011 .0045* -0.001 .0004* -0.000 .0012
Renter 0.013 .0167 0.002 .0008 0.002 .0044
Mortgage 0.135 .0162* 0.003 .0008* 0.010 .0044*
Spouse retired -0.004 .0216 -0.001 .0011 -0.003 .0057
Occupational pension 0.133 .0161* 0.010 .0008* 0.023 .0041*
N 1276 1276 1276
R-squared 0.6462 0.7634 0.4887
All regressions also include sets of dummies for industry, wealth (banded) and age 
* indicates significance at the 5% level; numbers have been rounded
Source: Data from Retirement Survey
152Table A4.3
Results of probit regression, probability of retirement
Full  results  are  reported  here  for  the  three  specifications  of  accrual  value, 
including  cohort  dummies,  excluding  age  of eligibility.  These  are  intended  to 
show  the  coefficients  on  the  other  socio-demographic  factors.  A  full  set  of 
coefficients on wealth and accrual variables are shown in table 4.6
Dependent variable = 1 if individual retires in period t
Single period Peak value Option value
Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
Total pension wealth 0.1853 0.0316 0.1599 0.0308 0.0816 0.0331
Accrual -1.4224 0.2422 -0.5072 0.1248 -2.8157 0.5880
Spouse pension wealth 0.0386 0.0165 0.0297 0.0166 0.0188 0.0165
Net earnings 0.0086 0.0102 0.0059 0.0103 0.0091 0.0099
Spouse net earnings -0.0110 0.0065 -0.0095 0.0065 -0.0118 0.0065
Net earnings A  2 -0.0004 0.0004 -0.0002 0.0004 -0.0002 0.0004
Spouse net earnings A  2 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0.0006 0.0005
Difference in ages -0.0040 0.0021 -0.0032 0.0021 -0.0017 0.0022
Job tenure 0.0003 0.0013 0.0007 0.0013 0.0047 0.0013
% time in FT employment 0.0167 0.0361 0.0120 0.0364 0.0184 0.0355
Education -0.0194 0.0194 -0.0186 0.0196 -0.0151 0.0193
Health score 0.0171 0.0088 0.0163 0.0091 0.0136 0.0089
Renter -0.0034 0.0225 -0.0077 0.0224 -0.0046 0.0223
Mortgage -0.0325 0.0215 -0.0357 0.0215 -0.0269 0.0216
Spouse retired 0.0871 0.0389 0.0955 0.0397 0.0866 0.0386
Occupational pension 0.0600 0.0183 0.0477 0.0190 0.0599 0.0386
All regressions also include sets of dummies for industry, wealth (banded) and cohort
Source: Data from Retirement Survey
153Chapter 5:  What do defined contribution pensions mean for 
retirement?
In recent years, the UK, like the US, has experienced a significant shift in private 
pension  provision  away  from  employer-provided defined benefit (DB)  schemes 
that typically guarantee a pension linked to years’ service and final salary, towards 
defined contribution (DC)  schemes, where the value  of the pension depends  on 
contributions and investment returns.  By 2004, half of all men who had opted out 
of the state second pension scheme had a DC scheme and, as shown later in this 
chapter, the majority of men currently approaching retirement have at least some 
pension wealth in a DC plan.
This shift in pension provision has a number of implications for the allocation of 
risk to individuals and for ensuring the adequacy of saving for retirement since in 
most DC schemes this is the individual’s responsibility (see Banks and Blundell, 
2005, for further discussion of these issues).  The particular issue that is addressed 
here is what the shift might mean for the timing of retirement.  As shown in the 
previous  chapter,  pension  incentives  have  an  important  role  in  affecting  when 
people retire and the growth of DB occupational pension schemes accounts for at 
least  part  of the  shift  to  early  retirement  that  occurred  in  the  1980s  and  early 
1990s.  Since  wealth  and  accrual  will  typically  be  different  in  DC  plans,  it  is
154natural to consider what effect this might have on the timing of retirement going 
forward.
This chapter addresses two questions.
The  first is  how retirement incentives  evolve  in DB  and DC  schemes  and what 
this  might mean  for the pattern of retirement under the  two  types  of plan.  As 
shown in Friedberg and Webb (2005) the profile of accruals in DC schemes is far 
smoother  than  that  in  a  DB  scheme  that  offers  particular  early  retirement 
incentives,  and  retirements  are  therefore  likely  to  be  less  clustered  around 
particular ages.
The  second  is  how  individuals  actually  respond  to  incentives  in  DB  and  DC 
schemes.  In practice there are a number of reasons why the responses to the same 
level of (modelled) wealth and accrual might differ,  including differences  in the 
accuracy  of  modelling  wealth  and  accrual,  differences  in  individuals’ 
understanding  of  the  incentives  in  DB  and  DC  plans,  their  different  risk 
properties56 and flexibility.  I test this explicitly using data on a cohort of retirees 
from the first two waves of the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA).
The UK is an interesting case to look at for a number of reasons.
•  First,  DC  schemes really took off in  1988  when the government allowed 
people to opt out of secondary state provision into DC schemes as well as
56 It is well-recognized that the two types of scheme allocate risks differently between individuals 
and  employers.  In  DB  schemes,  individuals  are  exposed  to  employment  risk,  although much of 
this will have been resolved in the run up to retirement, but there is still a very real risk that the 
employer goes bust.  In DC  schemes,  individuals  may  still  be  exposed to  investment risk  in the
155DB  schemes.  This  means  that,  among  the  cohort  of people  currently 
approaching  retirement  age,  coverage  of  DC  schemes  is  widespread, 
including many for whom it is their single most important form of pension 
wealth.
•  Secondly,  for most people with private pensions in the UK,  their private 
pension  is  typically  their  primary  pension  in  terms  of  value  and  will 
therefore be  crucially important in determining their retirement.  This  is 
because  most  people  with  a  private  pension  choose  to  opt  out  of the 
secondary (eamings-related) state pension and the basic state pension that 
they are entitled to has declined in value relative to earnings to a level as to 
be relatively unimportant for determining retirement for most people with 
an  additional  private  scheme.  This  make  the  UK  a  good  case  for 
examining differences in the effect on retirement of DB and DC schemes 
since,  for  people  with  these  schemes,  their  retirement  will  be  driven 
largely by their private plans and not by separate,  and possibly different, 
incentives in their state pension.
•  Finally, there are particular institutional features of the UK pension system 
which make it interesting to look at, including the compulsory requirement 
to annuitize DC pension wealth before age 75.
This is not the first attempt to address the issue of what the shift from DB to DC 
schemes might mean for the timing of retirement.  Friedberg  and Webb (2005)
run-up  to  retirement.  Coile  and  Levine  (2006)  and  Gardner  and  Orszag  (2003)  present  mixed 
evidence on the impact of stock market falls on retirement.
156have addressed the same issue in the US.  Using a sample of workers aged 51-61 
in  the  1992  wave  of the  Health  and  Retirement  Survey,  they  estimate a probit 
model of retirement as a function of DB and DC pension wealth and DB pension 
accruals (plus demographic and other controls).  They do not include a measure of 
forward-looking  accrual  for  DC  pensions  in  their  regression  arguing  that  such 
measures are not meaningful for DC plans.  However, the next section shows that 
is  not necessarily  the  case.  Coile and Gruber (2007)  also  separately model the 
effect  of wealth  and  accrual  in  DC  schemes  and  find  that  DC  accrual  has  a 
significant effect (at the 10 per cent level).
In both  of these  earlier studies,  DC pension wealth,  unlike  DB  pension wealth, 
does not have a significant effect on the timing of retirement,  although it enters 
positively.  In this paper, DC wealth has a negative (but insignificant) sign.  Taken 
together these results indicate that the effect of (modelled) DC pension wealth on 
retirement differs to that of (modelled) DB  wealth.  As already discussed,  there 
are many possible reasons why this might be the case.  I present some supporting 
evidence to show that it is consistent with the more flexible nature of DC plans.
The plan of the chapter is as follows.  The next section compares the incentives in 
DB  and  DC  plans  and  their  likely  effect  on  retirement.  Sections  5.2  and  5.3 
describe the ELSA data and presents the empirical results.  Section 5.4 concludes.
5.1.  Retirement  incentives in DB and DC schemes
How  do  pension  wealth  and  accrual  evolve  with  age  of retirement  in  the  two 
different types of scheme?
157Defined benefit schemes
In a typical DB scheme, the final pension received if the individual retires at age, 
a,  is  linked  to  number  of years’  membership  of the  scheme  (Va),  a specified 
accrual rate (< f )), and pensionable earnings at age a {PEa).
Pa = NJPEa
By  delaying  retirement,  the  value  of pension  wealth  changes  in  the  following 
ways:
•  By carrying on working, someone can increase the value of their lump sum 
and final pension by increasing the  final  salary  on which the pension is 
based and the number of years’  service, typically up to a maximum of 40. 
There may be a deferral rate for delaying retirement beyond this.
•  By  delaying  retirement,  they  lose  the  value  from  getting  the  lump  sum 
now, and one year of the pension that they would have been entitled to if 
they retired now.  In practice, there may be a normal or early retirement 
age, before which it is not possible to draw a pension or take a lump sum. 
Depending on the particular scheme,  there may also be early retirement 
windows at particular ages, allowing someone to retire and receive the full 
pension  they  are  entitled  to,  or  a  pension  reduced  at  an  actuarially 
favourable  rate.  As  already  shown,  these  windows  are  associated  with 
strong  incentives  to  delay  retirement  until  the  age  of eligibility,  and  to 
retire at that age.
158•  Finally  by  carrying  on  working,  there  is  a probability  of dying  without 
receiving any pension, although their survivor is likely to receive benefits.
As shown in Figure 5.1, panel a, under a typical DB plan with no early retirement 
scheme, accruals are fairly smooth up to the normal retirement age, which in this 
case,  coincides with the maximum possible number of years’  contributions (40). 
After this age, no further addition to pension wealth is possible and the individual 
loses  a  year’s  pension  income  for  each  year  of delay,  resulting  in  a  negative 
accrual.
But, panel b,  shows the pattern of accrual for a scheme that offers the option of 
early retirement at age 60 with no reduction in pension.57  In this case, there is a 
big incentive to delay retirement from age 59 in order to become eligible for the 
scheme.  By  comparison,  the  single  period  accrual  associated  with  delaying 
retirement  from  age  58  to  59  (and  at  earlier  ages)  is  relatively  small.  But,  it 
clearly under-estimates the true incentive to stay in work until age 59, which is the 
retained  option  of retiring  at  60  and becoming  eligible  for the  early  retirement 
scheme.  As  discussed in the previous chapter,  the option value model (or peak 
value  model)  is  well-suited  to  picking  up  these  crucial  non-linearities  by 
considering,  at each age,  the gain from postponing retirement until  all possible 
future ages.
57 This may sound generous, but is not atypical of many schemes in the UK, as shown in chapter 4.
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Defined contribution schemes
What  about  someone  with  a DC  scheme?  Their pension  is  determined by  the 
value of their pension fund at that age, which depends on past contributions and 
rates of return, and, in the UK, the annuity rate.  In the UK, up to one-quarter of 
the value of a pension fund can be taken as a lump sum, but three-quarters must be 
annuitized before the age of 75.  The annuity rate depends on the age at which 
someone  chooses  to  annuitize,  the  size  of annuity  purchased  and  the  type  of 
annuity chosen.  Numerous studies have shown that the money’s worth ratio of 
annuities is typically less than one (see Finkelstein and Poterba, 2002 and 2004, 
Cannon and Tonks, 2004, and Murthi et al, 1999) so the expected present value of
160
5pension wealth is  equal to the discounted,  expected sum of annuity income, not 
the fund value.
By  delaying  retirement,  the  value  of someone’s  pension  wealth  changes  in  the 
following ways:
•  They may die  -  in which case they lose the value of their pension fund, 
although they may benefit from the fact that their survivor will inherit it.
•  The  expected  value  of  their  pension  fund  increases  via  additional 
contributions from the state (through  contracting out)  or their employer, 
and another year’s return on the accumulated fund.  Unlike DB  schemes 
with maximum years for calculating entitlement, in principle, the monetary 
value of the fund could carry on increasing up to age 74, the maximum age 
of annuitization.
•  After age 50, the first year in which someone can draw a pension, there is 
a  loss  to delaying receipt of the  lump  sum and the  individual  loses  one 
year of pension income but, by delaying retirement to an older age, they 
face a higher annuity rate.58
If the change in annuity rates with age were exactly actuarially fair, the loss of one 
year’s annuitized income would exactly equal the expected value of the change in 
annuity rate times  current fund value.  In practice, however,  this  is typically not 
the  case.  Figure  5.2  plots  the  expected  value  of a  £100,000  annuity  fund  for
5 8 Annuity rates may also change with time, although someone could in principle hedge return risk 
against annuity rate risk.
161someone buying a single, level annuity at different ages.  Annuity rates are taken 
from the FSA’s comparative annuity table -  at each age, the best rate is used.59  In 
this  case  (based  on  a  4%  nominal  discount  rate  and  survival  probabilities  for 
personal pension annuitants  (lives) from the Continuous Mortality Investigation 
Bureau, 2006) the profile shows that the expected value of the annuity is broadly 
constant across most of the age range, but rises at older ages.  This differs to the 
finding of earlier studies (Finkelstein and Poterba (2002, 2004) and Murthi et al, 
1999) that the expected value of annuities falls with age, which they argue reflects 
selection effects.60  However, the difference reflects the fact that both the shape as 
well  as  the  level  of  the  age  profile  depends  on  assumptions  regarding  both 
discount rate and survival probabilities, suggesting that each individual may have 
an optimal age of annuitization,  reflecting their rate of time preference and their 
subjective  life  expectancy.  It  is  beyond  the  scope  of this  paper  to  model  this 
formally,61 but at the very least, this highlights that the annuitization requirement, 
combined with the pricing of annuities  at different ages, has implications for the 
timing of retirement, athough the magnitude of these effects is relatively small.
59  Six  providers  quoted  rates  at  all  ages  with  no  restriction  on  eligibility.  The  best  provider 
changes  with  age,  suggesting  interesting  selection  effects  with  age  across  providers,  or different 
assumptions about mortality.
60  the  higher annuity  rate  that  is  available  at  older  ages  of annuitization  will  be  worth  more  to 
people  who  expect  to  live  longer,  who  will  therefore  tend  to  annuitize  later,  and  wealthier 
individuals  (who  tend  to  live  longer)  may  have  alternative  sources  of  wealth  to  draw  on  in 
retirement; healthier individuals will also be able to carry on working for longer and will not need 
to draw their pension
61 For a more detailed analysis see for example, Milevsky and Young (2007)
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In order to get a better understanding of how DC pensions might affect the timing 
of retirement compared to DB pensions,  I  simulate pension wealth  and accrual 
under the two types of scheme for the same (single, male) individual.  In order to 
highlight the effect on retirement arising from the shape of accruals, rather than 
differences in levels of wealth, I set the contribution rate in the DC plan equal to 
13.5% in order to generate pension wealth of roughly the same order of magnitude 
at age 65 in the two schemes.62  Box 1  summarizes the assumptions underlying the 
stylized modeling.
62 This rate is high compared to the actual contribution rate in most DC schemes, but individuals in 
DC schemes will typically additionally receive contracted out rebates.  Low rates of persistency in 
DC schemes will also tend to reduce pension wealth in practice, see Smith (2006).
163Box 1: Key assumptions
Variable Assumption
Employment History Continuous from age 25
Earnings Estimated age profile based on median earnings by age, cohort 
and  education  for  full-time,  male  employees,  Family 
Expenditure Survey 1978 - 2002
Survival probabilities Continuous Mortality Investigation Bureau 2006 estimates for 
Life Office male pensioners, (PNML)
Inflation rate 2.5%
Nominal discount rate 5%
Accmal rate 1/60 th
Pensionable earnings Final year’s salary
Nominal equity return 7% (minus 1% for costs)
DC contribution rate 13.5% earnings
Annuity rate Best rate, level annuity, non-smoking male investing £100,000 
(Financial Services Authority, May 2007)
The patterns of accrual generated for someone in a DB scheme have been  shown 
in Figure  5.1.  For comparison,  figure 5.3  plots the age profile of single period 
accruals  for someone  in a DC plan.  Compared to the DB  scheme there are no 
kinks associated with particular ages and the profile of accrual rates is smooth.  It 
does, however, turn negative before the maximum age of annuitization, suggesting 
the existence of a peak value.  With a positive investment return,  the  financial 
value of the pension fund will continue to increase up to age 74, but the accrual 
will turn negative once the combined effect of discounting and mortality is greater 
than  the  growth  of the  fund  through  contributions  and  returns.  As  shown  in 
Figure 5.3,  this begins to happen from age 70  onwards.  In this example,  it has
164been  assumed  that  the  fund  continues  to  be  invested  in  equity,  and  that  the 
contributions  continue  at  the  same  rate.  In  practice,  a  shift  into  safer  assets 
(“lifestyling”)63  and/or  a  reduction  in  contributions  with  age64  will  both  bring 
forward the age at which the accrual turns negative.
Figure 5.3 
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The  age  profile  of accruals  shown  in  Figure  5.3  suggests  that  the  associated 
pattern of retirements is likely to be far smoother in a DC scheme than in a DB
63 This is a common default option, particularly in stakeholder pensions, see Blake et al (2005).
64 In the UK, contributions made to a DC fund as a result of the individual contracting out of the 
state secondary pension stop at age 65.
165scheme, particularly a DB scheme with an early retirement window.  To illustrate 
this,  I take the coefficients on wealth and peak value estimated in the previous 
chapter and in Figure 5.4 show the predicted retirement hazards at each age that 
would  arise  under  the  two  types  of scheme.  This  highlights  how  the  early 
retirement window concentrates retirements  around the age of first eligibility  -  
encouraging people to delay retirement until they are eligible for the scheme and 
then encouraging retirement after this age.  By comparison, the incentives in the 
DC scheme are associated with a far smoother pattern of retirements with higher 
retirement probabilities at both younger and older ages.
Friedberg and Webb (2005) and Munnell et al (2004) argue that the shift to DC 
schemes  is  likely  to  mean  later retirements.  In this  stylized example, however, 
with  wealth  equalised  at  age  65,  the  mean  age  of retirement  is  actually  lower 
under  the  DC  scheme  than  under  the  DB  scheme  (59  compared  to  61).  In 
practice, therefore, this effect is most likely to arise from the typically lower levels 
of pension wealth in DC plans
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However,  the  estimates  of the  effects  of wealth  and  accrual  on retirement  are 
based on retirements that took place between  1988 and  1992,  a time when DC 
pensions  were  largely  irrelevant  for  individual  retirement  decisions.  They 
therefore reflect individuals’ responses to incentive in state and DB schemes.  It 
has been assumed that (modeled) wealth and accrual have the same effect in a DC 
plan as in a DB plan, but there are several reasons why this might not be the case 
in practice, and this is explored in the next section.
5.2  DB and DC schemes in the ELSA data
To estimate the effect of DB and DC pension incentives on retirement, I use panel
167data from the first two waves (2002-03 and 2004-05) of the English Longitudinal 
Study  of Ageing  (ELSA)  to  model  the  probability  of retiring  between  the  two 
waves.65  ELSA is a representative sample of the household population aged 50 
and over in England, though here I make use only of data on men aged 50 -  64 in 
2002-03.  I  also  use  a  selected  sample  in  a  number  of other  ways  in  that  I 
condition on employment in wave  1   and use only those who survive (literally and 
in the sample) to wave 2.66  I also drop a small number who don’t know what type 
of pension they have and those who have large values of pension wealth (greater 
than £1  million) and non-pension wealth (greater than £5 million).  The final sub- 
sample contains 1,478 men.
ELSA  is  the far the best available recent data source in the UK for this kind of 
analysis since it is targeted on an older population and collects extremely detailed 
information  on  individuals’  pension  schemes,  as  well  as  demographic,  socio­
economic  and health variables.  However,  as will become  clear, when trying to 
model  the  complexities  of the  UK pension  system where  individuals  may have 
multiple  pension  schemes,  the  sizes  of relevant  sub-samples  are  a potentially
65 Further details on the ELSA data can be found in Marmot, et al, (2003).
66  Clearly  this  selection  may  have  non-trivial  effects  on  the  results.  Those  who  have  already 
retired by  wave  1   may  include  both  those  who  are  very responsive  to  pension incentives and/or 
those who have strong preferences for early retirement, independent of pension incentives.  Ideally 
the effects of the selection would be controlled for explicitly.  The only defence is that I follow the 
example of almost all other papers before which do not.
168limiting factor, although this situation should improve as more waves of the data 
become available.
ELSA  collects  information  on up  to  two  current pensions  and  up  to  three  past 
pensions.  Box 2  describes how current and future wealth is  calculated for each 
type  of pension.  In  practice,  as  shown  in  Table  5.1,  the  number of different 
pensions  an  individual  may  have  gives  rise  to  a  high  degree  of complexity  in 
categorising  individuals’  pension  type.  Almost  90  per  cent  of the  sample  has 
some private (DB or DC) pension.  Most can be categorized in terms of a  single 
current private pension, but one-third has two or more private pensions, often of 
different types.  Here, I aggregate pension wealth by type -  so that if someone has 
a  current  and  a  past  DB  pension,  the  value  of  both  of  those  schemes  will 
contribute  to  their  DB  pension  wealth,  although  of  course,  only  their  current 
scheme will contribute to the accrual.
169Box 2 -  calculating pension wealth for the ELSA sub-sample
All  calculations  use  age-specific  life  expectancies  for  the  cohort  from  the 
Government Actuary’s Department and a 5% nominal discount rate.  Earnings are 
assumed to remain constant in nominal terms.
Basic state pension
Individuals  are  credited  with  full-time  employment  since  they  left  full-time 
education.  Survivor benefits are calculated based on the age of the spouse.
Secondary state pension
Entitlement is calculated on the basis of full-time employment and earnings since 
SERPS was introduced in 1978.  In the absence of detailed earnings histories, past 
earnings  are  imputed on the basis of cohort and education,  subject to a constant 
adjustment factor that reflects the ratio of their observed earnings at wave 1  to the 
cohort/education average for that year.  No-one in a DB or employer-DC scheme 
is  assumed  to  receive  any  state  secondary  pension,  but  everyone  with  an 
individual DC scheme is assumed to be contracted in.  50% survivor benefits are 
included.
DB pension
Wealth is calculated on the basis of individuals’ reported years in the scheme (or, 
if missing, years with employer) and the self-reported scheme accrual rate.  It is 
assumed that the pensions will be uprated in line with inflation and 50% survivor 
benefits are included where relevant.  For current DB schemes, accruals are based 
on the accrual rate and constant, nominal earnings.  Individuals are asked whether 
there is an early retirement age and, if given, are assumed to be eligible for early 
retirement from this age with a 4% reduction in pension value  for each year of 
early retirement.
DC pension
Individuals are asked the value of their fund at wave  1.  This is converted into a 
wealth value using the second best available age-specific annuity rate.  For current 
DC pensions,  the value in future years  is  calculated assuming that contributions 
remain at their current rate and the fund attracts a nominal 5% annual return.
For  further  details  on  how  pension  wealth  has  been  calculated  for  the  ELSA 
sample, see Banks et al (2005)
170Table 5.1
Individuals’ pension arrangements, ELSA sub-sample
Pension type Proportion of sub-sample
Current DB only 0.269
Current DB, past DB 0.047
Current DB, past DC 0.008
Current DC 0.345
Current DC, past DB 0.091
Current DC, past DC 0.034
Current DB and DC 0.030
Past DB 0.063
Past DC 0.019
No private pension 0.094
A second issue is that, for many with DC pensions, the value of their pension is
t V i  tV i
very small.  Table  5.2  illustrates this.  It shows mean,  median and 25  and 75 
percentile values  of the distribution of pension wealth in DB  and DC  schemes. 
The mean level  of pension wealth in a DC scheme is less than a quarter that in a 
DB scheme, and the median level is less than 10%.  Thus, for many people with a 
DC  scheme,  other DB  or state  schemes may be more  important in determining 
their retirement in practice.  To  o\ercome this problem,  I define an individual’s 
main pension type to be DC (or DB) only if the value of wealth in their DC (or 
DB) plan is greater than the value of their state pension wealth.  Fewer than one- 
quarter of people with a DC plan have greater value in their DC scheme than in 
the state pension,  compared to nearly  80 per cent of those with a DB plan.  As 
shown  in  Table  5.2,  defining  individuals  according  to  their  main  pension  type 
reduces the gap between DB and DC schemes, but does not eliminate it.  It also 
changes the distribution of pension type with earnings,  as  shown in Figure 5.5.
171Looking  simply  at  pension  type  suggests  that  more  than  half  of those  in  the 
bottom  20%  of the  earnings  distribution have  a private  (DB  or DC)  pension. 
However,  taking  into  account  value  shows  that  the  state  pension  is  the  main 
pension  for  more  than  80%  of this  group.  The  importance  of  DB  and  DC 
pensions rises systematically with earnings.  For all earnings groups, the average 
value  of (main)  DC  plans  is  less  than  the  average  value  of (main)  DB  plans, 
although this difference is most pronounced for the highest earners.67
Table 5.2
Distribution of wealth in DB and DC schemes (£’00,000)
Mean 25% 50% 75% N
Value of DB pension 2.19 0.74 1.88 3.06 670
Value of DC pension 0.49 0.07 0.18 0.46 746
Value of DB pension - 2.73 1.48 2.28 3.37 528
main pension only
Value of DC pension - 1.63 0.61 0.98 1.42 166
main pension only
67 For the US, Samwick and Skinner (2004) and Poterba et al (2004) show that levels of wealth in 
DC schemes are high, even compared to DB wealth.
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173Table 5.3
Individual characteristics, by main pension type
DB DC-
employer
DC-
individual
State
pension
% sample 33.8% 3.6% 7.4% 55.3%
Total pension wealth 3.26 2.05 2.22 1.38
State pension wealth (£’00,000) 0.47 0.59 0.45 0.63
DB pension wealth (£’00,000) 2.59 0.07 0.54 0.03
DC pension wealth (£’00,000) 0.03 1.29 1.16 0.10
Financial wealth (£’00,000) 0.45 0.61 0.65 0.39
Total non-pension wealth (£’00,000) 1.46 3.18 3.11 1.73
Age 55.0 55.2 55.1 56.6
Gross annual earnings £27,965 £34,357 £41,006 £17,113
Job tenure 16.0 19.6 16.1 10.9
% doing manual work 0.25 0.26 0.35 0.46
% self-employed 0.04 0.02 0.56 0.31
% who retire 0.17 0.09 0.09 0.15
Table 5.3  summarizes individual characteristics by (main) pension type.  For DC 
pensions,  the  sample  is  split  according  to  whether  the  scheme  is  run  by  the 
employer or is an individual scheme.  For the purposes of modelling the effect of 
pension incentives  on retirement it is  arguably better to focus  only on employer 
DC pension schemes since in these schemes, a key parameter that is important in 
determining  wealth  and  accrual,  namely  the  contribution  rate,  is  in  most  cases 
determined exogenously.  In some individual schemes, by comparison, both the 
contribution  rate  and  the  rate  of investment  return  will  be  determined  by  the 
individual and are likely to  affected by the desired age of retirement,  in which 
case  the  coefficients  on  both  the  wealth  and  accrual  terms  will  be  biased.  In 
practice,  however,  the  sample  size is quite  small (there are only 53  men whose 
main pension wealth  is derived from an employer pension) and the regressions 
below  include  all  men  with  a  main  DC  pension  as  well  as  those  who  have  an
174employer DC scheme.
Table 5.3 shows that men with  most of their pension wealth in the state pension 
form a fairly distinct group from the rest.  They have the lowest level of pension 
wealth.  They are typically older, less well-paid, have shorter job tenure and are 
more  likely  to  be  doing  manual  work.  Those  with  DC  pensions  have  higher 
average earnings than those with DB pensions  and higher levels  of non-pension 
wealth,  although  the  value  of their  pension  wealth  is  lower.  Of course,  the 
difference in their pension income at retirement may be smaller since most people 
with  DC  pensions  choose  single  life,  nominal  annuities,  whereas  DB  pensions 
automatically uprate  income  in line with inflation and provide for 50%  survivor 
benefits  and the wealth reflects this.  A high proportion of men with individual 
DC plans are self-employed, and we control for this in the regression analysis.
The final row of Table 5.3 shows the proportion of each group who retire between 
the two waves.  This  is  significantly higher among the group with a (main) DB 
scheme  than  among  those  with  a  (main)  DC  scheme  and,  controlling  for their 
different ages,  than among those whose main pension is from the  state.  A key 
question  is  the  extent  to  which  these  differences  are  attributable  to  pension 
incentives.
5.3  Regression analysis
I estimate a model of the following form using a probit regression:
R = P„ + PlSPWi + P fiBWi + PfiCWi + PtSPA, +PpBAi+PpCAl + 
P1NRAi + PSERAI + P9AGEi + Pw In Y, + Pu (In Y f  + Xty + u,
175Where R is a dummy variable equal to one if the individual retires (is not in paid 
employment) by wave 2.
SPW is the individual’s wealth in state pension at wave  1,  which is defined for 
everyone in the sample.  DBW is equal to the level of DB pension wealth at wave 
1   for people with a (main) DB pension and DCW, the level of DC pension wealth 
for  men  with  a  (main)  DC  pension.  Including  DB  wealth  and  DC  wealth  for 
everyone does not change the results, but the log likelihood indicates that the fit is 
slightly worse.  Because DBW and DCW are missing for many people, the wealth 
variables are included as levels rather than logs; but I drop anyone with more than 
£1  million in  either a DC scheme or a DB  scheme to avoid dominance by these 
extreme values.  Entering each of the wealth terms in this way assumes that they 
have an additive effect,  in other words that £100,000 in a state pension has the 
same  effect irrespective  of what other DC  or DB pension wealth  someone has, 
although  £100,000  in  each  of the  schemes  is  allowed  to  affect  the  retirement 
decision differently.
SPA,  DBA  and  DC  A  are  the  forward-looking  accrual  measures  for  each  of the 
three pension types.  I  define  SPA  to  be  equal  to  peak value  (or  single period 
accrual) in state pension wealth only for people whose main pension is the state 
pension.  DBA  and  DCA  are  defined  to  be  equal  to  peak  value  (or  accrual), 
including the change  in state pension value,  for people whose main pension is a 
DB or DC plan.  I also try including terms that identify only the change in DB or 
DC component of pension wealth for those whose main pension is  a DB  or DC 
plan,  and the change  in state pension wealth for everyone, but this  specification
176results in a worse fit.
To  capture  forward-looking accrual incentives,  I try both peak value and  single 
period  accruals.  As  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter,  the  option  value  may 
provide  a more  accurate reflection of the underlying  incentives, but only if it is 
correctly specified, while peak value may provide a more robust approximation. 
From a practical point of view and of particular relevance here, the peak value is 
probably better-suited to testing whether different types of pension (state, DB and 
DC) have different effects since it allows wealth and accrual for different types of 
scheme to enter separately.
As has already been shown, the strength of option value and peak value are that 
they  can  capture  crucial  non-linearities  in  accruals.  This  is  arguably  less 
important in the case of DC pensions where accruals are smooth.  In this case, the 
peak value  will  simply  add up  across  a  set  of relatively  constant  accruals  and 
reflect  years  to  peak.  For  DB  pensions,  there  is  currently  insufficient detailed 
information  in  ELSA  to  allow  full  modelling  of  the  non-linearities  of  early 
retirement windows.  In practice, therefore, the peak value may not perform better 
than single period accruals,  although  for DB pensions,  this is  a limitation of the 
data.  The results  in Table  5.4 appear to confirm this  -   on the basis of the log 
likelihood  the  single  period  accruals  appear to  perform  slightly better than  the 
peak value.
The peak value is defined as the difference between the maximum expected future 
value of pension wealth and the expected value in 2004 (ie at wave 2).  For single 
period accruals, I include the change in expected wealth between 2004 and 2005
177(acc2005) which should have a negative effect on the probability of retiring by 
wave 2).  I also tried including the change in expected wealth between 2003 and 
2004 (acc2004) which should encourage people to stay in work past wave  1, but 
may be positively correlated with retirement by wave 2, but this did not improve 
the results,  however.  In all cases, negative values  are set to zero as is common 
practice (eg Friedberg and Webb, 2005, and Coile and Gruber, 2007).  Including 
the negative values does not substantively change the results.
The NRA  is  a dummy equal to one  if the person reaches the “normal retirement 
age” for their job between the two waves (equal to 65 if the normal retirement age 
is missing), while ERA  is a dummy equal to one if they reach their reported “early 
retirement  age”  (also  equal  to  65  if missing).  Since  kinks  in  accrual  in  DB 
schemes are often strongly associated with early and normal retirement ages, this 
is likely to reduce the coefficient on the accrual term, but will ensure that it picks 
up  the  financial  incentive,  rather than  any  social  norm  effects.  Both  terms  are 
positive, and usually significant, in the different specifications.
I include a linear age term (AGE), imposing the assumption that preferences for eg 
leisure evolve in a constant way with age.  Including a full set of age dummies has 
little effect on the results.  I also include both the  log of earnings  (In  Y) and its 
square.  Controlling separately for earnings is clearly important since earnings are 
highly correlated with both pension wealth and accrual and may separately affect 
retirement.  The earnings terms  are jointly,  and usually individually,  significant 
across specifications.
X  is a vector of other control variables  including the  log of non-pension wealth,
178whether the  individual  is  working full-time at wave  1,  whether the  individual is 
self-employed at wave  1, whether they are in manual work at wave  1,  their job 
tenure  at  wave  1   (and  its  square),  whether  their  spouse  is  in  work  at  wave  1, 
whether they have college education and indicators for a range of health problems 
present at wave 1.
I also include a set of dummy variables for an individual’s main pension type to 
pick up underlying differences in individuals across the different types of scheme 
that have not already been explicitly controlled for.  These are insignificant in all 
regressions, once wealth and accrual have been added.
Table 5.4 reports the average marginal effects for the wealth and accrual terms.  A 
full set of results  for the other control variables  are reported in Table A5  in the 
annex  to  this  chapter.  Results  are  given  for  one  specification  -   they  are 
qualitatively similar across all other specifications.
The first specification in Table 5.4 includes total pension wealth and peak value/ 
accrual,  as  in the previous  chapter.  The most directly comparable  set of lesults 
from chapter 4 are in Table 4.6, panel b which include  a controls  for linear age 
and  age  of pension  eligibility.  The  magnitudes  of the  estimated  effects  are 
broadly similar.  The results  from the Retirement  Survey implied an increase in 
the probability of retirement of 3.9 percentage points for a one standard deviation 
increase in pension wealth,  while the results  from ELSA  imply a corresponding 
increase of 4.9 percentage points.  For a one standard deviation in single period 
accrual  the  results  imply  a  reduction  in  the  probability  of  retirement  of  1.2 
percentage points  (Retirement  Survey)  and  1.3  percentage  points  (ELSA).  For
179peak value, the figures are 1.0 and 1.8.
Table 5.4
Regression results, probit regression, average marginal effects
Dependeit variable = 1  if left work by wave 2
Coeff  SE Coeff  SE Coeff  SE
Total wealth 0.0333  . 0073**
SP wealth 0.0532  .0481
DB wealth 0.0386  .0097**
DC wealth -0.0220  . 0437
DC wealth - emp
DC wealth - indiv
Peak value -0.0840  . 0659
SP peak 0.0561  .1066
DB peak -0.1073  .1307
DC peak -0.2414  .2162
DC peak - emp
DC peak - indiv
Log likelihood -475.26 -471.92
Total wealth 0.0349  .0072**
SP wealth 0.0479  .0480 0.0483  .0481
DB wealth 0.0408  .0095** 0.0399  . 0095**
DC wealth -0.0024  . 0480
DC wealth -  emp -0.0312  .1021
DC wealth - indiv 0.0215  .0413
Accrual -0.0255  .0319
SP acc2005 0.0923  .0514* 0.0760  .0515
DB acc2005 -0.1191  .0673* -0.1055  .0673
DC acc2005 -0.2709  .1372**
DC acc2005 - emp 0.1594  .2149
DC acc2005 - indiv -0.3716  .2067*
Log likelihood -475.92 -469.66 -469.21
Notes to table
All regressions include a full set of controls - marginal effects are reported in the annex to 
this chapter
All wealth and peak value terms are in £’00,000s; single period accruals are in £’0,000s 
* indicates significant at 10% level, ** indicates significant at 5% level
180The main interest here, however, is in the effects of the  different components of 
pension wealth and accrual -  DB, DC and state pensions.
State pension wealth is positive, but insignificant in the pooled regressions, but 
significant  in  a  separate  regression  for  people  with  no  private  pension  (not 
reported  here).  This is perhaps not surprising  -  a greater level of state pension 
wealth is likely to be less important in determining retirement for those with a DB 
or  DC  scheme  as  their main pension.  The  state pension  accrual  term  has  the 
wrong sign.  However, accrual is arguably not well defined for the ELSA sample 
since  it  varies  only  by  whether  someone  is  contracted  in  or  out  of the  state 
secondary pension scheme and by date of birth.
The  results  show  that  DB  pension  wealth  has  a  positive,  significant  effect  on 
retirement.  The  peak  and  single  period  DB  accrual  values  have  the  expected 
negative sign and the accrual term is significant at the  10% level.  Again, these 
results suggest that single period accrual performs as well as peak value, although 
this  is  likely  to  be  because  of  the  limitations  of  the  data  and  the  lack  of 
information on early retirement windows.
The coefficient on DC pension wealth has the  ‘wrong’  sign, but is insignificant. 
This result is confirmed when the same regressions are run only for a sample of 
people with a DC scheme and for a sample excluding the self-employed.  Previous 
studies that have  separately included DC pension wealth (Friedberg and Webb, 
2005, Coile and Gruber, 2007) have also failed to find a significant positive effect 
for DC pensions, unlike for DB pensions.  Taken together, these results seem to 
suggest that (modelled) DC pension wealth does not have the same positive effect
181on retirement as (modelled) DB and state pensions and there are several reasons 
why this may be the case.
One  is  that  researchers  are  better  at  modelling  DB  pension  wealth,  given  its 
formulaic nature, than they are at modelling DC pension wealth.  However, in the 
case of ELSA this seems unlikely since individuals are directly asked to give the 
value of their DC pension fund.
Another issue is that individuals’ perceptions of DB and DC pension wealth may 
be different.  People may care more about future pension income than wealth per 
se and this may be clearer  -  and therefore have more of an impact  -  in DB and 
state pensions  than in DC  schemes.  DC pension wealth also has  very different 
risk  properties  to  a  similar  level  of wealth  in  a  DB  fund.  By  the  time  of 
retirement, much of the employment and wage risk associated with a DB scheme 
has  been  resolved.68  In  a  DC  scheme,  however,  individuals  remain  exposed  to 
investment and annuity rate risk right up to retirement.  While the stock market 
rose in value almost continuously from January 2003, the  earlier falls may have 
had  repercussions  for  the  effect  of DC  pension  wealth  in  2002  on  subsequent 
retirement.  And as well  as  the effect of changes  in stock market prices  on the 
timing of retirement through their effect on wealth (see Coile and Levine, 2006, 
and Gardner and Orszag,  2003),  individuals may  also  choose to delay or bring 
forward their retirement in line with expectations about equity prices (or annuity
68  although,  until  the recent introduction of the Pension Protection Fund,  there  was still a risk of 
the employer going out of business.
182rates).  With only two waves available, however, it is not yet possible to explore 
this using ELSA data.
A  crucial  difference  between  the  two  types  of sheme  is  the  extent  to  which 
contributions -  and hence wealth and accrual  -  are voluntary.  By construction, 
estimated  DB  wealth  will  here  exclude  all  voluntary  contributions  since  it  is 
derived from individuals’  scheme tenure and the accrual rate (and hence excludes 
additional voluntary contributions).  For the majority of individual DC  schemes, 
by contrast,  contributions are almost entirely voluntary, while,  even in employer 
schemes,  some  individuals  may  choose  to  contribute  above  the  employer’s 
minimum or required level.  A particular problem with DC  schemes  is that the 
level of contributions may be endogenous to the retirement decision.  If people 
with  a  strong  preference  for  early  retirement  are  motivated  to  build  up  large 
amounts of wealth then the bias would tend to overstate the effect of wealth on 
retirement.  Another possibility,  however,  is  that  people  with  strong  tastes  for 
retirement saving may tend to retire later.
The  final  column  estimates  the  effect  of DC  pension  wealth  and  single  period 
accrual separately for people with employer and individual schemes.  The idea is 
that there is greater exogeneity of wealth (and accrual) in employer schemes and, 
therefore, that any bias problems should be less.  However, the results show that 
in  neither  case is DC pension wealth significant and,  perhaps  surprisingly,  it is 
employer DC pension wealth that attracts the wrong sign.
DC  accrual  has  the  right  (negative)  sign  and  enters  significantly.  In this  case, 
variation in accrual is driven solely by contribution rates, which are dependent on
183continued  employment  and  in  principle,  this  could  account  for  why  positive 
accrual would reduce the probability of retirement.  However, when DC accrual is 
included  separately  for people with employer and individual  schemes, it is only 
accrual  in individual schemes that has a negative  and significant effect and this 
result may be affected by the voluntary nature of contributions.
Finally,  there  are  important  differences  in  the  flexibility  of the  two  types  of 
scheme which may have implications for the modeling of retirement.  Implicit in 
the model of retirement adopted here is that retirement as a discrete decision (to 
work or not work),  a permanent state, and synonymous with drawing a pension. 
This seems appropriate for individuals in DB plans where there is little incentive 
to  reduce  hours  (since  pension  depends  on  final  salary)  and  individuals  cannot 
continue to build up their pension once they have left their employer.  Also, until 
recent  (2006)  legislation,  individuals  were  prohibited  from  working  for  an 
employer they drew  a pension from.  But,  DC  plans  offer greater flexibility in 
terms  of working and drawing a pension at the  same time.  And, unlike a DB 
scheme,  only  part  of  the  accrual  (the  contribution  to  the  fund)  depends  on 
continued employment.  Figure 5.6 presents evidence from the British Household 
Panel  Survey  suggesting  a  greater  dis-association  between  stopping  work  and 
drawing a pension for people with DB pensions than for people with DC pensions. 
The  graphs  show the difference  in years between stopping work and drawing a 
pension.  A value of zero indicates that the two are synonymous, a positive value 
indicates that someone started to draw a pension before they stopped work.  It is 
plausible  that  the  greater  flexibility  of  DC  schemes  implies  a  less  close  link 
between work and pension, and this might explain why the effect of DC pension
184wealth is different to that of DB pension wealth.
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To  see  what  these  results  imply  for the  timing  of retirement,  Figure  5.7  plots 
predicted retirement hazards for people with a main DB and main DC pension.  In 
both cases, the dummies for reaching normal retirement age and reaching early 
retirement  age  have  been  set  equal  to  zero  t)  highlight the  effects  of financial 
incentives.  The figure shows that people with a main DB  scheme have higher 
retirement hazards at all ages, but particularly at younger ages.  This is consistent 
with the raw difference in retirement probabilities in Table 5.3.
Of course, the difference in retirement probabilities shown in Figure 5.7 might be 
explained by differences in the level of wealth or size of accrual between DB and
185DC  schemes  (and  other  differences  between  individuals  in  the  two  types  of 
scheme),  as  well  as  differences  in  the  incentive  effects  of different  types  of 
pension.  In order to highlight the differential incentive effects, I therefore apply 
the estimated  incentive effects  for DC wealth and accrual to  individuals  with  a 
main DB scheme (left-hand panel, Figure 5.8) and the estimated incentive effects 
for DB wealth and accrual to individuals with a main DC scheme (right-hand side 
panel, Figure 5.8).  What these results clearly show is that the prediction of later 
retirements under DC schemes is not attributable to the different levels of wealth 
or accrual in these schemes, but to the way individuals respond to the incentives in 
these scheme -  and in particular, the absence of a positive relationship between 
wealth levels and retirement.
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5.4  Conclusions
This  chapter  has  shown  that  the  shift  from  DB  to  DC  schemes  has  important 
implications for the timing of retirement.  DB pension schemes offered employers 
a potentially powerful tool  for managing labour market exits.  Early retirement 
windows provided strong age-related incentives for retirement and resulted in the 
clustering of retirement around a narrow range of ages.  By contrast, there are 
fewer  age  related  incentives  in  typically  DC  schemes,  suggesting  that  the  age 
profile  of retirements  is  likely  to  be  far  smoother.  Moreover,  the  preliminary 
results  from  the  analysis  of the  ELSA  dataset  suggest  a  weaker  link between 
pension wealth and retirement for DC schemes.
187There are a number of possible reasons why the link may be weaker, including the 
more flexible nature of the schemes  -  the fact that someone can draw a pension 
and  carry  on  working,  for  example,  or  retire  and  continue  to  accrue  pension 
wealth.  Going forward, the lifting of legal restrictions on working and drawing an 
employer’s pension will also increase the flexibility of DB schemes.  Clearly, one 
implication is  that the  stylized version of retirement described in chapter  1   that 
underlies much of the modelling of the effect of pension incentives on retirement 
will  no  longer describe most retirement,  and a new approach will be needed to 
understand the determinants of labour market exits in the new environment.
Overall, DC pensions appear to be associated with later retirements, although this 
analysis  is  preliminary  and  not  without  potential  issues.  One  is  the  possible 
selection of individuals into different types of pension according to their desire to 
retire  earlier  or  later.  Another  important  issue  is  that  much  of the  wealth  and 
accrual  in  DC  schemes  is  driven  by  individual  contributions,  which  are 
determined  voluntarily.  This  makes  DC  wealth  and  accrual  potentially
endogenous, particularly for people with individual schemes while small sample 
sizes  in  the  current  ELSA  sample  preclude  detailed  analysis  of those  with  an 
employer scheme.  There is clearly further work to be done.
188Annex 5: Further regression results
Table A5
Regression results, probit regression, average marginal effects
Dependent variable = 1  if left work by wave 2
Coeff SE
Total wealth .0333 .0074**
Peak value -.0840 .0656
Age .0123 .0029**
Reach normal retirement age .0946 .0437**
Reach early retirement age .0487 .0265*
Ln earnings .0292 .0194
(Ln earnings)2 -.0038 .0017**
Ln non pension wealth .0026 .0074
Dummy for negative non pension wealth .0390 .0496
Full time work, wave 1 -.0688 .0333**
Self-employed, wave 1 -.0268 .0233
Manual work, wave 1 .0203 .0193
Job tenure -.0034 .0024
Job tenure 2 .0000 .0000
Partner in work, wave 1 -.0464 .0191**
College education -.0221 .0207
Mild health problems .0554 .0191**
Severe health problems -.0001 .0448
Psychiatric health problems .1483 .0494**
Musculo-skeletal health problems .0162 .0227
Respiratory health problems .0232 .0289
Notes to table
* indicates significant at 10% level, ** indicates significant at 5% level
189Chapter 6:  Did abolishing the earnings rule affect employment?
The  previous  two  chapters  have  considered  the  effect  of wealth  and  accrual 
incentives  in  pensions  on  the  timing  of retirement.  This  chapter  explores  the 
impact  of a pensions  earnings test,69  a particularly extreme version of a tax on 
older  workers,  operating  in  a  number  of OECD countries,  which  restricts  the 
amount of state pension that can be received by people who continue to work past 
pensionable  age,  by  withdrawing  the  pension  in  line  with  earnings  at  high 
marginal rates.  Potentially, therefore, an earnings test can act as a big disincentive 
to employment among older workers.  This chapter looks at what happened to the 
earnings and hours of men aged 65-69 and women aged 60-64 when the earnings 
test was abolished in the UK in 1989.
Table 6.1  describes the earnings tests that apply in a number of OECD countries. 
As can be seen, there is a wide variety of practice, from environments where it is 
basically impossible simultaneously to work and to receive a public pension (such 
as Ireland, Portugal and Spain) through to regimes where earnings can be received
69 Indeed, as Johnson (2000) restated, the existence of some form of earnings test and ‘actuarially 
unfair’  deferral  are  required  if the  public  pension  programme  is  to  act  as  an  implicit  tax  on 
continued work late in life.
190without extra penalty.70 Note also that many countries which operate such tests 
also  disregard  a  certain  level  of  earnings  in  applying  the  test,  and  that  some 
countries  also  permit  individuals  to  defer  their  pension,  with  a higher rate  of 
pension  being  paid  when  the  individual  finally  stops  working,  both  of which 
reduce the test’s effective penalty on working beyond pension age.
Table 6.1
Earnings Tests in OECD countries
Pension deferral not possible
Disregard 
(% of  average earnings)
Withdrawal rate (%)
Canada 160 15
Greece 116 Full
Denmark 50 60
Austria 30 Full
Belgium 33 100
Norway 18 50
Australia 8 50
Ireland None Full
Portugal None Full
Spain None Full
Pension deferral possible
Italy 23 100
Japan 17-90/90 20/full
United States 38 33-50
No restrictions
Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom_________________________________________________________
Notes:  Pension receipt in Ireland, Portugal and Spain conditional on withdrawal from work;
France conditional on withdrawal from normal work.  Pension withdrawn at a 100 per cent rate 
between 29 and 33 per cent of average earnings in Belgium.  Italy gives a higher disregard for 
self-employment incomes (which are an important income source).  Australia has a means-tested 
social security system.______________________________________________________________________
Source updated from Blondal and Scarpetta (1999).
70  Although,  of course,  such  countries  will  still  typically  levy  income  tax  and,  in  some  cases, 
payroll taxes on post-retirement earnings
191In  2000,  the  earnings  test  was  abolished  in  the  United  States,  with  the  aim  of 
increasing  hours  of  work  of  older  people.  The  debate  preceding  the  reform 
generated a certain amount of empirical work designed to simulate the impact of 
the policy. The United Kingdom, however, offers a ‘natural experiment’ by which 
the effect of such a change can be examined, since it abolished its own earnings 
test,  known as the  ‘earnings rule’  in  1989 (Whitehouse,  1990).  The purpose of 
this  chapter is to estimate the impact of the abolition of the earnings rule in the 
United Kingdom on the hours of work of older workers, comparing the findings 
with  simulations of similar changes both in the  UK and elsewhere and with one 
actual study of an abolition, for Canada.
The  structure  of  the  remainder  of  the  chapter  is  as  follows.  Section  6.2 
summarises the operation of the earnings rule in the UK up to  1989 and describes 
other studies of earnings tests both in the UK and elsewhere.  Section 6.3  writes 
down  a  simple  formal  model  of the joint  decisions  concerning  retirement  and 
deferral  facing  an  individual.  Section  6.4  provides  empirical  evidence  on  the 
impact of abolition and provides a brief conclus ion.
6.1  Background
The  imposition  of an  earnings  test  generates  a  highly  non-linear static budget 
constraint  facing  workers  on  reaching  pensionable  age.  Fig.  6.1  illustrates  a 
budget  constraint  that  exhibits  the  main  features  of the  ‘earnings  rule’  as  it 
operated in the United Kingdom until  1989.  It assumes a wage rate of £3.50 an 
hour, a basic state pension of £44 per week (the level in  1989), a tax rate, net of
192the age allowance (assumed equal to the basic pension), of 25% and an earnings 
rule  operating  in  the  following  manner:  gross  earnings  of  £75  per  week  are 
exempt, the basic pension is withdrawn at 50 pence per £ of earnings from £75 up 
to £79, and £ for £ thereafter.71
Fig. 6.1
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As Figure 6.1  demonstrates, the static budget constraint exhibits a convex kink at 
the  exempt  amount  (the  earnings  disregard)  at  point  B  and  a  non-convex kink 
where  the  state  pension  entitlement  is  exhausted,  at point  C.  Friedberg  (1998) 
provides illustrations of the very similar US earnings test.
71  The  earnings  rule  also  contained  a notional  limit  on  exempt weekly  hours  but  in practice,  the 
earnings limit seems to have been the binding constraint.
193In the simplest interpretation,  abolition of the earnings rule linearises the budget 
constraint, as indicated by the dotted line in figure 6.1.  Basic labour supply theory 
would  then  suggest  no  change  in  hours  for  non-participants  at point A  or for 
participants between points A and B, a potentially large increase in hours supplied 
by  individuals  bunched  at  the  kink point  B,  and  a possible  negative  impact  on 
hours  of those  had  previously  worked  at  some  point  above  C.72  On  balance, 
however,  the  net  effect  of these  changes,  although  depending  on  the  overall 
distribution of hours, might be positive,  especially where hours  are organised in 
discrete  ‘packages’  of part-time  and full-time work (Hurd,  1996).  Specifically, 
abolition of the earnings rule might encourage individuals who had gone part-time 
at state pension age in order to avoid the impact of the rule to choose instead to 
remain in full time work for a longer period.
There  are,  however,  complications  arising  from  the  earnings  rule.  First, 
individuals  in the United Kingdom had,  and still have,  the  opportunity to defer 
pension receipt. The earnings rule operated for five years after state pension age 
(65  for  men,  60  for  women)  until  state  ‘retirement  age’  (70  for  men,  65  for 
women).  Anyone could choose to defer receipt of the state pension for up to five 
years  and thereby  accrue  additional  pension  entitlements  at  a rate  of 7.5%  (in
72 This conclusion has to be slightly qualified if there are substantial fixed costs of work and/or if 
current labour supply decisions take account of future retirement behaviour.  In such cases, hours 
and participation should be  simultaneously modelled by  suitable  techniques.  We  do  not handle 
this explicitly in this particular paper, although we account for the censoring of hours and earnings 
at zero.
1941989)  for each year that they deferred.73  This rate is approximately actuarially 
unfair for a single man and actuarially favourable for a single woman, given life 
expectancies of respectively  14.3 years at 65 for a man and 22.1  years at 60 for a 
women,  although  one  should  also  take  account  of  time  discounting,  the 
inheritance of deceased spouse’s benefits,  and the  likelihood of self-selection of 
deferrers on the basis of individual differences  in expected longevity.  Note that 
deferral requires  an explicit decision in the UK, whereas  in the  US, benefits  in 
each year after normal retirement age are  automatically increased by 6.67% for 
each  year  of  full  benefits  lost  due  to  the  earnings  test  through  the  Delayed 
Retirement  Credit  (Gruber  and  Orszag,  2003).  In  figure  6.1,  actuarially unfair 
deferral is illustrated by the bold dashed line.  For such people who chose to defer, 
abolition of the  earnings rule should act as a pure positive income effect, which 
should, on balance, reduce their hours of work.
The other complication concerns  couples versus  single people.  Reforms  of this 
kind may also affect spouses’ behaviour, especially where one partner is over state 
pensionable age and the other is below. For example, abolition of the earnings rule 
might induce the older partner to continue in full time work rather than switch to 
part time work,  which might in turn affect the hours  or participation decision of 
the younger partner.74
73 The deferral rate had been raised to 7.5% in the years leading up to  1989 and was subsequently 
raised to  10% in 1995.
74  Similar  issues  have  been  noted  in  the  analysis  of in-work  benefits  to  low  income  married 
couples: see, again, Blundell et al (2000) for the UK, and Eissa and Hoynes (2004) for the US.
195Previous research on earnings tests
In contrast with other areas of labour supply, the literature on earnings tests and 
older workers is limited.  Moreover,  much of the  literature  does not adequately 
take adequate account of the deferral option or of the problem of handling the 
behaviour of spouses. The traditional approach in the United States, exemplified 
by  Burtless  and  Moffitt  (1985),  utilises  a  piecewise  linear  budget  constraint 
approach to estimate labour supply effects of the earnings test in the US  for an 
individual  worker.  Typically,  such  studies  conclude  that  the  test  has  had  little 
effect on labour supply (for a survey, see Leonesio, 1990).
A criticism of such studies, noted by Friedberg (2000) is that,  in the  absence of 
temporal variations in the tax structure (i.e. changes in the disregards, tax rates or 
even outright abolition of the earnings test),  estimates depend on cross  sectional 
variation in components of income such as the wage rate and unearned income. If 
these  correlate  with  unobservables,  then  the  estimated  effects  will  be  biased. 
Gustman  and  Steinmeier’s  study  (1986)  may  be  subject  to  the  same  criticism 
concerning  unobservables,  but  an  added  reason  for their  finding  of a  relatively 
small effect lies in their attempt to model the impact of the Delayed Retirement 
Credit in a structural retirement model which, as we suggested previously, should 
alleviate the  impact of the  test.  The  idea that an  earnings  test might affect the 
timing of the first claim  on  social  security  benefit  is  explored  by  Gruber  and 
Orszag (2003) who argue that abolition of the test might accelerate the first claim 
on social security, so reducing labour supply in total irrespective of the behaviour 
of those round the kink (i.e. point B in figure 6.1).
196A further criticism of quasi- structural estimation of the model (at least of its static 
component) arises from the use of the piecewise linear budget constraint method 
itself.  MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch (1990) argue that the log likelihood is only 
defined for individuals locating at a kink like point B in Fig.  1   if the compensated 
substitution effect is positive. Thus there is an inherent bias in the method towards 
finding  positive  compensated  substitution  effects.  Blundell  et  al  (1998) 
circumvent this issue in another context by dropping observations at the kink and 
estimating  labour  supply  elasticities  over  the  rest  of  the  sample,  selectivity 
corrected.  As  Friedberg  (2000)  points  out,  however,  their  procedure  is 
unappealing  in  the  cortext  of the  earnings  test  since  much  of the  ‘action’  is 
expected to derive precisely from the behaviour of those at the kink.  Her own 
estimates  by  the  piecewise  linear budget  constraint  method,  she  argues,  do  not 
require the imposition of a positive compensated substitution effect and avoid the 
issue of correlation with unobservables by exploiting temporal variations in both 
the level of the disregard (exempt amount) to the earnings test and changes in the 
effective tax rate, between 1978 and 1990.  She utilises the resulting elasticities to 
estimate that abolition of the earnings test in the US would raise hours worked of 
those at or above the kink at point B by 5.3%.  Put simply, this would raise the 
hours of a part timer working 20 hours a week by one hour.
However Friedberg’s work is also not immune from criticism.  The first is that the 
‘dynamic’  aspect of the issue -  the accrual of Delayed Retirement Credit (DRC) 
from  any  tax  levied  as  a  result  of the  earnings  test  -   is  simply  ignored  on the 
grounds  that people do not understand the DRC.  Effectively,  it is assumed that 
individuals  are  sophisticated  enough  to  adjust  their  labour  supply  to  small
197variations  in  exempt  amounts  and  effective  tax  rates  while  systematically 
disregarding the fact that tax levied will be recovered later through higher pension 
benefits. Second, there is always danger in extending marginal elasticities derived 
from small changes to construct hypothetical outcomes for large changes, such as 
the abolition of a whole tax regime.
The only previous study of the earnings rule in the UK is contained in a study by 
Zabalza  et  al  (1980).  They  utilised  data  for  a  cross-section  of people  aged 
between  50  and  73  in  1977  to  develop  a  discrete  tri-choice  model  in  which 
individuals  could  choose  between  full-time  and  part-time  work,  and  non­
participation.  By imposing a CES utility function and requiring convexity of the 
opportunity  set  in  the  ordering  full-time, part-time,  non-participation, they were 
able to predict chosen states  (78% of the time)  and to use parameter estimates to 
simulate policy changes.  Specifically,  abolition of the earnings rule would leave 
participation unaffected, but raised the average hours worked (averaged over all 
people) by about 2% for men and 1.6% for women.  Since roughly 20% of people 
in the relevant age range worked  in the  late  1970s,  this  gives  somewhat  larger 
magnitudes than Friedberg’s estimates.
Zabalza et al may however overstate the success  of their model.  Since the age 
range  is  fairly  broad,  predictive  power  is  achieved  largely  by  predicting  that 
people under pension age work and that the majority of older people over pension 
age do not work.  Only 10% of actual part-time workers (amongst whom are those 
at  the  kink  at  point  B  in  figure  6.1)  are  successfully  predicted by their model. 
Consequently,  the  simulated  shift  from part-time  to  full-time work arising from
198the abolition of the earnings rule must have a very high standard error.
What  characterises  all  these  studies  is  that  they  rely  on  simulated  responses 
derived from labour supply modelling, although Friedberg (2000), like Blundell et 
al  (1998),  exploits  policy  variation  to  identify  elements  of model  structure.  A 
different  empirical  strategy  is  to  look  at  actual  reforms  -   in  this  case,  actual 
abolition of earnings tests -  to estimate policy effects.  A standard approach in this 
case  uses  ‘differences  in  differences’,  which  requires  finding  a  ‘control  group’ 
who are unaffected by the reform in question and who are affected identically by 
other ‘shocks’  (for example, to labour demand).  This is the approach used here. 
It is  surveyed by Angrist and Krueger (1999)  and has been used extensively to 
analyse the effects of comparable policy experiments concerning tax regimes.75
Only one study, to our knowledge, applies the method to an earnings test.  Baker 
and Benjamin (1999)  examine the sequential  elimination of earnings  tests  from 
pension plans in Canada in the mid-1970s.  They exploit the fact that the Quebec 
Pension Plan and the (rest of) Canada Pension Plan abolished their earnings tests 
at different times.  Moreover, there was no equivalent to the Delayed Retirement
nr
Credit in the US to complicate the picture: taxed away benefits were simply lost. 
This  gives  a potentially  clean test  of the  impact.  Baker and  Benjamin find no 
evidence that abolition of the tests affected participation, some evidence that take-
75  For tax credits, see for example, Eissa and Leibman (1996), Eissa and Hoynes (1998), Blundell 
et al (2005).
76 There were however some transition provisions which were equivalent to actuarial fair deferral, 
not discussed by Baker and Benjamin.  We owe this point to Richard Johnson (see Johnson, 2000).
199up of benefits was affected and, most pertinently, some evidence of a shift from 
part-time to full-time work.  However this shift in general took the form  of a shift 
in the number of weeks  worked per year (+5  to  6 weeks)  rather than a shift in 
hours  per  week.  They  argue  that  this  result  is  consistent  with  a  discrete  shift 
fixed-hours of work model, as described by Hurd (1996), rather than incremental 
changes in hours around Point B in figure 6.1.
6.2  Modelling retirement with the UK earnings test
To  analyse  the  problem,  consider  a  simple  two-period decision environment at 
state  pensionable  age.  In  the  first  period  the  individual  decides  whether  to 
(continue to) work and whether to receive the flat state pension  -  yielding three 
possible  options.  He  or  she  can  retire  immediately  and  start  drawing  the  state 
pension. He or she can carry on working and defer pension receipt.  Or else (s)he 
can carry on working, and start drawing the pension, in which case (s)he might be 
subject to the earnings rule.77  In the second period, the individual receives a flat- 
rate  pension,  the  value  of which  is  conditional  on  the  choice  made  in  the  first 
period.
Assume a general utility function:
U = U(clt h; pC2, pl2 | d)  UcC ) > 0,  UiQ > 0
77 We ignore the fourth possible option -  retire and defer pension receipt -  by assuming no other 
available source of income.
200where c  is  consumption and  / is  leisure (indexed by period),  (3 is an individual 
discount  factor  (0  <  p <  1)  and  0 is  the  (individual-specific)  probability  of 
surviving until the second period.78
We now write the budget constraint for the two period remaining lifetime, Y, for 
different options.  If the individual retires immediately, total income is given by;
(1)  Y = p + 0p
where p is the flat (basic) pension.
If (s)he decides to continue to work and defer pension receipt, income is given by;
(2)  Y=w(l -t) + 0p(l +r)
where r is the adjustment of the pension arising from deferral and t is the average 
rate of tax which is payable when the individual is working but not when (s)he is 
retired.79
If (s)he works but does not defer pension receipt, total income is:
(3)  Y = w* + 9p where
(a) w* = (w + p) (1 -  t)  ifw< wo
(b) w* = (wo + p) (1 - 1) if wo  < w <  wo + p
78  This  might,  in  turn,  be  affected  by  the  decision  whether  to  carry  on  working,  but this  is not 
something we consider here.
201(c) w* = w(l -t) if w > wo + p
where the non- linearity in the wage outcome reflects the operation of the earnings 
rule.80
Faced with these different possibilities, what would an individual choose to do? 
Certain options can be eliminated fairly easily. For example, the individual would 
always  choose  3(a)  over 3(b)  since  in the latter case  dw*/dw  =  0.  So we might 
expect to see a ‘bunching’  of individuals at the kink point wo (point B in Figure 
6.1). Also, a forward-looking individual should always choose (2) over 3(c) since 
the  former  augments  the  pension  in  period  2  by  r.  This  reduces  the effective 
choice to (1), (2) and 3(a). The actual decision will depend on the relative utility 
from  leisure  and  consumption,  the  discount  rate,  the  survival  probability,  the 
income  tax  rate  and  the  deferral  rate.  These  last  four factors  determine  whether 
deferral is  actuarially fair.  For someone working,  this requires that  (1 -  t)  =  Or, 
although assuming  <  1   implies  that  an  individual  will  require  an  actuarially 
favourable deferral rate in order to postpone retirement. Note that the tax system 
tends to  favour  deferral  since  all  of the  pension  is  likely  to  be  taxed  if  the 
individual receives it now in addition to his or her earnings.
It is possible to distinguish four types of people.
79  Pension  income  is  assumed  not  to  be  taxed  since,  in  the  UK,  the  value  of the  individual’s 
personal tax allowance is at least as great as the value of the basic state pension.
80 For simplicity, ignore the small  segment of the budget constraint with a 50 per cent withdrawal 
rate.
202•  Type  Is  retire  and  start  drawing  their  pension  in  period  one.  They  are 
likely to derive high utility from leisure relative to additional income and 
deferral is more likely to be actuarially unfavourable for them.
•  Type 2s choose to work and earn at or less than the earnings test limit and 
start drawing their pension immediately. For them deferral is likely to be 
actuarially unfavourable and they derive relatively lower utility from any 
increased  income  they  could  get  earning  more  than  the  earnings  rule 
threshold.
•  Type 3s  are those who work and defer pension and for whom deferral is 
actuarially favourable.
•  Type 4s are those who work and defer and for whom deferral is actuarially 
unfavourable, but who derive high utility from income relative to  leisure 
and  are  therefore  prepared  to  pay  the  tax  implicit  in  deferral.  Note, 
however,  that  the  penalty  they  pay  for  earning  above  the  earnings  rule 
threshold is less than if there were no deferral option when they would lose 
Opr in the second period.
If the earnings test is abolished, (3) becomes;
(3)  Y=(w+p)(l-t) + dp
How does  this  affect the  four types?  Type  Is  and Types  3s  will be unaffected. 
Type 2s will tend to work more following the abolition of the earnings rule. They 
will have an incentive to increase their hours and earnings since  dY/dw >  0. Type 
4s,  for  whom  deferral  is  actuarially  unfavourable,  will  no  longer  have  to
203defer if the earnings rule is abolished. As a result they will experience a positive 
income effect and could choose to reduce the number of hours worked.
A priori the impact of abolishing the earnings rule on work incentives depends on 
the relative numbers of Type 2s and Type 4s, and on the size of the implicit tax 
rate facing Type 4s who chose to defer when the earnings rule was in place. At the 
time of abolition, the government claimed that around 400,000 people would gain 
as a result (see Whitehouse,  1990). This total included 200,000 people who would 
choose to work and earn more and 200,000 who would gain because they would 
no longer have to defer their pension. Taken literally, the official figures imply a 
fairly equal split between Type 2s, who would work more following the abolition 
of the earnings rule, and Type 4s who were previously deferring at an actuarially 
unfair rate and who might choose to work less after the abolition of the earnings 
rule. In fact this 200,000 figure for the number of people who would gain from no 
longer having to defer their pension seems too high. It is closer to the total number 
of deferrers at the time of the change and will therefore include some people of 
Type 3.
What of married women?  Given  their longer life  expectancy,  women  are more 
likely  than  men  to  be  Types  3s,  suggesting  a  gender-specific  impact  from 
abolition  of the  earnings  rule.  But  the  position  is  complicated  by  the  fact  that, 
before  1978,  married  women  could  opt  to  pay  a  reduced  rate  of  National 
Insurance  contribution,  which  meant  that  they  did  not  qualify  for  a  basic  state 
pension in their own right.  However couples in which one partner did not qualify 
would  receive  a  dependant’s  addition.  So  married  women  may  have  been
204indirectly affected by the reform through its effect on their spouses’ behaviour.
Again, there are several cases. The first case is women married to Type 2 men, i.e. 
men who are  likely to  increase their hours as  a result of the  earnings rule being 
abolished.  This  will  cause  a positive  income  effect  for  the  wife  who,  if she  is 
working,  is  likely to reduce her hours  -  or stop working altogether.  The second 
and  third  cases  are  both  women  married  to  Type  4  men,  i.e.  those  for  whom 
deferral  is  actuarially unfair and who choose to start drawing their pension once 
the  earnings rule  is  abolished.  The  distinction lies  in whether the husband takes 
account  of the  lifetime  of the  couple  in  assessing  whether  deferral  would  be 
actuarially unfair,  or only their own  lifetime.  If the  former,  then  abolishing the 
earnings rule and allowing the husband to draw the pension immediately will have 
a positive  income  effect for both  spouses.  If the  latter,  then there may be  some 
wives  who  experience  a fall in their total incomes following the abolition of the 
earnings  rule  if their  husbands  choose  not  to  defer.  For  members  of this  third 
group the abolition of the earnings rule has a negative income effect, which could 
cause them to  increase their hours  of work.  If they do not, then abolition of the 
earnings rule could in the longer term,  generate higher levels  of poverty among 
elderly widows. Overall, we might expect to find less clear cut results for women 
than for men.
6.3  Empirical analysis
The strategy for evaluating  the effect of abolishing the earnings rule is a simple 
“differences-in-differences”  approach.  This  looks  at  changes  in  the  hours  and 
earnings of the “treatment group” who were affected by the reform (men aged 65-
20569  and  women  aged  60-64), before  and after  the  earnings  rule  was  abolished 
(defined as April  1984 -  September 1989 and October  1989 -  March  1994).  To 
control  for  the  potential  effect  of other  factors  over  the  same  period,  such  as 
business-cycle  effects,  changes  in the earnings  and hours  of the treatment group 
are compared with changes in the same variables among a control group who were 
not affected by the reform, but would have been affected by the other factors.  In 
practice, there are two comparison groups.  The first consists of men and women 
five years before state pension age (i.e. men aged 60-64 and women aged 55-59) 
who remained ineligible for the state pension throughout.  The second consists of 
older men aged 70-74 and women aged 65-69 who could receive the state pension 
without being subject to earnings rule throughout.  There are a number of reasons 
for thinking that the older group would act as a better control, but low levels of 
employment among this group make for small  sample sizes.  Using the younger 
control group therefore increases the available number of observations.8 1
To  identify  the  effect of the reform  from  a differences-in-differences approach, 
two  conditions  must  be  satisfied  (Angrist  and  Krueger,  1999).  First,  the 
composition of the groups must be stable across time and second, the control and 
treatment group must be subject to (and react in the same way to) macro trends. 
For the younger control group, both conditions may be violated.
Figure  1.1  in  chapter  1   shows  employment  rates  among  the  three  age  groups 
(treatment and two  control  groups)  for men between  1968-2002.  The period of
81  An  attempt  was  made  to  increase  sample  size  by  splicing  in  additional  data  from  the  General 
Household Survey, but inconsistent data definitions precluded this strategy yielding useful results.
206analysis of the earnings test (1984-94) comes after the biggest fall in employment 
among 60-64 year olds, but nevertheless, there appear to be differences between 
the trend in employment of this group and that of the 65-69 age group.  As seen in 
chapter  4,  employment  among  the  younger  age  group  is  likely  to  be  heavily 
influenced by occupational pension incentives, which is not true of the older age 
groups.  Also,  the  balance  between  full-time  and  part-time  workers  is  quite 
different in the younger male cohort compared to the treatment group and is much 
more similar in the treatment group and the older cohort. Since full-time and part- 
time workers might be differentially affected by macro factors, this also will tend 
to make the younger cohort a less valid control.
Finally,  there  may  be  spillover  effects  from  the  reform  to  the  younger  control 
group.  This  is  a  potential  problem  if members  of the  younger  control  group 
change their labour market behaviour in anticipation of no longer having to face 
the earnings rule when they reach state pension age. The effect on labour supply 
could go  either way.  If there  are  significant tenure effects then abolition of the 
earnings rule might create a stronger incentive for younger workers to work now.
o 'J
Any positive income effect would tend to work in the other direction.
82  There  could be  a potential  problem  if we  used  data  from  after  1994  when  the  older cohort  of 
people  would  include  those  people  who  were  in  the  treatment  age  range  when  the  reform  was 
made.  If there were employment dynamics such that hours and earnings decisions taken when 65- 
69 affected hours and earnings decisions when 70-74 then the older group would not be a proper 
control.
207Because  of  these  potential  problems  with  the  younger  control  group,  in  the 
analysis that follows, results are presented using just the older control group, and 
using the older and younger combined.
The data are taken from the Family Expenditure Survey from April 1984 -  March 
1994. The FES contains reliable and consistent information on employment status, 
hours worked and earnings that allows us to look at employment before and after 
the  abolition  of the  earnings  rule,  as  well  as  information  on  individuals’  state 
pension  income  that  permits  an  assessment  of the  extent  to  which  individuals 
defer pension receipt. Table 6.2 shows the sample sizes for the ‘treatment’ group 
and the two ‘control’  groups. Among the older age groups participation rates are 
very  low  and pooling  across  a number of years  is necessary to  increase  sample 
sizes when looking at hours and earnings.
Table 6.2
Sample sizes
Pre-reform 
All  Employed
Post-reform 
All  Employed
Treatment Men aged 65-69 2111 160 1713 128
Control 1 Men aged 60-64 2185 888 1558 511
Control 2 Men aged 70-74 1573 77 1371 67
Treatment Women aged 60-64 2697 450 1916 338
Control 1 Women aged 55-59 2399 1125 1718 838
Control 2 Women aged 65-69 2576 134 2017 119
Source: Family Expenditure Survey  1984 -  94
Figure 6.2A plots the distribution of earnings (in constant  1989 prices,  adjusted
208using an earnings index) for men aged 65-69 when the earnings rule was in place 
and after its abolition, for positive earnings.  Figure 6.2B presents the same data 
for women.  We  focus  on the period after April  1986  since  from this  time the 
earnings rule thresholds were unchanged in nominal terms.  The earnings rule did 
appear to have had some impact on earnings for men and women.  The rule made 
some allowance for work-related costs, which will have had a smoothing effect on 
any potential ‘kink’ in the distribution of earnings at the threshold.  Even so, there 
is some bunching in the distribution of male and female earnings around the £75 
threshold,  although  in  neither  case  is  the  mass  of the  distribution  to  be  found 
around  these  points.  Interestingly,  the  largest  spike  in  the  distribution  for  men 
occurs  around  £40  a  week,  reflecting  the  Lower  Earnings  Limit  for  National 
Insurance  contributions,  even  though  employees  over  state  pensionable  age  are 
not  liable  for National  Insurance  contributions.  After  abolition  there  is  some 
evidence,  from  ‘eye-balling’  the distributions,  of a reduction in the  spike at £75 
and  of  greater  frequencies  at  higher  earnings  for  both  the  male  and  female 
distributions.
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Table  6.3  summarizes  participation  and  average  hours  for  the  treatment  and 
control groups before and after abolition of the earnings rule. The only significant
210
45change  in participation occurs  for younger men.  The  fall  in employment among 
this group -  and the likely effect of this on the sample composition of workers in 
this age range -  poses problems for using younger men as a control group.
Table 6.3
Participation and hours, before and after the reform
Participation (%) 
Pre  Post
Mean Pre
Hours (>0) 
Mean Post Rank sum 
Test
Men 65-69 7.58 7.47 22.43 26.27* 2.266
Men 60-64 40.64 32.80* 40.62 40.35 0.560
Men 70-74 4.90 4.89 17.81 18.40 1.041
Women 60-64 16.39 17.64 21.06 22.89* 1.611
Women 55-59 46.89 48.78 27.09 27.06 0.407
Women 65-69 5.20 5.90 15.32 16.59 0.802
* change significant at 5 per cent level
In  contrast,  the evidence  clearly  suggests that the  abolition of the  earnings rule 
had a significant effect on the number of hours worked by men. A Wilcoxon rank- 
sum test rejects the null that the pre and post-reform distributions are independent 
samples  from  populations  with  the  same  distribution  (Table  6.3).  The  average 
number of hours worked by men in the treatment group increased significantly, by 
nearly four hours per worker, despite no significant change in average hours, or in 
the distribution of hours, among the older or younger cohort over the same period.
This  is  confirmed  by  regression  analysis.  Weekly hours for individuals
211in  the  three  groups  are  regressed  on  a  set  of dummies  for  the  treatment  and 
younger  control  groups  and  a  dummy  for  the  period  after the  abolition  of the 
earnings  test.  An  interaction  term  is  included  that  takes  the  value  one  for  the 
treatment group in the post-reform period to pick up any differential change in the 
hours of this group after the reform relative to the two control groups.  Both OLS 
and Tobit regressions were run; the latter to handle the left censoring of the data. 
The Tobit estimates are depicted here, although there is in fact little difference in 
the results using the two estimators.
The  results  for  men  are  summarised  in  Table  6.4.  Combining  the  two  control 
groups,  there  is  a significant  increase  in the  average number of weekly hours  -  
around four hours a week -  worked by members of the treatment group relative to 
the controls after the reform. Excluding the younger control group, there is still an 
increase of just over three hours  a week,  although the reduction in sample size 
increases the standard error and the coefficient is significant only at the 10% level.
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Regression results (men)
Tobit - hours worked per 
week
Probit - worked more 
than 40 hours
Tobit - weekly earnings
Control groups Older and 
younger
Older only Older and 
younger
Older only Older and 
younger
Older only
Treatment group 4.121**
(1.334)
3.594*
(1.887)
0.208**
(0.082)
0.080*
(0.047)
14.18
(12.27)
13.93
(15.54)
Younger control 22.248**
(1.000)
0.488**
(0.033)
148.51**
(12.37)
Post-reform
dummy
-0.294
(0.611)
0.778
(2.246)
-0.018
(0.027)
-0.035
(0.076)
-15.51**
(7.51)
-13.64
(18.50)
Treatment*
Dummy
4.150**
(1.474)
3.130
(2.760)
0.227**
(0.066)
0.176*
(0.113)
42.36**
(18.14)
40.12*
(22.74)
No. obs 1781 429 1781 429 1781 429
Log likelihood -6836.21 -1722.49 -1108.85 -161.70 -11301.9 -2627.09
Standard errors in parentheses. The regressions control for education, marital status, presence of children in the 
household, spouse’s age, employment and education.
Earnings are adjusted by a wage index calculated using FES data for male employees aged 20-64.
*  change significant at 10 per cent level  ** change significant at 5 per cent level
Table 6.4 also shows the marginal effects from a probit regression on whether or 
not the individual works 40 or more hours a week. There is a significant increase 
in the proportion of men  in the treatment group working more  than 40  hours  a 
week  after  the  reform  compared  to  the  control  group.  This  result  strongly
213suggests that we are observing discrete shifts from part-time to full-time work, as 
conjectured by Zabalza et al (1980) and Baker and Benjamin (1999), rather than 
incremental adjustments of hours which, given the argument of Section 2, might 
be expected to reduce hours  among those higher earners  for whom the earnings 
rule abolition induces a notional positive income effect.83
Finally, Table 6.4 summarises the results of a regression of earnings on the same 
variables  and  shows  a  positive  and  significant  increase  in  the  earnings  of the 
treatment  group  after  the  reform  compared  when  both  control  groups.  Again, 
small sample size limits the significance of the comparison with the older control 
group.  Note that the increase in earnings of the control group more than offsets a 
reduction in earnings in the post-abolition period across all groups.
Table  6.5  replicates  Table  6.4,  but  for  women.  Similar  results  are  obtained, 
although the coefficient  estimates  are  lower.  The  abolition of the  earnings  test 
raises average hours by just over two hours a week, and average earnings by just 
over £20 per week, but these results disappear when only the older control group 
are used, despite the larger sample size compared to men. A Wilcoxon rank-sum 
test fails to reject that the distribution of hours are the same before and after the
83  We  experimented  with  various  cut-offs  of  hours  to  capture  any  income  effects  inducing 
reductions  in  hours  among  full-time  workers,  without  success.  It  is  possible  of  course  that 
earnings  cut-offs,  rather  than  hours,  might  find  evidence  of such  opposite  effects  and  indeed 
Friedberg (2000) does find very small such effects.
214reform,  but  the  increase  in  the  average  number  of  hours  worked  among  the 
treatment group is significant at the 5% level.
Table 6.5
Regression results (women)
Tobit -  hours worked per 
week
Probit - worked more 
than 40 hours
Tobit - weekly earnings
Control groups Older and 
younger
Older only Older and 
younger
Older only Older and 
younger
Older only
Treatment group 5.214**
(1.026)
6,288**
(1.266)
0.172**
(0.048)
0.171**
(0.040)
21.98**
(6.15)
33.54**
(6.74)
Younger control 11.430**
(0.860)
0.372**
(0.033)
54.07**
(5.15)
Post-reform
dummy
-0.186
(0.584)
2.070
(1.597)
-0.029
(0.024)
-0.070
(0.065)
-25.35**
(3.50)
-1.94
(8.50)
Treatment*
Dummy
2.350**
(1.082)
-0.298
(1.850)
0.103**
(0.046)
0.018
(0.071)
23.83**
(6.48)
-0.41
(9.84)
No. obs 2694 984 2694 984 2694 984
Log likelihood -10587.2 -3877.03 -1681.54 -546.48 -15410.0 -5522.09
Standard errors in parentheses. The regressions control for education, marital status, presence of children in the 
household, spouse’s age, employment and education.
Earnings are adjusted by a wage index calculated using FES data for male employees aged 20-64.
*  change significant at 10 per cent level  ** change significant at 5 per cent level
84 Given the argument in Section 6.2, it would be nice to pin down the possible different behaviour 
of  wives,  single  women  (never  married  versus  widows  and  divorcees).  Small  sample  sizes 
preclude this.
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Deferral
There is  little evidence of a reduction in hours  among high  earners  caused by a 
positive income effect among people of type 4 (i.e. those who previously chose to 
work and defer at an actuarially unfair rate). One possible explanation is that for 
most  people  who  chose  to  defer their pension,  deferral  was  in  fact  actuarially 
favourable given their individual expected longevity.  In this case, we would not 
expect to  see  a large  fall  in the  number of people who chose to defer after the 
reform.
Figure  6.3  shows  cohort  profiles  of  the  proportion  of  men  who  received 
increments to their pension as a result of deferral, derived from published official 
statistics (DSS, Social Security Statistics, various years). The cohorts are defined 
according to the year in which people reach state pension age. The oldest cohort 
comprises those who reached  65  in  1980.  At younger ages,  the  cohort profiles 
rise,  reflecting  an  increasing  number  of the  cohort  who  have  retired  after state
Figure 3: Proportion of men in receipt of deferred pension, by cohort
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Age6.4  Conclusions
The  a  priori  effect  of  abolishing  earnings  tests  for  social  security  on  work 
incentives is ambiguous.  People who are currently earning at or near the earnings 
test threshold are likely to have an incentive to work more. But a second group of 
people  will  experience  a  positive  income  effect  as  a  result  of abolishing  the 
earnings test and this second group may actually reduce their hours and earnings. 
In  practice,  the  option  to  defer pension  receipt  reduces  the  size  of the  penalty 
associated with earning above the earnings test threshold.  Indeed if deferral were 
actuarially fair it would eliminate the penalty of the earnings test altogether -  and 
any positive income effect arising from its abolition.
The earnings test, known as the earnings rule, was abolished in the UK in October 
1989.  The estimates presented here suggest that the reform had a positive effect 
on the hours and earnings of men and women, although the net impact on women 
is  lower,  as  our  discussion  of  family  responses  would  suggest.  Among  male 
participants in the affected ags range there was an increase of between 3 -4  hours 
per  week,  and  for  women,  perhaps  2  hours  a  week.  To  get  some  idea  of the 
magnitude  of  this  effect,  an  earnings  response  of  this  size  would  generate 
additional tax revenue for the government of around £20 million per year (in 1989 
prices).
There  is no  evidence of any reduction in hours that would arise as a result of a 
positive income effect from abolishing the earnings test.  The explanation for this 
finding is that most of those who chose to defer did so because, for them, deferral 
was actuarially favourable.  Support for this hypothesis comes from the fact that
217there is little indication of a significant reduction in deferral after the earnings test 
was abolished.
Two caveats are  in order.  First,  the ymnger control group  is not ideal,  and the 
results are much weaker when only the older control group is used, given its small 
sample size.  Second, the ‘differences of differences’ approach used here does not 
permit any structural modelling, in particular of the decision to participate (not to 
retire) and how many hours to supply conditional on participation.  An alternative, 
given the clean test offered by the UK experience, would be to nest the policy 
‘experiment’ within a structural approach to labour supply.
218References
Aguiar, M. and Hurst, E. (2005) “Consumption and expenditure”, Journal of 
Political Economy, 113 (5), pp 919 -  48
Ameriks, J., Caplin, A. and Leahy, J. (2002) “Retirement consumption: Insights 
from a survey”, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 
No. 8735
Angrist. J. and Krueger, A. (1999) “Empirical strategies in labor economics” pp 
1277-1365 in O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds) Handbook of  Labor 
Economics, Volume 3, Elsevier Science B.V.
Baker, M. and Benjamin, D. (1999) “How do retirement tests affect the labour 
supply of older men?” Journal of  Public Economics, 71, pp. 27 -  51
Banks, J. and Blundell, R., (2005) “Private pension arrangements and retirement”, 
Fiscal Studies 26 (1), pp. 35-53
Banks, J., Blundell, R. and Tanner, S. (1998) “Is there a retirement-savings 
puzzle?” American Economic Review, vol. 88 (4), pp. 769 -  88
Banks, J. and Casanova. M. (2004), Work and retirement, in Marmot, M., J. 
Banks, R, Blundell, C. Lessof and J. Nazroo (eds) Health wealth and 
lifestyles of the older population in England: The 2002 English 
Longitudinal Study of  Ageing, London: IFS
Banks, J., Emmerson, C. and Tetlow, G. (2005) “Modelling pension wealth of 
ELSA respondents”, Institute for Fiscal Studies Working Paper W05/09
Banks, J. and Smith, S. (2006) “Retirement in the UK” Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, 22 (1), pp. 40 -  56
Berkovec, J. and Stem, S. (1991) “Job exit behavior of older men”, Econometrica, 
59, l,pp.  189-210.
219Bemheim, D. (1989) “The timing of retirement: A comparison of expectations and 
realizations”, in D.A. Wise (ed) The Economics of  Aging, Chicago 
University Press for National Bureau of Economic Research.
Bemheim, D., Skinner, J. and Weinberg, S. (2001) “What accounts for the 
variation in retirement wealth among US households?” American 
Economic Review, 91 (4) pp. 832 -  57
Blake, D., Byme, A., Caims and Dowd, K. (2005) The Stakeholder Pension 
Lottery: An Analysis of the Default Funds in UK Stakeholder Pension 
Schemes, mimeo
Blau, D. (1994), ‘Labour force dynamics of older men’ Econometrica, 62 (1),  pp. 
157-180
Blau, D (2004) ‘Retirement and consumption in a life-cycle model’, mimeo, 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Blondal, S. and Scarpetta, S. (1999) The retirement decision in OECD countries, 
Ageing Working Paper 14, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development: Paris.
Blundell. R., Brewer. M. and Shepard. A. (2005), “Evaluating the labour market 
impact of the Working Family Tax Credit using difference in differences”, 
HM Revenue and Customs
Blundell, R., Duncan, A., McCrae, J. and Meghir, C. (2000) “The labour market 
impact of the working families’ tax credit”, Fiscal Studies, 21, pp.75-104
Blundell, R., Duncan, A. and Meghir, C. (1998) “Estimating labour supply 
responses using tax reforms”, Econometrica, 66, pp. 827 -  862
Blundell, R. and Johnson, P. (1998) “Pensions and Labour Market Participation”, 
American Economic Review, 88(2), pp.  168-72
Blundell, R., Meghir, C. and Smith, S. (2004) “Pension incentives and the pattern 
of retirement in the UK”, in J. Gruber and D. Wise (eds), Social Security
220Programs and Retirement Around the World, Micro-estimation, Chicago 
and London: The University of Chicago Press.
Bone, M., Gregory, J., Gill, B. and Lader, D. (1992), Retirement and retirement 
plans, HMSO: London.
Browning, M., Deaton, A. and Irish, M. (1985) “A profitable approach to labor
supply and commodity demands over the life-cycle”, Econometrica, vol 53 
(3) pp. 503-43
Burtless, G. and Moffitt, R. (1985) “The joint choice of retirement age and post­
retirement hours of work”, Journal of  Labor Economics, 3, pp. 209-236.
Cannon, E. and Tonks, I. (2004) ‘U.K. Annuity Rates, Money's worth and
Pension Replacement Ratios, 1957-2002”, The Geneva Papers on Risk and 
Insurance - Issues and Practice 29(3)
Carlson, J.A. and Parkin, M. (1975) “Inflation expectations”, Economica, 42, pp. 
123-128.
Coile, C (2004) “Retirement Incentives and Couples’ Retirement Decisions.” 
Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy, 4(1)
Coile, C. and Gruber, J., (2000) “Social security and retirement”, National Bureau 
of Economic Research Working Paper No. 7651
Coile, C. and Gruber, J., (2007) “Social security and retirement”, Review of 
Economics and Statistics, forthcoming
Coile, C. and Levine, P. (2006) “Bulls, bears and retirement behaviour”,
Industrial and Labor Relations Review
Chung, W., Disney, R., Emerson, C. and Wakefield, M. (2004) Public policy and 
saving  for retirement: Evidence from the introduction of  stakeholder 
pensions in the UK, University of Nottingham Centre for Policy 
Evaluation working paper 4/04
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/economics/cpe/publications/RD  stakeholder
221pensions.pdf
Continuous Mortality Investigation Bureau (2006) The Graduation of the CMI 
1999-2002 Mortality Experience: Final “00” Series Mortality Tables - 
Annuitants and Pensioners, Mortality Committee Working Paper 22
Das, M. (1996) On Income Expectations and Other Subjective Data: A
Microeconometric Analysis: CentER for Economic Research, Tilburg 
University
Das, M. and van Soest, A. (1997) “Expected and realized income changes:
evidence from the Dutch Socio-economic panel”, Journal of  Economic 
Behaviour and Organisation, 32, 137-154
Diamond, P. and Hausman, J. (1984) “Individual retirement and savings 
decisions”, Journal of  Public Economics
Disney, R. (1999) “Why have older men stopped working?” pp. 58-74 in P. Gregg 
and J. Wadsworth (eds) The State of Working Britain, Manchester 
University Press.
Disney, R., Emerson, C. and Wakefield, M. (2004) “Ill-health and retirement in 
Britain - a panel data analysis”, Journal of  Health Economics, 25(4), pp. 
621 -649
Disney, R., Emerson, C. and Smith, S. (2004) “Pension reform and economic 
performance” in D. Card, R. Blundell and R. Freeman (eds), Seeking a 
premier economy: The economic effects of  British economic reforms,  1980 
-  2000, University of Chicago Press
Disney, R., Grundy, E. and Johnson, P. (1997) eds., The dynamics of retirement 
Department for Social Security Research Report No. 72, HMSO: London.
Disney, R. and Hawkes, D. (2003) “Why has employment recently risen among 
older workers in Britain”, in Dickens, R., Gregg,. P. and Wadsworth, J. 
(eds) The labour market under New Labour: The state of working Britain
222II, Manchester University Press
Disney, R., Meghir, C. and Whitehouse, E. (1994), “Retirement behaviour in 
Britain”, Fiscal Studies 15(1), pp 24-43.
Dominitz, J. and Manski, C.F. (1997) “Using expectations data to study subjective 
income expectations”, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 92, 
855-867.
Eissa, N. and Hoynes, H. (2004) “Taxes and the labor market participation of 
married women: The Earned Income Tax Credit”, Journal of  Public 
Economics  88, pp. 1931 -  1958
Eissa, N. and Leibman, J. (1996) “Labor supply response to the Earned Income 
Tax Credit”, Quarterly Journal of  Economics, 111, 605-37
Fields, G. and Mitchell, O. (1984) Retirement, pensions and social security, MIT 
Press
Finkelstein, A. and Poterba, J. (2002) “Selection effects in the United Kingdom 
individual annuities market”, Economic Journal
Finkelstein, A. and Poterba, J. (2004) “Adverse Selection in insurance markets: 
Policyholder evidence from the UK annuity market”, Journal of  Public 
Economics
French, E. (2005) “The effects of health, wealth and wages on labour supply and 
retirement behaviour”, Review of  Economic Studies, 72, pp. 395 -  427
Friedberg, L. (1998) “The social security earnings test and labor supply of older 
men”, pp. 121-150 in J. Poterba (ed) Tax Policy and the Economy,  12, 
Cambridge: MIT Press.
Friedberg, L. (2000) “The labor supply effects of the social security earnings test”, 
Review of  Economics and Statistics, 82 (February), pp. 48-63.
Friedberg, L. and Webb, A. (2005) “Retirement and the evolution of pension
223structure”, Journal of  Human Resources 40(2), pp. 281 -  308
Gardner, J. and Orszag, M. (2003) How have older workers responded to scary 
markets? Watson Wyatt technical paper 2003-LS04
Gruber, J. and Oszag, P. (2003) “Does the social security earnings test affect labor 
supply and benefits receipt? ” National Tax Journal, 56(4), pp. 755 -  773
Gruber, J. and Wise, D. eds (1999) Social security and retirement around the 
world, University of Chicago Press
Gruber, J. and Wise, D. eds (2004) Social security programs and retirement 
around the world: Micro-estimation, University of Chicago Press
Gustman, A. and Steinmeier, T. (1986) “A structural retirement model”, 
Econometrica, 54, pp. 555-584
Gustman, A. and Steinmeier, T. (2004) “Social security, pensions and retirement 
behaviour within the family”, Journal of  Applied Econometrics
Haider, S. and Stephens, M. (2007) “Is there a retirement-consumption puzzle?
Evidence using subjective retirement expectations”, Review of  Economics 
and Statistics, forthcoming
Hamermesh, D. (1984) “Life-cycle effects on consumption and retirement”, 
Journal of  Labor Economics 2, pp. 353-370
Hurd, M. (1990) “The Joint Retirement Decision of Husbands and Wives,” in 
Issues in the Economics of  Aging, D. Wise (editor), The University of 
Chicago Press.
Hurd, M. (1996) “The effect of labor market rigidities on the labor force behavior 
of older men”, pp.  11-58 in D. Wise (ed) Advances in the Economics of 
Aging, University of Chicago Press, for National Bureau of Economic 
Research.
Hurd, M. (1996) “Labour market transitions in the Health and Retirement Survey
224-  the effects of subjective probabilities of retirement” mimeo, prepared for 
the symposium to honour F. Thomas Juster.
Hurd, M.D. and McGarry, K. (1995) Evaluation of the subjective probabilities of 
survival in the Health and Retirement Survey, Journal of  Human 
Resources, 30, S268-292.
Hurd, M. and Rohwedder, S. (2003) “The retirement-consumption puzzle: 
Anticipated and actual declines in spending and retirement” National 
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 9586
Johnson, R. (2000) “The effect of old age insurance on male retirement: Evidence 
from historical cross-country data”, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 
Research Division, Working Paper 0-09.
Juster, F.T. and Smith, J.P. (1997) “Improving the quality of economic data:
lessons from the HRS and AHEAD”, Journal of the American Statistical 
Association, 92, 1268-1278.
Keane, M.P. and Runkle, D.E. (1990) “Testing the rationality of price forecasts: 
new evidence from panel data”, American Economic Review, 80, 714-735.
Leonesio, M. (1990) “Effects of the social security test on the labor market
activity of older Americans: A review of the evidence”, Social Security 
Bulletin, 53, 2-21.
Lumsdaine, R. and Mitchell, O. (1999) “New Developments in the Economic 
Analysis of Retirement”, in Ashenfelter and Card (eds) Handbook of 
Labor Economics
Lumsdaine, R., Stock, J. and D. Wise (1990) “Three models of retirement:
Computational complexity versus predictive validity”, National Bureau of 
Economic Research working paper 3558.
MaCurdy, T, Green, D. and Paarsch, H. (1990) “Assessing empirical approaches 
for analyzing taxes and labor supply”, Journal of  Human Resources, 25,
225415-490.
Manski, C.F. (1990) “The use of intentions data to predict behavior: A best case 
analysis”, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 85, 934-940.
Marmot, M., J. Banks, R, Blundell, C. Lessof and J. Nazroo (eds) (2004) Health 
wealth and lifestyles of the older population in England: The 2002 English 
Longitudinal Study of  Ageing, London: IFS
Meadows, P. (2003) Retirement ages in the UK: a review of the literature, DTI 
Employment Relations Research Series No.  18
Meghir, C. and Whitehouse, E. (1997) “Labour market transitions and retirement 
behaviour of men in the UK”, Journal of  Econometrics 79, pp 327-354.
Milevsky, M. and Young, V. (2007) “The timing of annuitization: Investment
dominance and mortality risk” Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, 40 
(l)pp. 135-144
Miniaci, R., Monfardini, C. and Weber, G. (2003) “Is there a retirement-
consumption puzzle in Italy?” Institute for Fiscal Studies Working Paper 
No. 03/14
Munnell, A., Cahill, K. and Jivan,N. (2003) How has the shift to 401(K)s affected 
retirement age? Center for Retirement Research, Briefing
Murthi, M., Orszag, M. and Orszag, P. (1999) The value of money of annuities in 
the UK: Theory, policy and evidence, Birkbeck College, London, 
Discussion Paper
Neumark, D.  and Stock, W. (1999) “Age discrimination laws and labor market 
efficiency”, Journal of  Political Economy, 107 (5), pp. 1081 -  1125
Poterba, J., Venti, S. and Wise, D (2004) “The transition to personal accounts and 
increasing retirement wealth: Macro- and Micro-evidence”, in Wise (ed) 
Perspectives on the Economics of  Aging, University of Chicago press
226Quinn, J.F., Burkhauser, R.V. and Myers, D.A. (1990) Passing the Torch: The 
Influence of  Economic Incentives on Work and Retirement, Kalamazoo, 
MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute of Employment Research.
Ruhm, C. (1990) “Bridge jobs and partial retirement”, Journal of  Labor 
Economics, 8 (4), pp. 482 -  501
Rust, J. (1987) “A dynamic programming model of retirement behaviour”, 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 2470
Rust, J. and Phelan, C. (1997) “How social security and medicare affect
retirement behavior in a world of incomplete markets”, Econometrica. 
65(4), 781-831.
Samwick, A. (1998) “New Evidence on Pensions, Social Security, and the Timing 
of Retirement,” Journal of  Public Economics
Samwick, A. and Skinner, J. (2004) “How Will 401(k) Plans Affect Retirement 
Income?” American Economic Review 94, pp 329 -  343
Smith, S. (2004) “Persistency of pension contributions: Evidence from the British 
Household Panel Survey”, Journal of  Pension Economics and Finance, 5 
(1), pp. 357-274
Stock, J.H. and Wise, D.A. (1990) “Pensions, the option value of work, and 
retirement”, Econometrica, 58(5), pp. 1151-1180.
Tanner, S. (1998) “The dynamics of male retirement behaviour”, Fiscal Studies, 
19(2), pp. 175-196.
Whitehouse, E. (1990) “The abolition of the pension ‘earnings rule”’, Fiscal 
Studies,  11, pp. 55-70.
Wolpin, K. and Gonul, R. (1985) “On the use of expectations data in micro­
surveys: the case of retirement”, mimeo, Ohio State University.
227Zabalza, A., Pissarides, C. and Barton, M. (1980) “Social security and the choice 
between full-time work, part-time work, and retirement”, Journal of 
Public Economics, 14, pp. 245-276
228